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Introduction	
A. SELF-OPPRESSION:	A	REAL	FORM	OF	HUMAN	AGENCY	When	we	think	of	oppression,	we	tend	to	think	of	a	person	being	oppressed	by	someone	or	something	else:	a	domineering	husband	oppresses	his	wife	or	chil-dren;	the	structure	of	the	labour	market	oppresses	the	already	disadvantaged…	Examples	abound.	But	is	it	possible	to	oppress	oneself?	This	thesis	is	driven	by	the	intuition	that,	although	paradoxical,	self-op-pression	is	a	real	form	of	human	agency.	In	the	cases	that	I	have	in	mind,	an	agent	exhibits	certain	characteristics	commonly	associated	with	oppression:	a	pres-sured,	controlled	quality	to	agency	that	compromises	agency	by	compromising	choice.	The	agent	feels	as	if	she	has	to	act	the	way	she	does,	such	that	the	action	does	not	fully	seem	to	be	her	choice.	Yet,	curiously,	there	is	no	identifiable	third	party	 to	whom	the	oppression	can	be	attributed.	Rather,	 this	seems	to	be	 the	agent	herself:	she	appears,	therefore,	to	be	both	the	oppressor	and	the	oppressed.	Though	self-oppression	is	a	paradoxical	form	of	agency,	examples	of	the	phenomenon	seem	fairly	common.	Consider,	for	example,	the	following	passage,	in	which	a	woman	called	Beth	explains	how,	worried	about	global	waste	and	overconsumption,	she	tries	to	minimise	her	ecological	footprint	on	the	world:		A	plan	presents	itself.	I	will	cook	my	cabbage	in	the	early	hours	of	each	morning,	when	the	electricity	is	charged	at	‘night’	rate:	I	already	rise	at	five	to	boil	a	series	of	kettles,	the	hot	water	to	be	kept	in	a	succession	of	flasks	for	hourly	doling	out	of	 coffee,	 saving	precious	pence	 (and	power)	with	every	 tepid	cup.	 […]	 I	war	my	cabbage	cold	 in	 the	evenings,	 from	 then	on,	which	 fills	me	with	a	kind	of	sanctimonious	despair.	
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	I	cannot	solve	the	global	issues	of	over-consumption,	waste,	and	inequality	–	but	I	can,	at	least	as	far	as	my	responsibility	goes,	not	take	more	than	I	need.	I	will	have	no	part	in	this	wasteful	system;	I	do	not	buy	into	its	rules.	I	will	take	no	apples,	and	they	will	have	no	place	in	me.	My	energy	bills	will	be	minimal;	I	put	no	extra	demand	on	the	system.	I	will	not	want.	(Beth,	2017:	25)			Another	example	can	be	found	in	Shani	Raviv’s	autobiography,	in	which	she	re-lates	her	experience	of	her	eating	disorder:	
In	 time	 I	 formulated	a	more	precise	 list	of	 “can”	and	“can’t”	 in	my	head	 that	dictated	what	I	was	allowed	or	forbidden	to	consume.	The	point	is	not	what	was	listed	but	to	what	extent	this	list	dictated	my	life.	It	became	my	way	of	life.	My	manual.	My	blueprint.	But	more	than	that,	it	gave	me	false	reassurance	that	my	
life	was	under	control.	I	was	managing	everything	because	I	had	this	list	in	front	of	me	telling	me	what	–	and	what	not	–	to	do.	(Raviv,	2010:	55)			As	a	final	example,	consider	the	following	statement	written	by	self-con-fessed	‘super	mom’	Jaimi	Erickson,	on	a	blog	for	full-time	mothers:	
When	good	things	become	rules	and	comparison	drags	our	self-esteem	into	the	gutter,	Super-Mom	Syndrome	isn’t	working.	At	the	heart	of	all	my	efforts	was	a	fear	of	failure	with	the	most	important	thing	I	have	ever	been	entrusted	with.		How	much	is	enough?	And	if	it	all	depends	on	us,	anything	that	goes	wrong	is	on	us.	So	we	fix	and	cajole.	We	control	and	contrive.	We	stress	and	we	push.	With	all	we’ve	got,	we	try	to	make	life	perfect.		And	it	is	never	enough.	(Erickson,	2010)			In	all	of	these	passages,	it	is	apparent	that	the	agent	feels	very	pressured:	Beth	
has	to	reduce	her	negative	impact	on	the	world,	Shani	has	to	follow	her	list	of	
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rules,	and	Jaimi	has	to	keep	pushing	for	perfection.	I	hypothesise	that	this	pres-sure	is	an	oppressive	one,	meaning	it	compromises	these	agents’	choices:	they	don’t	fully	seem	to	choose	to	act	as	they	do.	Yet,	all	these	agents	remain	agents:	they	are	the	ones	in	control	of	their	actions,	and	no	one	else	is	directly	forcing	them	to	act	in	this	way.	They	are	the	ones,	at	least	in	an	immediate	sense,	who	are	exerting	the	oppressive	pressure	(though,	in	some	or	all	cases,	we	may	want	to	trace	the	oppression	back	to	others	–	a	point	to	which	I	will	return).	I	submit,	therefore,	that	these	agents	display	symptoms	of	self-oppression.	It	must	immediately	be	noted,	though,	that	my	intention	is	not	to	rein-force	stereotypes:	I	do	not	suggest	that	all	perfectionist	mothers	or	conscientious	eaters	are	self-oppressive	by	default.	I	cannot	sufficiently	stress	that	self-oppres-sion,	as	I	see	it,	is	a	style	of	agency,	and	as	such	independent	of	what	the	agent	in	question	is	doing	or	pursuing.	Beth,	Shani,	and	Jaimi	seem	self-oppressive	be-cause	they	behave	in	a	certain	manner,	not	because	of	what	they	do.	In	this	thesis,	as	will	become	clear,	I	will	avoid	approaching	the	question	of	self-oppression	by	referring	to	the	content	of	action.		
B. PRELIMINARY	CHARACTERISATION	My	hypothesis	is	thus	that	self-oppression	is	a	real,	and	distinct,	form	of	human	agency.	The	headline	aim	of	this	thesis	is	to	offer	a	conceptualisation	of	self-op-pression,	which	demonstrates	that	it	is	a	form	of	agency	which	is	both	possible	and	distinct	from	other	forms	of	agency.	Thus	far,	I	have	characterised	self-op-pression	as	having	two	defining	features.	First	of	all,	it	involves	self-control:	the	agent	is	in	charge	of	her	own	actions.	This	means	essentially	two	things:	(1)	it	means	that	someone	is	in	control.	Self-oppressive	actions	exhibit	a	particularly	
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controlled	 style	of	 agency.	On	 this	basis,	 self-oppression	differs	 from	cases	 in	which	control	is	lost:	think	of	someone	caving	into	the	urge	to	eat	a	second	slice	of	cake,	or	the	wanton	agent	who	just	goes	along	with	whatever	opportunity	that	arises.	Such	 instances	of	agency	–	 if	we	want	to	consider	them	agency	at	all	–	have	a	very	different	style	than	instances	of	self-oppression:	they	are	impulsive,	whilst	self-oppressed	actions	are	minutely	regulated	and	directed.	(2)	But,	cru-cially,	self-oppression	features	self-control:	it	is	the	agent	herself	who	is	in	con-trol.	Her	actions	are	not,	in	any	immediate	sense,	directed	by	someone	or	some-thing	else:	she	retains	control	over	her	actions.	It	is	not	so	that	a	third	party	is	forcing	the	agent	to	act,	as	is	the	case	when,	for	example,	I	would	hand	my	money	over	at	an	armed	robbery;	and	neither	is	she	manipulated,	brainwashed,	or	any-thing	of	the	sort.	On	this	basis,	self-oppression	must	be	distinguished	from	third-party	oppression	and	other	forms	of	third-party	interference	such	as	undue	in-fluence.	A	second	characteristic	of	self-oppression	is	that	it	features	compromised	choice.	The	exerted	self-control	involves	such	a	pressure	that	it	seems	to	com-promise	the	agent’s	choices:	hence	the	analogy	with	oppression.	This	is	not	to	say,	of	course,	that	all	forms	of	oppression	involve	obvious	pressure,	or	that	op-pression	necessarily	compromises	choice.1	But	I	do	take	these	to	be	common	and	significant	effects	of	oppression,	and	key	aspects	of	the	phenomenon	I	call	self-
																																								 																					1	Surely,	there	may	be	forms	of	oppression	which	do	not	compromise	choice:	it	may,	for	example,	have	a	merely	affective	or	psychological	effect.	Some	people,	who	we	may	want	to	call	oppressed,	may	feel	unworthy	or	unrecognised,	without	this	necessarily	affecting	their	actions	and	so	without	necessarily	compromising	their	choices.		
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oppression.	In	this	thesis,	I	am	invoking	the	notion	of	oppression	to	refer	to	sit-uations	in	which	an	agent’s	choices	are	compromised,	and	it	is	in	analogy	with	such	situations	that	I	describe	self-oppression	as	such.	It	is	also	clear	that	not	all	kinds	of	pressure	compromise	choice:	indeed,	we	often	make	our	choices	under	pressure,	whether	self-induced	or	not.	Some-one	playing	speed	chess	is	under	pressure	to	choose	her	next	move	quickly;	a	fire	fighter	on	the	job	makes	pressured	high-stakes	decisions.	For	this	reason,	not	all	cases	which	look	like	instances	of	self-oppression	necessarily	are.	We	of-ten	act	under	self-imposed	pressure,	but	this	does	not	always	mean	this	pressure	is	compromising	our	choices.	Someone	who	is	very	dedicated	to	a	challenging	project	may	exert	a	considerable	pressure	over	herself,	which	is	nonetheless	not	oppressive.	 There	 is	 thus	 something	 peculiar	 about	 the	kind	of	 pressure	 that	seems	to	characterise	self-oppression,	such	that	it	compromises	choice.	Of	course,	what	it	means	exactly	to	choose	is	also	a	contested	issue:	the	term	is	used	in	many	ways	and	contexts,	not	all	of	them	compatible.	I	use	it	here	in	order	to	capture	a	specific	aspect	of	agency	which	is	hampered	whenever	an	agent	 acts	 under	 a	 certain	 kind	 of	 pressure,	which	 I	 call	oppressive	pressure.	Pressure	 is	 oppressive,	 on	my	view,	 if	 the	 agent	 feels	 that	 she	has	 to	do	–	or	
mustn’t	do	–	certain	 things,	 in	 such	a	way	 that	 it	doesn’t	 seem	to	be	 fully	her	choice.	My	hypothesis,	then,	is	that	the	self-control	exercised	by	the	self-oppres-sive	agent	involves	an	oppressive	pressure,	which	compromises	her	choices.	Of	course,	conceptualising	self-oppression	adequately	will	require	spelling	out	how	exactly	the	notion	of	choice	is	used	here.	In	 self-oppression,	 choice	 is	 thus	 compromised	 in	 this	primary	 sense:	when	the	agent	acts	one	way	or	another	under	such	a	pressure,	she	is	not	fully	
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choosing	 to.	 In	 addition,	 as	 we	 will	 see,	 self-oppression	 often	 compromises	choice	in	a	secondary	sense	as	well.	This	because	it	tends	to	have	further	conse-quences	on	one’s	ability	to	exercise	agency	in	other	matters.	Insofar	as	an	agent	is	pressured	into	doing,	or	refraining	from	doing,	certain	things,	she	is	also	pre-vented	from	doing	any	other	things:	Beth,	sleep-deprived	from	her	nightly	activ-ities	to	save	energy,	may	have	to	give	up	certain	hobbies;	or	Jaimi,	so	preoccupied	with	perfecting	her	role	as	a	mother,	may	 feel	 that	she	 is	 failing	 to	be	a	good	friend	–	both	without	really	choosing	to.	This	is	a	secondary	way	in	which	self-oppression,	when	severe,	tends	to	compromise	choice.	This,	however,	is	just	a	common,	and	not	an	essential	feature	of	self-oppression.	In	sum,	my	starting	hypothesis	is	that			
self-oppression	is	a	real	form	of	agency,	which	features	a	form	of	self-
control	which	compromises	choice.		
C. THE	PARADOX	OF	SELF-OPPRESSION	
My	hypothesis	is	thus	that	self-oppression	is	a	real	form	of	agency.	As	I	have	de-scribed	it	thus	far,	however,	it	seems	to	be	an	impossible	form	of	agency,	and	this	for	two	reasons.	First	of	all,	the	concept	of	self-oppression	is	inherently	paradox-
ical.	If	the	agent	is	both	the	oppressor	and	the	oppressed,	a	philosophical	riddle	emerges:	who	is	here	oppressing	whom?	It	seems	that	the	self,	in	the	term	self-oppression,	has	a	dual	function:	it	exists	both	in	the	nominative	(as	the	part	that	oppresses)	and	in	the	accusative	(as	the	part	that	is	oppressed).	Untangling	these	two	modes	of	the	self	will	be	crucial	for	developing	an	account	of	self-oppression.	Secondly,	it	is	unclear	how	an	agent	could	compromise	her	own	choices.	
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To	answer	this	question,	I	must	specify	how	I	understand	choice	in	the	context	of	self-oppression.	My	assumption	so	far	is	that	self-oppression	features	an	op-pressive,	choice-undermining	pressure,	but	this	needs	to	be	explained	further.	How	exactly	can	a	pressure	compromise	choice?	In	cases	of	third-party	oppres-sion,	we	can	often	approach	this	question	by	asking	whether	the	exerted	pres-sure	overrides	the	agent’s	will,	thus	in	a	sense	overriding	her	agency.	For	exam-ple,	if	an	oppressive	husband	forbids	his	wife	to	leave	the	house	by	herself,	her	staying	indoors	does	not	seem	to	be	fully	her	choice.	The	reason	for	this	is	that	her	actions	are	not	really	her	own,	but	are	rather	controlled	by	another.	But	if	it	is	the	agent	herself	who	exerts	the	pressure,	this	kind	of	explanation	isn’t	avail-able:	it	is	the	exercise	of	her	own	agency	which	is	oppressive,	so	its	effect	cannot	be	that	agency	is	overridden.	If	I	am	the	one	who	is	in	control	of	my	actions,	this	seems	to	imply	that	my	actions	will	be	the	result	of	my	choices	(and	vice	versa).	Choice	seems	compromised	if	and	only	if	the	agent	loses	control	over	her	actions,	either	due	to	impersonal	forces	or	due	to	other	agents.	In	self-oppression,	how-ever,	actions	are	under	the	direct	control	of	the	agent.	On	what	grounds,	then,	could	her	choices	be	compromised?		This	second	 issue	 is,	 in	 fact,	closely	 intertwined	with	the	 first.	For	 the	question	of	who	oppresses	whom	corresponds	to	the	question	of	how	one	can	ex-ercise	control	over	oneself	on	the	one	hand,	yet	have	one’s	choice	compromised	on	the	other.	So,	in	self-oppression,	who	exercises	self-control,	and	whose	choice	is	compromised?		
D. THESIS	AIM	AND	SCOPE		As	I	described	it	so	far,	self-oppression	appears	to	be	impossible.	The	headline	
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aim	of	this	thesis	is	to	explain	the	apparent	possibility	of	self-oppression	by	of-fering	a	conceptualisation	of	it	which	is	both	plausible	and	philosophically	satis-factory.	This	conceptualisation	should	establish	that	self-oppression	is	a	logically	possible	form	of	agency,	which	warrants	its	own	category.	My	strategy	will	be	to	carve	out	a	space	for	self-oppression	within	a	tax-onomy	 of	 different	 forms	 of	 agency.	 Self-oppression	 is	 one	 of	many	ways	 in	which	one	can	act,	and	 it	exists	alongside	other	regulatory	styles,	 such	as,	 for	example,	the	one	which	I	display	when	surrendering	to	the	urge	to	eat	a	second	slice	of	cake.	To	demonstrate	that	self-oppression	warrants	its	own	place	within	this	taxonomy,	I	will	spell	out	its	differentiae:	I	will	describe	which	features	seem	distinctive	about	 it,	 and	 set	 it	 apart	 from	other	 regulatory	 styles.	This	 should	demonstrate	that	self-oppression	is	indeed	a	distinct	form	of	agency.	In	my	pre-liminary	characterisation,	I	already	spelled	out	two	differentiae	for	self-oppres-sion:	 self-control	 and	 compromised	 choice.	 These	 differentiae,	 however,	 will	need	to	be	spelled	out	both	more	extensively	and	more	systematically.	If	this	conceptualisation	is	to	establish	that	self-oppression	is	not	only	a	distinct,	but	also	a	possible	form	of	agency,	it	must	address	the	two	issues	raised	in	the	previous	section:	who,	in	self-oppression,	oppresses	whom?	And	how	can	an	agent	compromise	her	own	choices?	My	strategy	to	address	the	first	problem	will	be	to	seek	the	right	kind	of	mereology	of	the	agent,	which	allows	for	this	kind	of	internal	constellation.	In	order	to	address	the	second	issue,	I	will	have	to	ex-plain	 how	 choice	 can	 be	 compromised	 without	 agency	 being	 overridden:	we	must	find	out	how	an	agent	may	be	able	to	make	choices,	which	are	nevertheless	compromised.	Together,	this	calls	for	a	mereology	of	the	agent	in	which	one	part	of	the	self	can	function	as	the	controlling	part,	and	in	which	another	part	is	the	
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faculty	of	choice.	My	aim	is	thus	to	formulate	an	account	of	self-oppression	which	features	a	mereology	of	 this	kind,	and	which	can	be	differentiated	 from	other	forms	of	agency.	This	 conceptualisation	of	 self-oppression,	however,	will	not	provide	a	set	of	necessary	and	sufficient	conditions	for	self-oppression.	Nor	will	it	deter-mine	the	boundaries	of	the	phenomenon.	My	aim	is	more	modest:	first	and	fore-most,	I	want	to	establish	that	self-oppression	is	indeed	a	logical	possibility,	de-spite	the	paradox	that	might	suggest	that	it	is	impossible.	Further,	although	es-tablishing	rigid	boundaries	is	not	my	aim	here,	I	will	undertake	to	exhibit	how	core	cases	of	self-oppression	differ	from	other	forms	of	agency.	My	aim	is	thus	to	establish	that	(1)	although	self-oppression	is	intrinsically	paradoxical,	it	is	none-theless	both	possible	and	actual,	and	(2)	that	it	is	a	distinct	phenomenon,	signif-icantly	different	from	other	forms	of	agency,	which	therefore	warrants	its	own	conceptualisation.	My	method	for	achieving	these	aims	will	be	to	offer	a	concep-tualisation	 of	 self-oppression,	 exhibiting	 the	 psychological	 structure	 of	 some	core	cases,	and	showing	how	it	differs	from	other	configurations	of	agency.		
E. OTHER	CATEGORIES	OF	AGENCY	
It	may	not	be	clear,	however,	that	self-oppression	really	warrants	its	own	cate-gory.	There	may	be	existing	categories	of	agency	which	manage	to	explain	the	examples	of	paradoxical	agency	which	I	have	in	mind.	In	this	section,	I	will	con-sider	some	of	these	categories,	and	explain	why	they	do	not	manage	to	fully	ex-plain	the	cases	at	hand.		
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E.1 The	Notion	of	Compulsion	A	first	notion	which	comes	to	mind	when	trying	to	explain	cases	of	self-oppres-sion	is,	perhaps,	the	notion	of	compulsion,	which	seems	very	related.	In	compul-sion,	on	a	common	understanding	of	the	term,	we	also	have	a	form	of	agency	in	which	choice	seems	compromised	due	to	an	oppressive	form	of	regulation,	exer-cised	by	the	agent	herself.	Self-oppression,	however,	is	distinct	from	canonical	forms	of	compulsion	in	at	least	one	crucial	sense.	Compulsions,	at	least	in	their	canonical	form,	are	egodystonic	–	meaning	that	those	who	suffer	from	them	do	not	identify	with	or	endorse	their	compulsive	actions.	On	common	understand-ings	of	Obsessive-Compulsive	Disorder	–	the	most	common	clinical	example	of	compulsive	behaviour	–	 the	 condition	 is	 experienced	as	unwelcome	and	 irra-tional	by	the	sufferer.	In	the	Diagnostic	and	Statistical	Manual	of	Mental	Disorders	[DSM-V],	for	example,	the	first	criterion	for	OCD	is	the	presence	of	‘[r]ecurrent	and	persistent	thoughts,	urges,	or	impulses	that	are	experienced,	at	some	time	during	 the	 disturbance,	 as	 intrusive	 and	 unwanted’	 (DSM-V,	 section	 II).2	 The	compulsive	agent	thus	experiences	her	own	behaviour	as	alien.	The	cases	of	self-oppression	that	interest	me	in	this	thesis,	however,	are	not	straightforwardly	ego-dystonic	–	the	self-oppressive	agent’s	relation	to	her	behaviour	seems	more	complex	than	one	of	simple	dissociation.	Though	she	may	not	be	exactly	pleased	with	her	self-oppressive	behaviour,	it	is,	somehow,	woven	into	her	self-understanding,	identity,	or	set	of	values.	Beth,	for	example,	wants	to	save	the	planet,	thinking	it	a	morally	valuable	aspiration;	Shani	is	attached	to	the	sense	of	self-worth	she	associates	with	weight	loss;	and	Jaimi	deeply	identifies	
																																								 																					2	See	also	Rachman	and	Hodgson	(1980:	12-21).	
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with	the	role	of	a	mother.	This	is	quite	different	from	common	experiences	of	compulsion,	in	which	the	agent	feels	intruded	by	urges	that	feel	alien	to	her.	Of	course,	the	canonical	compulsive	person	is	also	invested	in	her	behaviour	–	but	in	a	different	sense:	the	compulsive	person	is	attached	to	her	compulsions	be-cause	they	help	her	cope,	for	example,	but	the	actions	themselves	are	usually	no	integral	part	of	her	identity.	In	the	cases	of	self-oppression	which	interest	me,	in	contrast,	behaviours	are	much	more	closely	interwoven	with	the	agent’s	sense	of	self.	 It	is	on	this	basis,	I	submit,	that	self-oppression	often	features	a	form	of	self-control,	albeit	a	complicated	one,	whereas	compulsions,	typically,	do	not.	As	Alfred	Mele	(2001)	points	out,	one	could	argue	that	compulsive	behaviours	do	not	feature	self-control	because	of	the	agent’s	dissociation:		People	 suffering	 from	obsessive-compulsive	 disorders	 fall	 short	 of	 ideal	 self-control,	on	an	orthodox	conception	of	the	disorders.	Standardly	conceived,	one	of	the	defining	features	is	that	the	person	recognizes	[her]	problem	as	a	problem	and	regards	relevant	distressing	thoughts,	urges,	and	feelings	of	[hers]	as	unrea-sonable.	An	ideally	self-controlled	person	would	lack	such	mental	states,	or	at	least	swiftly	eradicate	them	should	they	arise.	(Mele,	2001:	127fn)		We	thus	cannot	fully	explain	the	apparent	possibility	of	self-oppression	within	existing	accounts	of	compulsion.	Though	compulsion	is	certainly	akin	to	self-op-pression,	the	latter	still	seems	to	deserve	its	own	category;	and	we	can	distin-guish	both	forms	of	agency	on	the	basis	that,	characteristically,	only	the	former	features	a	form	of	self-control.		But	I	have	merely	distinguished	core	cases	of	self-oppression	from	core	cases	of	compulsion	on	a	common	understanding	of	the	latter.	But,	of	course,	not	
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all	approaches	to	compulsion	conceptualise	it	in	this	way.	One	exception	to	this	common	characterisation	of	compulsion	is	found	in	David	Shapiro	(1981).	In	his	book	Autonomy	and	Rigid	Character,	he	examines	what	he	calls	‘rigid	character’,	a	certain	type	of	behaviour	of	which	obsessive-compulsive	behaviour	is	a	primal	example.	Crucially,	on	Shapiro’s	picture,	rigid	behaviour	does	involve	an	identi-fication	of	the	agent	with	her	rigid	self-regulation:	‘Even	if	it	is	true’,	he	writes,	‘that	the	rigid	person	lives	under	the	authority	of	[her	self-imposed	regime],	it	is	also	true	that	[s]he	[her]self	imposes	that	authority,	that	[s]he	respects	it,	iden-tifies	its	aims	and	purposes	as	[her]	own’	(Shapiro,	1981:	73-74).	Thus,	 on	 Shapiro’s	 picture,	 rigid	 behaviour	does	 involve	 identification	with	the	compulsive	behaviour,	and	thus	a	form	of	self-control.	Is	he,	therefore,	offering	an	explanation	of	self-oppression?	Not	quite.	For,	on	Shapiro’s	descrip-tion,	this	identification	is	something	the	agent	herself	is	unaware	of.	Though	she	is,	for	Shapiro,	actually	exerting	self-control,	she	will	feel	as	if	she	isn’t	because	she	does	not	realise	that	her	compulsions	reflect	her	truest	desires.	Shapiro	as-serts	that	‘the	rigid	person	experiences	weakness	of	self-control	when	the	direc-tives	of	[her]	will,	which	[s]he	identifies	as	[her]	wish,	are	contrary	to	[her]	ac-
tual	but	unrecognized	wish	and	intention’	(Shapiro,	1981:	71).	The	agent,	in	other	words,	fails	to	recognise	that	she	does	actually	want	to	do	the	compulsive	things	which,	on	a	conscious	level,	she	dissociates	from.	As	such,	the	dissociation	expe-rienced	by	the	compulsive	agent,	according	to	Shapiro,	is	false	at	a	deeper	level:	though	she	experiences	a	weakness	of	self-control,	he	contends,	this	agent	is	ef-fectively	exercising	self-control.	Yet	Shapiro’s	account	of	rigid	character	cannot	fully	explain	the	possibil-ity	of	self-oppression	either.	First	of	all,	I	have	my	reservations	about	Shapiro’s	
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set	of	assumptions	in	this	context.	If	at	all	possible,	I	will	avoid	speculation	about	actual	but	unrecognized	wishes	and	intentions,	and	take	the	identifications	and	dissociations	 of	 an	 agent	 at	 face	 value.	 My	 reservations	 about	 Shapiro’s	 ap-proach,	however,	are	not	the	main	 issue	here.	Most	 important	 is	 the	fact	 that,	since	the	self-control	featured	in	rigid	character	is	‘unrecognised’,	Shapiro’s	com-pulsive	agent	does	experience	dissociation	on	Shapiro’s	characterisation.	Shapiro	thinks	this	dissociation	is	only	superficial,	and	dissolves	once	we	venture	into	the	subconscious	depths	of	the	agent’s	psychology	–	but	this	does	not	take	away	from	the	fact	that	compulsion	features	an	experience	of	dissociation	on	his	ac-count.	The	phenomenon	Shapiro	is	trying	to	explain	is,	therefore,	still	compulsion	on	the	common	understanding,	and	after	all	distinct	from	the	kind	of	cases	I	de-scribed	as	self-oppression.	Even	if	we	would	concede	that	compulsive	behaviour	may	involve	an	unrecognised	form	of	self-control,	the	cases	of	self-oppression	I	want	to	explain	do	not	feature	the	kind	of	experienced	dissociation	that	compul-sion	 does.	 On	 this	 basis,	 we	 cannot	 explain	 them	 away	 as	 instances	 of	 what	Shapiro	calls	rigid	character.		
E.2 Internalised	Oppression	Another	possibility	to	consider	is	that	cases	of	self-oppression	may	in	fact	be	in-stances	of	internalised	oppression.	When	faced	with	examples	of	self-oppression,	one	may	think	the	oppression	can	be	traced	back	to	other	people,	or	to	imper-sonal	social	 forces:	 there	may	be	systematic	social	pressures	at	work	that	are	ultimately	the	source	of	the	self-oppression.	I	agree	that	this	may	be	so	in	some,	or	even	all,	cases	of	self-oppression.	Notwithstanding,	I	want	to	resist	explaining	
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away	all	 cases	of	 self-oppression	 in	 reference	 to	 larger	oppressive	structures,	and	this	 for	two	reasons.	(1)	First,	 I	want	to	take	seriously	the	possibility	that	there	may	be	instances	of	self-oppression	which	cannot	be	traced	back	to	such	external	forces.	(2)	Second,	even	when	self-oppression	would	operate	as	a	mi-cro-mechanism	of	social-oppression,	it	is	still	a	paradoxical	form	of	agency	which	deserves	being	analysed	 in	 its	own	right.	Explaining	the	possibility	of	self-op-pression	would	mean	explaining	in	what	sense	we	can	recognise	the	agency	at	work	in	internalised	oppression,	however	paradoxical	it	seems	to	be.	If	we	do	not	want	to	assume	that,	in	internalised	oppression,	the	agent	is	but	a	vessel	for	social	oppression,	we	must	take	seriously	the	question	how	an	agent	can	oppress	
herself.	Internalised	oppression	is	a	category	specifically	designed	to	capture	the	wider	social	structures	at	play	when	an	agent	perpetuates	her	own	oppression.	An	account	of	self-oppression	could	supplement	such	accounts	by	focusing	more	on	the	part	played	by	the	agent	herself	in	such	cases,	and	less	on	the	wider	op-pressive	forces	which	are	causing	her	to	do	so.		For	these	reasons,	 in	this	thesis,	I	will	mostly	bracket	the	larger	social	structures	which	may	or	may	not	be	at	play	in	the	genesis	of	self-oppression.	My	aim	is	to	first	of	all	understand	its	internal,	psychological	structures,	regardless	of	its	exact	aetiology.	Hopefully,	the	model	of	self-oppression	constructed	in	this	thesis	might	be	useful,	in	further	work,	to	consider	self-oppression	as	an	element	of	 social	oppression:	 for	 it	 seems	definitely	 the	case	 that	oppression	often	in-volves,	as	a	micro-mechanism,	something	like	self-oppression.	But	that	is	not	my	aim	in	this	thesis.		
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E.3 Plato’s	Tyrannical	Soul	Lastly,	turning	to	the	history	of	philosophy,	there	appear	to	be	traces	of	the	con-cept	of	self-oppression	as	far	back	as	the	4th	century	BC.	In	The	Republic	[R],	Plato	–	through	the	voice	of	Socrates	–	describes	what	he	calls	‘the	individual	of	tyran-nical	character’,	whose	soul	is	like	a	city	under	tyranny	(R	571a).	In	this	individ-ual,	a	certain	type	of	desire	reigns	freely:	a	desire	which	‘is	a	terribly	bestial	and	immoral	type	of	desire’	(R	572b).	This	desire	is	termed	‘a	master	passion’,	and	is	said	to	have	‘absolute	control	of	a	man’s	mind’	(R	573d).	We	thus	have	a	style	of	self-regulation	 in	which	 an	 agent’s	 own	desire	 exerts	 tyrannical	 control.	 This	control,	 indeed,	 appears	 to	 be	 of	 an	 oppressive	 kind:	 Plato	 does	not	mention	choice,	but	he	takes	freedom	to	be	compromised	in	this	type	of	agent:	‘[Her]	mind	will	be	burdened	with	servile	restrictions,	because	the	best	elements	in	[her]	will	be	enslaved	and	completely	controlled	by	a	minority	of	the	lowest	and	most	lu-natic	impulses’	(R	577d).	Agency	is	compromised	as	a	result:	‘the	mind	in	which	there	is	a	tyranny	will	also	be	least	able	to	do	what,	as	a	whole,	it	wishes,	because	it	is	under	the	compulsive	drive	of	madness’	(R	577e).	Thus,	a	part	of	the	agent’s	own	soul	tyrannises	her	such	that	her	freedom	suffers	from	it.	Plato’s	tyrannical	soul,	writes	Christine	Korsgaard,	‘is	consistently	ruled	and	unified,	though	it	is	not	 self-governed.	 The	 tyrannical	 soul	 is	 a	 slave,	 a	 terrified	 and	 captive	 soul’	(Korsgaard,	2009:	171).	Korsgaard,	indeed,	concludes	from	Plato’s	description	that	‘the	tyrannical	person	does	not	really	choose	actions	[…].	There’s	one	end	[…]	or	act	that	[s]he’s	going	to	pursue	or	to	do	no	matter	what,	and	it	rules	[her]’	(Korsgaard,	2009:	173).	Was	Socrates	–	or	Plato	–	here	describing	something	 like	 self-oppres-sion?	The	tyrannical	soul	displays	a	controlled	quality	to	agency,	which	 is	not	
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directly	implemented	by	anyone	or	anything	else,	and	yet	this	control	seems	to	compromise	her	freedom	of	choice.	She	is	thus	controlled	by	a	certain	purpose	or	end	such	that	her	choices	are	compromised.	Yet	on	Plato’s	description,	 the	tyrannical	 soul	 seems	 qualitatively	 different	 from	 the	 self-oppressive	 agent.	There	 is	a	 ‘suppressed’	quality	to	agency,	and	arguably	this	pressure	compro-mises	choice:	she	is	subdued	by	her	own	tyrannical	desire.	But	does	the	behav-iour	of	the	tyrannical	soul	really	feature	self-control?	It	seems	that,	in	the	tyran-nical	soul,	certain	desires	go	unchecked,	and	are	precisely	not	controlled	by	the	agent.	 For	 this	 reason,	 her	 regulatory	 style	 is	 impulsive	 rather	 than	 self-con-trolled.	In	this	context,	it	is	worth	mentioning	how	there	is,	according	to	Plato	(or	Socrates)	‘also	a	touch	of	the	tyrant	about	a	man	who’s	drunk’	(R	573b).	The	behaviour	of	the	tyrannical	soul,	in	this	sense,	does	not	seem	controlled	at	all,	and	more	akin	to	forms	of	agency	in	which	the	agent	caves	in	to	certain	impulses.	Further,	even	if	we	want	to	say	that	her	behaviour	is	controlled,	it	would	still	not	amount	to	self-control.	For,	according	to	Plato,	the	tyrannical	soul	is	unfree	inso-far	as	she	cannot	do	what	she	wishes	to	do	most.	This	indicates	a	level	of	disso-ciation	from	her	own	behaviour,	which	means	the	tyrannical	soul	would	be	more	like	the	compulsive	agent.	In	other	words,	even	if	we	do	not	consider	the	tyran-nical	soul	to	be	impulsive,	we	still	have	to	consider	her	to	be	compulsive.	Of	course,	like	much	of	Plato’s	work,	this	passage	has	been	interpreted	in	varying	ways.	One	point	of	disagreement	is	what	exactly	the	tyrannical	soul	is	controlled	by.	Whether	or	not	it	seems	similar	to	self-oppression	will,	of	course,	depend	on	the	answer	to	this	question.	In	this	context,	Mark	Johnstone	(2015)	lists	no	less	than	three	common	interpretations	of	this	passage,	which	he	rejects	before	proposing	his	own:	he	mentions	‘the	view	that	the	tyrannical	[person]’s	
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soul	is	ruled	by	[her]	“lawless”	unnecessary	appetites,	the	view	that	it	is	ruled	by	sexual	desire,	and	the	view	that	it	is	ruled	by	a	lust	for	power’	(Johnstone,	2015:	424).	On	Johnstone’s	own	view,	the	desire	reigning	freely	in	the	tyrannical	soul	is	rather	a	bodily	one:	‘the	tyrannical	[person]’s	soul	is	to	be	understood	as	ruled	by	a	single,	persistent,	powerful	desire	for	bodily	pleasure:	as	much	as	[s]he	can	get,	and	however	[s]he	can	get	it’	(Johnstone,	2015:	424).	But	on	all	four	inter-pretations	mentioned,	it	remains	clear	that	what	Plato	had	in	mind	seems	quite	different	from	our	cases	of	self-oppression:	the	tyrannical	soul	is	obsessed	by	a	certain	 impulsive	desire.	And	even	if	her	actions	are	meticulously	organised	 in	order	to	get	what	she	wants,	such	that	her	behaviour	cannot	be	called	impulsive,	it	would	still	not	be	self-controlled	since	the	agent	does	not	identify	with	her	ty-rannical	desire.		
F. THESIS	STRATEGY	
I	thus	maintain	a	distinction	between	self-oppression,	as	I	have	sketched	it,	and	compulsive	behaviour,	 internalised	oppression,	and	 impulsive	behaviour.	But,	naturally,	it	is	not	so	that	the	phenomenon	of	self-oppression	as	I	have	sketched	
it	has	gone	entirely	unnoticed.	One	author	who	makes	reference	to	this	phenom-enon,	for	example,	is	Alfred	Mele	(2001).	A	main	objective	of	his	book,	Autono-
mous	Agents,	is	to	differentiate	between	self-control	on	the	one	hand,	and	auton-omy	on	 the	 other.	 At	 the	 end	 of	 the	 first	 chapter,	 he	 raises	 the	 possibility	 of	a	style	of	self-control	which	compromises	autonomy.	‘If	this	view	of	the	situation	is	right,’	he	writes,	‘autonomy	is	not	just	self-rule	or	self-government;	for	certain	
kinds	of	self-rule	or	self-government,	on	this	view,	are	self-limiting,	self-oppress-ing,	and	self-victimizing	in	a	way	that	is	at	odds	with	a	robust	autonomy’	(Mele,	
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2001:	126).	This,	though	differently	formulated,	seems	very	close	to	our	descrip-tion	of	self-oppression	as	featuring	self-control	yet	compromised	choice.	As	an	example	of	what	he	has	in	mind,	Mele	describes	an	agent	called	Zed,	who	is	a	high-achieving	philosophy	academic.	Zed,	on	Mele’s	description,	‘never	finds	enjoyment	in	his	philosophical	work	itself;	indeed,	he	frequently	ex-periences	his	routine	as	oppressive’	(Mele,	2001:	124).	 Importantly,	however,	Zed	consciously	identifies	with	his	self-imposed	regime:	
Zed	values	his	having	these	values,	believing	that	his	life	would	be	empty	with-out	them.	[…]	It	is	Zed	himself	who	values	these	things,	not	something	alien	to	Zed.	[…]	These	values	are	“his	own,”	at	last	in	the	sense	that	they	are	his;	indeed,	not	only	does	he	possess	the	values,	but	he	identifies	with	them,	as	well.	(Mele,	2001:	124-125)		As	such,	when	he	acts	in	accordance	with	these	values,	this	counts	as	an	exercise	of	self-control.	Yet,	Mele	writes,	it	may	appear	that	Zed	somehow	is	not	fully	au-tonomous.	The	form	of	agency	described	by	Mele	seems	definitely	akin	to	self-op-pression:	if	Zed	is	lacking	in	autonomy	because	he	experiences	his	own	self-con-trol	as	oppressive,	it	also	seems	to	be	the	case	that	his	choices	are	compromised.	Granted,	the	notions	of	autonomy	and	choice	are	not	synonymous	on	every	in-terpretation	of	them;	but	in	this	context	I	take	them	to	be	very	closely	related.	If	the	notions,	on	my	interpretation	of	them,	do	not	exactly	overlap,	they	are	at	least	deeply	connected:	it	may	be	that,	wherever	autonomy	is	compromised,	choice	is	also	often	compromised	at	once,	since	the	same	kinds	of	factors	and	situations	
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which	inhibit	an	agent’s	autonomy	will	tend	to	inhibit	her	choices	as	well.3	How,	then,	does	Mele	explain	Zed’s	situation?	Even	though	he	is	not	com-mitted	 to	proving	 that	agents	 like	Zed	effectively	are	 lacking	 in	autonomy,	he	does	construct	a	possible	explanation	as	to	why	this	may	be	so.	He	suggests	that,	perhaps,	there	exists	a	connection	between	autonomy	and	the	prospect	of	flour-
ishing:	‘we	might	hold’,	he	writes,	‘that	to	the	extent	to	which	[Zed’s]	conduct	is	a	product	of	his	self-victimization,	it	is	not	autonomous’	(Mele,	2001:	125).	Au-tonomy	could	thus	be	compromised	in	cases	like	Zed’s,	according	to	Mele,	be-cause	the	agent	has	limited	prospects	of	‘personal	satisfaction,	enjoyment,	and	fulfilment’	(Mele,	2001:	126).	In	other	words,	Mele	suggests	that	self-control	may	compromise	autonomy	insofar	as	it	causes	the	agent	to	suffer	in	a	certain	way.	For,	on	the	explanation	he	suggests,	it	is	only	when	we	can	describe	the	agent	as	
victimised	by	her	own	behaviour	that	autonomy	would	be	compromised.	Mele,	in	fact,	takes	this	suggestion	even	further.	He	finishes	the	section	by	proposing	that	autonomy	might	require	mental	health:	‘If,	as	one	should	think,	being	auton-omous	is	compatible	with	the	possession	of	continuous	mental	health,	the	latter	serves	as	an	appropriate	element	 in	a	sufficient	condition	for	personal	auton-omy’	(Mele,	2001:	126).	Thus,	Mele	here	advances	the	hypothesis	that	human	flourishing	and	autonomy	somehow	come	as	a	pair,	and	draws	a	potential	con-nection	between	autonomy	and	mental	health.	Unfortunately,	Mele	does	not	go	into	further	detail	 in	this	section.	The	
																																								 																					3	Note	that	Mele	does	not	speak	of	choice	in	this	context	at	all.	In	his	book,	he	only	uses	the	term	when	discussing	 free	choice	in	the	context	of	causal	determinism	(see	Mele,	2001:	205	et	seq.).	
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passage	is	just	meant	to	flag	the	possibility	that	the	conditions	for	personal	au-tonomy,	which	he	spells	out	in	the	rest	of	the	book,	might	not	be	strictly	suffi-cient,	and	that	an	additional	condition	of	mental	health	may	be	required.	But	he	does	not	devote	any	further	attention	to	this	possibility	in	the	book.	If	we	are	to	take	Mele’s	cue	here,	and	develop	this	suggestion,	we	would	have	to	conceptual-ise	self-oppression	in	reference	to	a	diminished	prospect	for	flourishing,	or	even	diminished	mental	health.	But	such	a	strategy	seems	problematic.	The	connection	between	auton-omy	(or	choice)	on	the	one	hand,	and	flourishing	and	mental	health	on	the	other,	seems	to	hold	in	theory	nor	in	practice.	First	of	all,	this	connection	seems	theo-retically	flawed.	Mele	makes	an	inference	from	the	assumption	that	autonomy	and	mental	health	are	‘compatible’	to	the	idea	that	mental	health	could	therefore	be	a	sufficient	condition	for	autonomy,	but	this	is	a	non	sequitur:	the	fact	that	X	and	Y	are	compatible	does	not	at	all	entail	that	Y	is	part	of	the	sufficient	condition	for	X.4	 Further,	 this	 connection	 does	 not	 hold	 in	 practice	 either.	 On	 what	grounds	would	it	be	impossible	that	one	would	be	autonomous,	but	miserable?	Imagine	a	heroic	firefighter,	for	example,	who	would	prefer	to	spend	more	time	with	her	family	but	feels	she	has	a	duty,	which	translates	into	an	authentic	wish,	to	save	as	many	lives	as	possible.	She	does	not	find	her	job	particularly	satisfying	or	fulfilling,	and	is	fuelled	just	by	a	sense	of	duty.	This	woman	can	very	much	be	the	victim,	in	a	sense,	of	her	self-control:	certain	possibilities	of	self-fulfilment	
																																								 																					4	I	thank	Fabian	Freyenhagen	for	pointing	this	out.	
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(e.g.	how	much	she	flourishes	as	a	mother)	are	certainly	closed	off	by	her	behav-iour.	But	would	she	therefore	be	less	autonomous	than	others?	Does	this	entail	that	her	commitment	to	her	career	does	not	reflect	her	own	choice?	This	seems	to	be	a	strange	suggestion.	What	is	more,	when	we	consider	it	in	the	context	of	mental	health,	 the	 line	of	reasoning	offered	by	Mele	seems	plainly	dangerous:	surely,	we	should	avoid	denying	agents	the	capacity	for	autonomy	or	choice	on	the	basis	of	their	mental	health.5	For	these	reasons,	when	conceptualising	self-oppression,	I	will	not	take	into	account	an	agent’s	psychological	or	psychiatric	status.	Though	self-oppres-sion,	as	a	form	of	agency,	may	often	feature	in	certain	psychological	or	psychiat-ric	conditions,	I	do	not	mean	to	present	self-oppression	as	such	a	condition.	Thus,	my	taxonomical	classification	will	not	take	into	account	whether	it	stems	from,	or	is	entangled	with,	any	psychological	or	psychiatric	issues.	I	will	focus	merely	at	the	structures	of	agents’	current	behaviour.	In	addition,	questions	regarding	the	nature	of	flourishing,	and	even	the	nature	of	mental	health,	are	often	difficult	to	approach	in	a	content-neutral	man-ner.	As	previously	noted,	I	will	not	conceptualise	self-oppression	on	the	basis	of	
what	an	agent	is	doing.	My	assumption	is	that	self-oppression	is	a	style	of	agency,	and	not	a	kind	of	action.	I	will	thus	not	suggest	that	certain	kinds	of	actions	or	endeavours	are	inherently	self-oppressive.	A	self-confessed	super-mom	may	or	
																																								 																					5	Nevertheless,	quite	a	few	authors	assume	some	connection	between	autonomy	or	au-thenticity	and	mental	health,	without	developing	it	into	further	detail.	John	Christman,	for	example,	writes	that	conditions	of	autonomy	‘relate	to	cognitive	and	normative	com-petence	–	rationality,	self-control,	absence	of	psychosis	and	other	pathologies,	and	so	on’	(Christman,	2009:	134,	emphasis	mine).	For	a	discussion	of	the	relation	between	mental	health	and	the	right	to	autonomy,	see	e.g.	Atkinson	(1991).	
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may	not	be	self-oppressive,	as	may	a	celebrated	athlete.	My	aim,	in	other	words,	is	to	conceptualise	self-oppression	in	a	way	that	is	content-neutral:	the	charac-teristics	of	self-oppression	which	I	will	spell	out	concern	the	structures	of	agency	only.	This	is	not	to	say,	of	course,	that	there	is	never	any	sort	of	connection	be-tween	the	content	and	the	structure	of	behaviour.	One	might	have	the	intuition	that	certain	kinds	of	behaviour	are	very	prone	to	self-oppression.	Indeed,	I	share	this	intuition	–	and	ideally,	our	model	of	self-oppression	will	be	able	to	track	it	to	some	extent.	It	also	makes	sense	to	look	out	for	examples	of	the	phenomenon	in	these	places.	But	I	want	to	avoid	relying	on	this	intuition	when	conceptualising	self-oppression.	I	conclude,	therefore,	that	Mele’s	brief	suggestion	–	which,	in	all	fairness,	was	only	meant	as	that	–	cannot	help	us	explain	the	category	of	self-oppression.	Of	course,	my	preferred	approach	might	not	be	viable.	It	may	turn	out	that	we	cannot	 coherently	 conceptualise	 self-oppression,	 or	 distinguish	 it	 from	 other	forms	of	agency,	without	taking	into	the	content	of	the	agent’s	behaviour,	or	even	the	status	of	her	mental	health.	But	the	attempt,	to	me,	seems	worthwhile.		
G. THESIS	SUMMARY	
I	will	thus	devise	my	own	conceptualisation	of	self-oppression.	It	must	be	noted,	here,	 that	the	strategy	of	 this	 thesis	will	be	rather	unusual.	Rather	than	being	located	within	one	specific	philosophical	tradition,	it	will	draw	on	four	different	authors,	belonging	to	different	scholarships,	 in	order	to	tackle	the	question	of	self-oppression.	Whilst	the	scope	of	the	thesis	is	too	small	to	do	justice	to	these	scholarships	in	their	entirety,	I	will	demonstrate	how	each	of	them	offers	some	
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vital	source	material,	which	can	be	employed	to	develop	the	category	of	self-op-pression.	 In	 the	 first	 four	 chapters,	 I	will	 collect	 the	 required	source	material	from	the	different	scholarships.	 In	a	 final	chapter,	 I	will	organise	 the	selected	materials	into	an	account	of	self-oppression,	before	applying	this	account	to	two	case	studies.	I	will	start,	in	the	first	chapter,	with	Aristotle’s	theory	of	action.	This	the-ory	forms	an	excellent	starting	point	for	the	thesis,	since	it	offers	a	basic	mereol-ogy	of	the	agent,	as	well	as	a	taxonomy	of	different	regulatory	styles.	Though	his	taxonomy	does	not	include	a	regulatory	style	that	describes	self-oppression,	we	can	use	its	underlying	conceptual	building	blocks	to	construe	an	additional	cat-egory	for	self-oppression:	accordingly,	at	the	end	of	the	first	chapter,	I	formulate	the	category	of	hyperkrasia,	designed	to	capture	the	phenomenon	of	self-oppres-sion.	This	is	not	itself	an	Aristotelean	category,	but	it	draws	on	Aristotelean	re-sources.	I	hypothesise	that,	in	hyperkrasia,	the	part	of	the	agent	which	Aristotle	calls	practical	reason,	and	which	is	by	nature	authoritative,	becomes	authoritar-
ian.	We	can	thus	pinpoint	the	part	of	the	agent	that	becomes	oppressive	in	self-oppression,	which	addresses	our	first	major	issue:	who,	in	self-oppression,	op-presses	whom?	In	consecutive	chapters,	I	will	supplement	this	Aristotelean	picture	with	elements	from	other	scholarships.	In	the	second	chapter,	I	turn	to	the	works	of	St	Augustine.	The	reason	for	this	turn	is	that,	on	Aristotle’s	picture,	we	cannot	explain	how	choice	could	be	compromised	in	hyperkrasia.	On	Aristotle’s	view,	the	 faculty	of	practical	reason	 is	also	 the	 faculty	of	choice,	so	practical	reason	could	not	 coherently	undermine	choice	on	 this	 view.	 In	order	 to	address	 this	issue,	I	introduce	Augustine’s	notion	of	the	will.	On	his	picture,	the	will	functions	
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as	a	faculty	of	choice	separate	from	practical	reason.	What	is	more,	Augustine	also	introduces	the	notion	of	a	corrupted	will:	such	a	will	makes	choices,	but	can-
not	but	make	the	choices	it	makes.	As	such,	I	will	argue,	Augustine	describes	a	way	in	which	choice	can	be	compromised	without	agency	being	overridden.	This	offers	us	the	sort	of	account	of	choice	needed	to	make	sense	of	self-oppression	–	since,	 in	 self-oppression,	 it	 is	 the	 agent	 herself	 who	 compromises	 her	 own	choices.	At	the	end	of	chapter	two,	I	hypothesise	that	a	certain	kind	of	exercise	of	practical	reason	has	the	potential	to	corrupt	our	will.	This	is	not	itself	an	Au-gustinian	idea,	but	it	draws	on	Augustinian	resources.	On	Augustine’s	picture,	 however,	 the	will	 is	 corrupted	 through	divine	punishment.	As	such,	he	does	not	conceptualise	the	idea	in	a	manner	useful	to	us:	for	he	was	not	concerned	with	how	–	if	at	all	–	other,	more	worldly	factors	can	corrupt	our	will.	To	explain	how	our	will	may	be	corrupted	in	more	profane	ways,	the	third	chapter	turns	to	Michel	Foucault,	and	more	specifically	to	his	ac-count	of	modern	domination.	Domination,	on	my	interpretation	of	Foucault,	is	a	specific	and	 insidious	 form	of	oppression,	 in	which	the	behaviour	of	agents	 is	controlled	through	the	control	of	their	own	agency:	domination	does	not	control	agents	by	overriding	their	agency	through	violence	or	force,	but	turns	agents	into	a	certain	kind	of	subject	which	in	turn	leads	them	to	act	a	certain	way.	Joining	together	 two	 of	 Foucault’s	 phrases,	 I	 propose	 that	 domination	 operates	 by	“freezing”	an	agent’s	‘field	of	possible	action’.	Though	Foucault	does	not	himself	speak	of	choice	or	the	will,	I	submit	that	domination,	thus	understood,	corrupts	the	subject’s	will	and	so	compromises	her	choice.	Though	she	may	still	act	and	choose	“at	will”	within	 her	 field	 of	 possible	 action,	 I	 argue	 that	 her	 will	 is	corrupted,	 and	 her	choices	compromised,	 insofar	as	 this	 field	 is	 frozen.	This,	
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again,	is	not	a	Foucauldian	idea,	but	it	draws	on	Foucauldian	resources.	Though	this	does	not	yet	explain	how	practical	reason	can	corrupt	the	will,	it	shows	how	the	will	can	be	corrupted	by	certain	oppressive	structures.	This	brings	us	closer	to	the	idea	of	self-oppression:	might	similar	oppressive	structures	occur	inter-nally,	within	an	agent?	My	hypothesis	will	be	that	an	agent’s	practical	reason	can	corrupt	her	will	by	freezing	her	field	of	possible	action.	But,	before	we	can	piece	together	our	account	of	self-oppression,	some	elements	of	this	hypothesis	require	some	further	elaboration.	Though	he	coined	the	phrase,	Foucault	does	not	offer	any	account	of	a	field	of	possible	action:	he	only	uses	the	phrase	once	or	twice.	Neither	does	he	offer	the	conceptual	tools	to	explain	how	a	field	of	possible	action	might	freeze:	this	is	just	my	interpretation	of	what	happens	in	domination.	For	these	reasons,	the	fourth	chapter	turns	to	the	phenomenology	of	Maurice	Merleau-Ponty.	Drawing	on	his	phenomenologi-cal	account	of	action,	I	develop	a	more	substantial	account	of	fields	of	possible	action	as	consisting	in	perceived	opportunities	for	action,	which	draw	the	agent	toward	action.	I	then	argue	that,	when	an	agent	perceives	opportunities	in	a	cer-tain	way,	this	can	freeze	her	field	of	possible	action:	more	precisely,	this	happens	when	she	perceives	certain	opportunities	as	so	urgent	that	any	other	opportuni-ties	seem	unviable	to	her.	This	corrupts	her	will,	since	these	opportunities	will	draw	her	to	action	with	such	force	that	she	cannot	but	act	on	them.	As	such,	this	compromises	her	choices.	Finally,	 in	a	 last	chapter,	 I	will	present	my	account	of	self-oppression,	which	joins	together	the	materials	collected	in	the	preceding	chapters.	My	final	hypothesis	will	be	 that	a	 certain	exercise	of	practical	 reason	can	 influence	an	
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agent’s	own	perceptions	such	that	it	freezes	her	field	of	possible	action,	thus	cor-rupting	her	own	will	and	so	compromising	her	choices.	This,	then,	is	my	model	of	hyperkrasia.	It	establishes	that	self-oppression,	as	I	described	the	phenome-non,	 is	 indeed	 possible,	 and	 simultaneously	 demonstrates	 how	 it	 is	 different	from	other	forms	of	agency.	As	mentioned,	this	model	is	not	meant	as	to	provide	necessary	or	suffi-cient	conditions	for	hyperkrasia.	This,	however,	does	not	mean	it	is	without	fur-ther	application.	Taxonomy	starts	from	observation,	turning	to	classification	in	an	attempt	to	get	a	grip	on	the	observed	phenomena.	Once	new	categories	for	classification	are	casted,	we	can	then	return	to	the	phenomena	with	a	sharper	lens.	I	will	demonstrate	that	the	proposed	model	of	hyperkrasia	can	help	us	dif-ferentiate	core	forms	of	self-oppression	from	other	forms	of	agency	which	for-mally	share	many	of	its	characteristics.	To	this	end,	I	will	conclude	the	thesis	with	two	brief	case	studies.	We	will	consider	the	case	of	Sam,	an	agent	who	suffers	from	anorexia	nervosa,	and	demonstrate	how	our	account	of	self-oppression	can	explain	some	of	the	structures	of	her	agency.	Next,	we	will	consider	the	case	of	Alex,	a	celebrated	rock	climber	who	keeps	pushing	for	the	extreme.	I	will	demon-strate	that,	whilst	Alex’s	agency	in	some	ways	resembles	that	of	Sam,	his	does	not	count	as	self-oppressive.	Crucially,	this	distinction	is	made	not	on	the	basis	of	what	these	agents	are	pursuing	but	how	they	pursue	it:	the	proposed	account	of	self-oppression	differentiates	it	on	the	basis	of	the	perceptual	consequences	of	their	self-imposed	pressure,	not	on	the	basis	of	the	actions	they	are	pressuring	themselves	into.	Here,	again,	my	aim	is	not	to	articulate	the	boundary	conditions	of	hy-
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perkrasia.	Rather,	my	aim	is	to	show	that	the	proposed	model	helps	us	to	articu-late	some	significant	differences	between	two	cases	that	formally	share	much	in	common,	and	to	show	why	one	deserves	to	be	called	hyperkrasia	while	the	other	does	not	—	and	to	do	so	in	a	way	that	is	neutral	as	to	the	content	of	the	action.	Determining	 the	 boundary	 conditions	 of	 hyperkrasia	 is	 a	 task	 for	 further	 re-search,	which	I	will	not	undertake	in	the	thesis.	In	light	of	this,	I	end	by	raising	some	open	questions	regarding	the	scope	and	limits	of	the	category	of	hyperkra-sia	as	I	have	sketched	it.	
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I. Aristotle	
A. INTRODUCTION	This	 chapter	will	 consider	Aristotle’s	philosophy	of	 action	as	 found	 in	his	Ni-
comachean	Ethics	 (henceforth:	NE),	 a	 ten-book	work	written	 around	340	BC.	This	turn	to	Aristotle	may	seem	surprising	at	first.	The	NE,	admittedly,	is	not	de-voted	directly	to	the	philosophy	of	action.	Rather,	it	addresses	the	question	of	the	good	life:	what	does	it	mean,	for	humans,	to	live	a	good	life,	and	how	can	we	achieve	this?	But	in	spelling	out	an	answer	to	this	question,	Aristotle	maps	out	a	rather	elaborate	theory	of	agency:	the	focus	point	of	the	book,	one	could	say,	is	the	development	of	a	moral	psychology.	This	moral	psychology,	I	submit,	forms	a	plausible	starting	point	for	this	thesis,	and	this	for	a	few	reasons.	A	primary	reason	is	that	it	features	a	taxonomy	of	different	moral	dispo-sitions,	which	can	be	read	as	a	taxonomy	of	different	forms	of	agency.1	This	tax-onomy	seems	especially	adequate	as	a	point	of	departure	for	our	purposes	be-cause	of	its	strong	structural	underpinnings.	Even	though	the	different	forms	of	agency	are	described	as	moral	dispositions,	Aristotle	distinguishes	them	in	ref-erence	to	how	actions	are	regulated	by	the	agent,	rather	than	on	the	basis	of	her	actions.	Thus,	he	essentially	describes	different	ways	of	 regulating	action:	his	taxonomy,	therefore,	can	also	be	read	as	a	taxonomy	of	what	we	could	call	regu-
latory	styles.	This	means	that	his	approach	is	compatible	with	my	aim	of	content-
																																								 																					1	These	forms	of	agency	will	include	behaviour	in	which	the	agent	acts	against	her	better	judgment	(that	is,	instances	of	what	is	often	termed	“weakness	of	the	will”).	I	am	aware	that	some	might	not	want	to	include	such	instances	in	the	realm	of	agency.	
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neutrality.	Though,	as	we	will	see,	Aristotle’s	taxonomy	is	not	exactly	content-neutral,	we	ca	bracket	any	elements	which	do	not	qualify	as	content-neutral,	and	work	with	its	structural	underpinnings	only.		What	is	more,	these	regulatory	styles	are	formulated	by	Aristotle	in	ref-erence	 to	 a	mereological	 account	 of	 the	 agent.	 Aristotle	maps	 out	 and	 names	some	of	the	main	elements	of	the	human	agent,	and	differentiates	the	different	regulatory	styles	by	describing	different	possible	constellations	of	these	parts.	This	mereology	may	help	us	address	one	of	our	main	issues:	namely	the	question	of	who,	in	self-oppression,	is	oppressing	whom.	Another	reason	why	Aristotle’s	theory	of	action	forms	an	adequate	start-ing	point	is	that	it	includes	a	conceptualisation	of	choice,	and	pays	considerable	attention	 to	 the	ways	 in	which	 the	process	of	 choosing	can	be	disrupted.	The	presence	and	absence	of	choice,	in	fact,	can	be	included	in	the	differentiae	of	the	different	regulatory	styles.	As	such,	his	theory	may	also	help	us	address	our	se-cond	major	 issue:	namely	 the	question	how,	 in	 self-oppression,	 choice	can	be	compromised.	In	the	first	parts	of	the	chapter,	I	will	set	out	the	basics	of	Aristotle’s	the-ory	of	agency,	and	extract	a	taxonomy	of	regulatory	styles	from	his	taxonomy	of	moral	dispositions.	It	will	turn	out	that	this	taxonomy	does	not	include	a	regula-tory	style	that	fits	our	description	of	self-oppression.	Yet,	I	argue,	the	NE	offers	some	useful	conceptual	building	blocks	that	can	help	us	think	about	self-oppres-sion.	More	precisely,	I	will	identify	practical	reason,	the	part	of	the	agent	respon-sible	for	making	and	implementing	our	better	judgments,	as	the	part	of	the	agent	that	becomes	oppressive	in	self-oppression.	I	will	posit	that	practical	reason	can	be	understood	as	our	faculty	of	self-control,	and	that	its	naturally	authoritative	
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nature	 can	become	authoritarian,	 thus	 turning	 oppressive.	Accordingly,	 I	will	formulate	an	additional	regulatory	style,	named	hyperkrasia,	designed	to	capture	this	situation.	This	goes	some	way	towards	solving	our	first	major	 issue:	 for	we	will	have	identified	which	part	of	the	agent	is	oppressive	in	self-oppression.	Aristo-tle’s	theory	of	action,	however,	does	not	allow	us	to	address	our	second	major	issue:	how	is	choice	compromised	in	self-oppression?	Since	Aristotle	takes	prac-tical	reason	itself	to	be	the	faculty	of	choice,	the	idea	that	practical	reason	could	compromise	choice	is	nonsensical	on	his	view.	Thus,	it	is	not	just	that	Aristotle’s	theory	of	agency	does	not	include	a	de-scription	of	self-oppression:	the	problem	is	that	self-oppression	is	conceptually	
inconceivable	within	it.	This	because	his	definition	of	choice	captures	a	different	kind	of	thing	than	the	choice	which	I	take	to	be	compromised	in	self-oppression.	As	such,	I	will	conclude,	the	possibility	of	self-oppression	cannot	be	fully	and	co-herently	explained	within	this	framework.	Nonetheless,	the	negative	results	of	this	chapter	will	prove	useful:	for	the	specific	ways	in	which	Aristotle’s	theory	fails	to	capture	self-oppression	will	lead	us	toward	our	next	set	of	resources.			
B. ARISTOTLE’S	THEORY	OF	AGENCY:	THE	BASICS	
In	this	section,	I	will	set	out	the	basics	of	Aristotle’s	theory	of	agency,	paying	par-ticular	attention	to	his	mereology	of	the	agent	and	his	conception	of	choice.	But	before	I	commence	my	reading,	three	cautionary	remarks	must	be	made.	It	must	be	noted,	for	one,	that	any	explanation	of	Aristotle’s	views	is	highly	dependent	on	interpretation.	There	exists	considerable	debate	amongst	scholars	about	how	
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his	texts	should	be	read,	and	the	interpretation	I	advance	is	merely	one	amongst	many.	Though	this	interpretation	is	my	own,	at	some	critical	points	I	have	added	support	 from	other	scholars,	 including	Sarah	Broadie	(1994),	Byron	 J.	Stoyles	(2007)	and	Ursula	Coope	(2010).	Importantly,	though,	the	primary	purpose	of	my	reading	is	a	pragmatic	one:	I	turn	to	Aristotle’s	theory	to	extract	some	vital	source	material	for	my	account	of	self-oppression.	And	though	I	have	sought	to	remain	faithful	to	Aristotle’s	text,	the	hermeneutical	validity	of	my	reading	does	not	bear	on	the	larger	project	of	this	thesis.	Naturally,	this	specific	agenda	also	implies	a	certain	focus.	As	mentioned,	I	will	particularly	focus	on	Aristotle’s	mereology	of	the	agent,	his	conception	of	choice	and	how	it	might	be	compromised,	and	some	of	the	moral	dispositions	he	describes.	Settling	on	this	lens	means	that	certain	aspects	of	his	views	will	be	left	out,	or	not	addressed	in	detail:	many	themes,	concepts,	and	ideas	that	feature	in	the	NE	will	remain	largely	or	entirely	untouched.	Finally,	there	is	one	way	in	which	my	reading	of	the	NE	will	be	signifi-cantly	deviant:	I	will	aim	to	make	abstraction	of	the	morally	objectivist	dimen-sion	of	Aristotle’s	views.2	His	theory	of	agency,	especially	in	the	NE,	is	embedded	in	a	normative	conception	of	 the	good	 life.3	My	 focus,	however,	will	be	on	the	
																																								 																					2	 I	 refrain	 from	calling	Aristotle	a	moral	realist,	since	 it	 is	unclear	whether	he	would	attribute	a	mind-independent	existence	to	the	Good.	As	we	will	see,	it	is	clear	that	he	takes	the	Good	to	be	something	which	has	an	objective	validity,	and	he	thus	prescribes	to	a	moral	objectivism.	But	as	I	understand	the	term,	this	does	not	necessarily	make	him	a	moral	realist.	This	distinction,	however,	is	of	no	further	relevance	in	this	thesis.	3	There	of	course	exists	debate	regarding	the	extent	to	which	Aristotle’s	views	are	pre-scriptive,	and/or	embedded	in	a	moral	objectivism	or	realism.	For	discussions	of	these	topics,	see	e.g.	Williams	(1996)	and	Heinaman	(1995).	
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regulatory	 styles	 that	 feature	 within	 this	 description.	 For	 Aristotle,	 as	 men-tioned,	these	different	ways	of	acting	represent	different	moral	dispositions,	but	I	will	single	out	their	structural	features	and	bracket	their	moral	status.	From	now	on,	I	will	simply	speak	of	regulatory	styles	when	referring	to	these	moral	dispositions.	Naturally,	this	approach	has	its	limitations:	the	focus	on	the	good	life	is	central	to	the	NE	and	Aristotle’s	theory	of	agency	more	generally,	and	it	cannot	be	completely	and	consistently	separated	from	his	descriptions	of	agency	as	such.	Bearing	this	in	mind,	however,	I	will	attempt	to	bracket	this	normative	dimension	insofar	as	I	can,	in	order	to	employ	his	theory	of	agency	in	the	specific	context	of	the	thesis.	At	various	points,	I	will	emphasise	the	structural	dimension	of	Aristotle’s	descriptions	of	agency	and	show	that,	for	my	purposes,	it	can	be	sufficiently	separated	from	their	moral	dimension.			
B.1 The	Genus:	Voluntary	Action	We	can	now	turn	to	Aristotle’s	theory	of	action.	A	first	step,	if	we	are	to	spell	out	a	taxonomy	of	regulatory	styles,	is	to	get	a	grip	on	the	genus	to	which	they	all	belong.	When	differentiating	regulatory	styles,	what	kinds	of	things	are	we	dif-ferentiating?	What	is	the	general	category	to	which	they	all	belong?	Regulatory	styles,	of	course,	are	all	forms	of	agency.	Thus,	we	must	first	establish	when,	and	on	what	basis,	the	movements	of	a	person	can	be	classified	as	a	form	of	agency	on	Aristotle’s	view:	what	does	it	mean,	for	Aristotle,	to	do	something?	Aristotle’s	answer	to	this	question	is	fairly	nuanced.	On	the	most	basic	level,	 he	distinguishes	between	voluntary,	 involuntary,	 and	non-voluntary	ac-
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tions.	Acts	are	voluntary	(hekousioi),	on	his	view,	whenever	the	origin	of	the	ac-tion	lies	within	the	agent.	This	means,	on	his	description,	that	‘the	movement	of	the	limbs	that	are	the	instruments	of	action	has	its	origin	in	the	agent	himself,	and	where	this	is	so	it	is	in	his	power	either	to	act	or	not’	(NE	1110a:	16-17).4	Aristotle	refers	here	simply	to	the	locus	of	initiation:	‘if	we	are	unable	to	trace	our	conduct	back	to	any	other	origins	than	those	within	ourselves,	then	actions	of	which	the	origins	are	within	us,	themselves	depend	on	us,	and	are	voluntary’	(NE	1113b:	21-22).5	The	class	of	voluntary	actions,	for	Aristotle,	thus	includes	those	performed	by	children	and	nonhuman	animals:	he	writes	that	‘both	chil-dren	and	animals	have	a	share	in	voluntary	action’	(NE	1111b:	9).	Conversely,	actions	are	involuntary	(akousioi)	when	they	are	caused	by	a	force	that	is	not	within	the	agent.	As	a	general	rule,	Aristotle	submits	that	ac-tions	are	involuntary	when	they	are	compulsory	(biaioi),	which	means	that	the	action	‘has	an	external	origin	of	such	a	kind	that	the	agent	or	patient	contributes	nothing	to	it’	(NE	1110a:	1-2).	These	external	factors	can	be	impersonal	forces,	as	well	as	other	people:	actions	are	compulsory,	for	example,	‘if	a	voyager	were	to	be	conveyed	somewhere	by	the	wind	or	by	men	who	had	him	in	their	power’	(NE	 1110a:	 3-4).	 Thus,	 according	 to	 Aristotle,	 actions	 should	 only	 be	 termed	compulsory	when	the	origin	of	the	action	is	external	to	the	agent.	
																																								 																					4	Unless	otherwise	specified,	my	citations	are	taken	from	the	J.A.K.	Thomson	translation	(1953)	of	the	NE.	My	preference	is	for	the	Thomson	translation	as	it	reads	most	smoothly,	but	I	have,	at	times,	opted	for	the	Harris	Rackham	translation	(1934)	as	it	tends	to	remain	closer	to	the	original	text.	5	Note	that	the	final	cause	of	any	act	always	lies	outside	of	the	agent	on	Aristotle’s	view:	it	is	the	object	that	the	agent	wishes	to	obtain	through	action.		
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Interestingly,	this	means	that	internal	forces,	such	as	strong	urges	or	in-clinations,	do	not	result	in	compulsory	action	on	his	view:	‘It	is	probably	wrong‘,	Aristotle	writes,	 ‘to	say	that	acts	due	to	temper	or	desire	are	involuntary’	(NE	1111a:	24).	This	might	seem	counterintuitive.	But	Aristotle	argues	in	clear	terms	that	acting	on	strong	internal	forces	is	always	voluntary	and	never	compulsory,	even	though	it	is	tempting	to	assume	otherwise.	First	of	all,	he	contends,	it	would	be	absurd	to	restrict	the	scope	of	voluntary	action	to	include	only	those	of	adult	human	animals:	‘on	this	view	in	the	first	place	the	capacity	for	voluntary	action	will	 not	 extend	 to	 any	 animal	 other	 than	 [humans],	 or	 even	 to	 children’	 (NE	1111a:	26-27).	Secondly,	he	points	out	that	our	inclination	to	treat	compulsory	actions	as	involuntary	is,	in	fact,	an	inclination	to	only	treat	our	bad	ones	as	such:	‘when	we	act	from	desire	of	temper’,	he	asks,	‘are	none	of	our	actions	voluntary?	Or	are	our	fine	actions	done	voluntarily	and	our	discreditable	ones	involuntar-ily?’	(NE	1111a:	27).	This,	Aristotle	argues,	would	be	 inconsistent:	 ‘Surely’,	he	writes,	‘this	is	a	ridiculous	distinction,	since	the	cause	is	one	and	the	same	[…].	It	follows	that	actions	due	to	temper	or	desire	are	also	proper	to	the	human	agent.	Therefore	 it	 is	 absurd	 to	 class	 these	 actions	 as	 involuntary’	 (NE	 1111a:	 27-1111b:	1-4).	The	actions	Aristotle	is	referring	to	here	stem	from	desire	or	temper.	As	such,	 they	are	what	 I	have	called	 impulsive	actions,	which	are	desired	but	not	endorsed	by	the	agent.	Aristotle	does	not	here	mention	whether	there	may	exist	
compulsions	 in	 the	sense	we	nowadays	 tend	 to	understand	 the	 term:	compul-sions,	that	is,	which	are	desired	nor	endorsed	by	the	agent,	but	caused	by	an	urge	she	 dissociates	 from.	Would	 compulsions	 count	 as	 compulsory	 for	 Aristotle?	Probably	so.	I	take	Aristotle’s	point	to	be	that	impulses	are	not	to	be	counted	as	
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compulsory	because	they	follow	our	own	desires.	But	compulsions,	on	the	mod-ern	understanding,	may	best	be	classified	as	a	subspecies	of	compulsory	actions,	caused	by	a	factor	external	to	the	agent,	insofar	as	the	agent	in	question	experi-ences	the	compulsion	to	be	alien	indeed.	Aristotle	mentions	a	second	way	in	which	actions	can	count	as	involun-tary,	even	if	they	are	not	compulsory:	namely	if	they	are	executed	in	ignorance.	For	example,	Aristotle	writes,	‘one	might	kill	someone	with	a	dose	of	a	drug	in-tended	to	save	his	life’,	not	knowing	the	dose	would	be	lethal	(NE	1111a:	13).	For	Aristotle,	an	act	done	out	of	ignorance	is	not	voluntary,	even	though	the	agent	has	 technically	 speaking	 initiated	 it.	 In	 this	 context,	 the	author	 further	distin-guishes	between	involuntary	and	non-voluntary	action.	Actions	done	out	of	ig-norance	are	always	non-voluntary.	But	only	if	the	result	of	an	action	done	from	ignorance	is	undesirable	to	us,	should	it	be	considered	involuntary:	 ‘Every	act	done	 through	 ignorance	 is	 non-voluntary,	 but	 it	 is	 involuntary	 only	 when	 it	causes	 the	agent	 subsequent	pain	and	repentance’	 (NE	1110b:	17-22).	Other-wise,	 the	action	 is	 simply	non-voluntary:	 ‘[f]or	 if	 a	 [person]	has	done	any	act	through	ignorance	and	is	not	in	the	least	upset	about	it,	although	[s]he	has	not	acted	voluntarily	[…],	[s]he	has	not	acted	involuntarily	either,	since	[s]he	feels	no	pain’	(NE	1110b:	17-22).	Note,	though,	that	Aristotle	refers	to	a	specific	form	of	ignorance	in	this	context.	He	distinguishes	between	acting	through	ignorance	and	acting	in	ignorance.	Sometimes,	when	we	are	drunk	for	example,	our	igno-rance	is	our	own	fault.	In	such	cases,	Aristotle	asserts,	we	act	in	ignorance,	and	since	this	ignorance	has	its	origin	in	us,	these	actions	have	their	origin	in	us	by	proxy.	This	implies	that	they	are	voluntary:	‘An	act	is	not	properly	called	invol-untary	if	the	agent	is	ignorant	of	[her]	own	advantage’	(NE	1110b:	25-1111a:	1-
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2).		 In	sum,	Aristotle	concludes,	‘an	involuntary	act	is	one	performed	under	compulsion	or	as	a	result	of	ignorance,	a	voluntary	act	would	seem	to	be	one	of	which	the	originating	cause	lies	in	the	agent	[her]self,	who	knows	the	particular	circumstances	of	[her]	action’	(NE	1111a:	21-23).	Voluntary	action	denotes	pur-poseful,	 intentional	conduct.	We	may	thus	refer	 to	voluntary	action	as	agency	
proper,	and	this	category	will	serve	as	the	genus	to	which	the	different	regulatory	styles,	discussed	in	this	thesis,	belong.	Of	course,	it	is	hard	to	categorise	agency	as	such,	and	it	can	be	difficult	in	practice	to	judge	whether	a	behaviour	should	be	classified	as	a	voluntary	action.	Aristotle	admits	that	the	line	between	voluntary	and	involuntary	is	not	always	clear-cut:	
sometimes	the	act	is	done	through	fear	of	something	worse,	or	for	some	admi-rable	purpose;	e.g.	if	a	tyrant	who	has	a	man’s	parents	and	children	in	his	power	were	to	order	him	to	do	something	dishonourable	on	condition	that	if	he	did	it	their	lives	would	be	spared,	and	if	he	did	not	they	would	be	put	to	death:	in	these	cases	it	is	debatable	whether	the	actions	are	involuntary	or	voluntary.	A	similar	difficulty	occurs	with	regard	to	jettonising	cargo	in	bad	weather.	[…]	Such	ac-tions	are	mixed,	although	they	seem	more	like	voluntary	than	involuntary	ones.	(NE	1109b:	36-1110a:	1-13)		But	however	blurry	their	boundaries,	these	categories	remain	useful	concepts	for	us	to	understand	the	landscape	of	agency.		
B.2 Aristotle’s	Mereology	of	the	Agent	
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Thus,	the	realm	of	voluntary	action	forms	the	most	basal	level	of	agency	on	Aris-totle’s	picture,	and	human	and	nonhuman	animals	alike	share	in	it.	But	not	all	voluntary	actions	are	the	same:	they	are	actions	initiated	by	the	agent,	but	–	ac-cording	to	Aristotle	–	an	agent	can	initiate	actions	in	a	number	of	different	ways.	Depending	on	how	she	does	so,	different	regulatory	styles	ensue.	As	such,	the	different	regulatory	styles	he	describes	form	different	species	of	voluntary	ac-tion,	spelling	out	a	taxonomy	of	sorts.	We	will	lay	out	this	taxonomy	shortly.	First,	however,	we	must	discuss	Aristotle’s	mereology	of	the	agent:	for	his	taxonomy	is	formulated	in	reference	to,	and	on	the	basis	of,	this	mereology.	In	the	NE,	he	divides	the	agent	into	different	parts,	which	can	all	take	part	in	the	genesis	of	voluntary	action.	So	how	does	Aristotle	picture	the	human	agent?6	In	the	first	chapter	of	the	NE,	he	suggests	 that	human	beings	have	a	distinct	and	dual	nature.	Their	souls,	he	writes,	can	be	divided	into	an	 irrational	part	on	the	one	hand,	and	a	more	deliberative,	reasonable	part	on	the	other:	 ‘the	soul	 is	part	rational	 [eu-
logos]	and	part	irrational	[alogos]’	(NE	1102a:	27).	In	this	passage,	Aristotle	de-scribes	the	rational	part	as	‘the	rational	element	in	our	souls’,	but	sometimes	he	also	refers	to	it	as	the	intellect	(noûs).7	I	will	simply	refer	to	it	as	reason.	Reason,	
																																								 																					6	That	is,	the	adult	human	agent.	In	what	follows,	these	two	qualifiers	are	implicit	when-ever	I	use	the	word	‘agent’.	This	is	not	to	deny	that	children	and	nonhuman	animals	are	agents	as	well:	both,	as	we	saw,	are	capable	of	voluntary	action	and	could	thus	be	called	agents.	In	this	thesis,	however,	following	Aristotle,	I	focus	on	adult	human	agents	only.		7	See,	for	example,	NE	1139a:18.	It	seems,	though,	that	Aristotle	is	not	wholly	consistent	in	his	use	of	the	term	noûs.	At	times,	he	seems	to	use	noûs	to	refer	to	a	specific	part	of	the	rational	element	in	our	souls:	namely	the	theoretical	part.	Insofar	as	the	term	is	used	in	the	context	of	his	theory	of	action,	however,	I	will	take	noûs	to	denote	the	rational	part	of	the	soul	in	general,	which	also	–	as	we	will	see	shortly	–	includes	a	practical	part	
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which	is	exclusively	human	on	Aristotle’s	view,	is	the	part	that	‘has’	the	rational	principle	(logos),	meaning	it	has	the	capacity	for	rationality.8	The	irrational	part	of	the	soul,	which	lacks	the	rational	principle,	is	also	found	in	nonhuman	animals.		These	two	parts	of	the	human	soul	are	further	divided	by	Aristotle	into	different	faculties.	The	irrational	part	consists	in	two	different	faculties.	On	the	one	hand,	it	includes	our	vegetative	part	(to	phutikon),	which	is	‘the	cause	of	nu-trition	and	growth’	and	which	is	found	‘in	everything	that	receives	nourishment’	(NE	1102a:	35-1102b:	1).	This	faculty	is	thus	shared	by	plants,	nonhuman	ani-mals,	and	humans	alike.	On	the	other	hand,	the	irrational	part	of	our	soul	also	houses	an	appetitive	and	desirous	faculty	(to	epithumētikon).9	This	faculty	is	de-scribed	by	Aristotle	as	 ‘the	seat	of	 the	appetites	and	of	desire	 in	general’	 (NE	1102b:	34,	trans.	Rackham)	–	the	term	he	uses,	epithumētikon,	is	derived	from	the	 noun	 epithumia,	which	 translates	 to	 ‘desire’	 or	 ‘yearning’.	 This	 faculty	 is	found	in	humans	as	well	as	other	animals.10	Unlike	the	vegetative	faculty,	the	ap-petitive	faculty	is	a	part	of	the	human	being	as	an	agent:	for,	as	we	will	see,	it	has	
																																								 																					(see	Rackham,	1934:	328fn).		8	The	rational	part	of	the	soul	is	distinct	from	the	rational	principle	itself	[logos]	(see	NE	1102b:	15):	Aristotle	describes	the	rational	part	of	the	soul	as	the	part	that	has	the	ra-tional	principle.	I	will	reserve	the	term	reason	to	refer	to	the	rational	part	of	the	soul,	which	has	logos,	and	will	refer	to	logos	itself	as	the	rational	principle.		9	Elsewhere,	for	example	in	De	Anima	[DA],	Aristotle	also	distinguishes	the	spirited	fac-ulty	(to	thumikon),	which	he	does	not	mention	in	this	passage	(DA	432b:6).	Later	in	the	NE,	he	does	mention	temper	(thumos).	Interestingly,	temper	bears	relations	to	both	the	rational	and	the	irrational	faculty	(see	NE	1149a:	26-7).	It	thus	seems	to	occupy	an	in-teresting	place	in	Aristotle’s	mereology	of	the	agent.	As	it	does	not	seem	hugely	relevant	to	this	thesis,	however,	I	will	not	here	flesh	out	what	exactly	this	place	is.	10	Note,	though,	that	the	appetitive	faculty	itself	depends	on	our	faculty	of	sense	percep-tion,	which	Aristotle	does	not	mention	in	this	passage.	 In	DA,	however,	he	assumes	a	
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motivational	power.	It	thus	forms	a	first	part	of	our	mereology	of	the	agent.	The	rational	part	of	the	soul,	equally,	consists	in	two	different	faculties.	Aristotle	divides	it	 into	a	theoretical	and	a	practical	faculty:	he	writes	that	the	‘two	rational	faculties	may	be	designated	the	Scientific	Faculty	[theoretical	rea-son,	 to	 epistēmonikon]	 and	 the	 Calculative	 Faculty	 [practical	 reason,	 to	 logis-
tikon]	respectively’	(NE	1139a:6-11,	trans.	Rackham).	These	faculties	reflect	the	two	things	which	our	capacity	for	rationality	enables	us	to	do.	(1)	Firstly,	it	ena-bles	us	to	think	about	matters	of	fact	and	their	explanation:	we	are	capable,	for	example,	of	conducting	scientific	 investigations.	This	 is	done	by	our	 faculty	of	theoretical	reason.	(2)	Secondly,	our	capacity	for	rationality	enables	us	to	think	about	what	we	do.	This	is	done	by	our	faculty	of	practical	reason.	This	faculty,	therefore,	like	the	appetitive	faculty,	can	motivate	us	to	act.	It	thus	also	belongs	to	the	human	being	as	an	agent,	forming	a	second	part	of	our	mereology.		In	sum,	on	Aristotle’s	picture,	the	human	soul	consists	 in	an	irrational	and	a	rational	part,	each	of	which	consists	in	two	different	faculties.	The	human	
agent,	more	specifically,	consists	in	the	two	motivational	faculties:	the	appetitive	faculty,	belonging	to	the	irrational	part,	and	the	faculty	of	practical	reason	be-longing	to	the	part	that	has	reason.	Now	we	have	sketched	a	basic	picture	of	the	human	agent,	we	can	consider	how,	for	Aristotle,	 its	different	parts	can	play	a	role	in	initiating	action.		(1) The	Rational	Part	Initiating	Action		
																																								 																					close	tie	between	the	appetitive	faculty	and	the	capacity	for	sense	perception,	arguing	that	our	desires	cannot	arise	but	in	response	to	sensation	(see	DA	iii.7).	
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Let	us	first	consider	how	the	rational	part	can	initiate	action.	Because	they	pos-sess	the	faculty	of	practical	reason,	human	agents	are	capable	of	a	uniquely	hu-man	 form	of	 voluntary	 action:	 rational	 or	deliberative	 action,	which	Aristotle	calls	 praxis.11	 This,	 in	 short,	 is	 action	 which	 involves	 rational	 deliberation	(bouleusis).	On	Aristotle’s	characterisation,	practical	reason	is	our	faculty	of	de-
liberation:	it	allows	us	to	consider	different	routes	of	action	within	a	given	situ-ation,	and	judge	which	one	is	best.	In	contrast	to	other	animals,	which	are	bound	to	immediately	and	unreflectively	follow	their	every	inclination,	humans	can	de-liberate	about	what	to	do	(see	NE	1139a:	18-20).	Aristotle	 describes	 in	 detail	 how	 practical	 deliberation	works.	 On	 his	view,	deliberation	is	guided	by	the	question	what	would	be	the	right	thing	to	do.	When	we	act	rationally,	we	are	guided	by	the	ends	we	want	to	achieve:	our	aims	and	 projects,	 the	 things	we	 find	 important.	 Aristotle’s	 term	 for	 these	 is	wish	(boulêsis	–	a	term	closely	related	to	his	term	for	deliberation).12	He	is	clear	that	our	wishes	are	always	things	we	judge	to	be	good.	He	writes	that	‘that	what	ap-
																																								 																					11	Most	translators,	though,	simply	translate	praxis	as	‘action’,	without	specifying	that	it	is	specifically	rational	or	deliberative.	Rackham	explains	in	a	footnote	that	praxis	‘means	rational	action,	conduct.	The	movements	of	animals,	Aristotle	appears	to	think,	are	mere	reactions	to	the	stimuli	of	sensation’	(Rackham,	1934:	328fn).	Though,	at	times,	Aristo-tle	does	seem	to	use	praxis,	and	 its	related	verb	prattein,	 in	a	more	general	sense,	 to	denote	voluntary	action	in	general	(see	Irwin,	2000b:	315).	When	speaking	of	praxis	in	this	chapter,	 I	am	referring	 to	deliberative	action	specifically.	 I	will	 further	refine	my	interpretation	of	praxis	when	spelling	out	our	taxonomy	of	regulatory	styles	(see	section	C	in	this	chapter).		12	From	now	on,	when	I	use	the	term	wish	in	this	thesis,	it	is	specifically	in	this	Aristo-telean	sense.	
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pears	good	to	each	person	is	wished	for	by	[her]’	(NE	1113a:	24-25,	trans.	Rack-ham,	emphasis	mine).	Our	wishes,	then,	form	the	starting	point	of	rational	delib-eration.	This	seems	plausible:	when	reasoning	about	how	we	should	act,	we	are	guided	by	the	question	what	we	think	is	worth	achieving.	We	deliberate	about	what	to	do,	then,	in	order	to	find	out	how	we	can	achieve	 our	wishes.	Wishes,	 on	 Aristotle’s	 view,	 are	 not	 particular	 things	we	want	to	achieve	at	a	specific	time	or	place,	but	things	we	generally	aspire	for.	The	task	of	deliberation,	for	Aristotle,	is	to	select	the	appropriate	courses	of	action	which	 can	help	us	 achieve	 the	 things	we	wish	 for	 in	particular	 situations.	He	writes	that,	in	deliberation,	agents	‘[f]irst	set	some	end	before	themselves,	and	then	proceed	to	consider	by	which	it	can	be	attained	best	and	most	easily’	(NE	1112b:	16-18).	For	example,	 if	 I	wish	for	physical	health,	my	deliberation	will	help	me	identify	those	courses	of	action	which	should	help	me	achieve	this	end:	e.g.	take	the	stairs	instead	of	the	lift,	decline	the	third	glass	of	wine,	or	go	to	bed	early.	Note	that,	for	Aristotle,	‘[w]e	deliberate	not	about	ends	but	about	means’	(NE	1112b:	12).	He	seems	to	assume	that	our	ends	and	values	in	life	are	a	given,	or	at	least	he	does	not	say	much	about	how	we	come	to	have	them.	Our	wishes	can	thus	be	considered	the	‘input’	of	practical	deliberation.13	To	 explain	how	deliberation	works	precisely,	Aristotle	 introduces	 the	concept	of	the	practical	syllogism.	The	practical	syllogism	is	analogous,	but	cru-cially	different,	to	the	demonstrative	syllogism.	The	demonstrative	syllogism	is	a	form	of	theoretical	reasoning:	it	consists	in	two	theoretical	premises	–	a	minor	premise	and	a	major	premise	–	which,	paired	 together,	 result	 in	a	 theoretical																																									 																					13	For	a	discussion	of	Aristotle’s	claim	that	deliberation	is	about	means	and	not	ends,	see	e.g.	Cammack	(2013),	Cooper	(1986),	Thornton	(1982),	and	Wiggins	(1975-6).	
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conclusion.	The	minor	premise	is	always	a	specific	statement,	whilst	the	major	premise	is	a	general	statement.	When	faced	with	certain	specific	statements	(for	example,	 “Socrates	 is	 human”),	 reason	 recognises	 that	 certain	 general	 state-ments	 apply	 to	 them	 (“All	 humans	 are	mortal”).	 The	 combination	 of	 a	minor	premise	with	a	relevant	major	premise	then	yields	a	specific	conclusion	(“Socra-tes	is	mortal”).	In	the	practical	syllogism,	in	contrast,	the	major	premise	is	a	gen-
eral	wish	(for	example,	“I	should	aspire	for	health”).	The	minor	premise	concerns	a	particular	situation	(at	tx),	in	which	different	courses	of	action	are	available	(I	am	offered	a	piece	of	cake).	My	practical	reason	reveals	how,	in	this	particular	situation,	this	wish	may	be	achieved	(by	not	eating	the	piece	of	cake).	Thus,	ra-ther	than	a	theoretical	conclusion,	the	practical	syllogism	is	supposed	to	produce	an	action	(I	refrain	from	eating	the	cake).	In	the	case	of	the	theoretical	syllogism,	Aristotle	writes,	‘the	mind	must	affirm	the	conclusion,	but	in	the	practical	syllo-gism	it	must	immediately	act	on	it’	(NE	11147a:	26-28).	Basically,	the	idea	is	that	in	deliberation,	practical	reason	recognises	spe-cific	situations	as	situations	in	which	a	certain	wish	may	be	achieved.	A	sensory	perception	thus	offers	an	opportunity	to	further	a	valued	end.	Taking	this	oppor-tunity	 is	 the	rational	connection	between	a	particular	 situation	and	a	general	wish:	given	that	I	want	to	be	healthy,	and	given	my	current	situation	in	which	I	am	confronted	with	cake,	the	rational	thing	for	me	to	do	is	not	to	eat	it.	Sarah	Broadie	(1994)	explains	this	point	as	follows:	
The	practical	inquirer	tries	to	identify	a	possible	determinate	action,	the	doing	of	which	would	render	[her]	circumstances,	C,	circumstances	under	which	the	practicable	good	or	best	 is	achieved.	The	chosen	action	 (call	 it	 ‘A’)	 is	 like	 the	theoretical	middle	term	because	it	is	selected	as	mediating	in	practical	fashion	between	the	agent's	situation	and	[her]	objective.	(Broadie,	1994:	225).	
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	The	practical	syllogism	thus	starts	form	a	rational	wish.	It	seems,	how-ever,	 that	 the	 practical	 syllogism	 can	 also	 operate	with	more	 specific	general	rules	for	action,	which	are	not	exactly	wishes,	but	are	aimed	towards	a	wish:	I	may,	for	example,	operate	with	the	general	rule	that	I	should	avoid	sugary	foods,	which	aims	towards	my	general	wish	for	health.	Of	course,	whether	or	not	one	assumes	such	a	distinction	depends	on	how	narrowly	one	wants	to	define	a	wish.	One	could	say	that	I	wish	to	avoid	excessive	sugar	consumption,	just	like	I	wish	to	take	the	stairs	rather	than	the	lift,	and	that	these	wishes	can	be	clustered	to-gether	into	a	higher	level	wish	for	health.	Alternatively,	one	could	say	our	wishes	can	often	be	attained	through	attending	to	general	rules,	and	so	we	often	come	to	operate	with	such	rules	when	engaging	in	practical	deliberation.	These	rules	are	not	 themselves	wishes,	but	adopted	by	our	practical	 reason	because	 they	tend	to	help	us	achieve	our	wishes.	This	seems	to	me	the	best	explanation,	but	the	distinction	is	of	no	further	relevance	here.	We	can	say	that	practical	deliber-ation	always	happens	in	light	of	our	wishes,	and	our	practical	syllogisms	always	start	from	a	general	rule	which	either	is,	or	is	aimed	towards,	a	wish.	In	what	follows,	I	will	speak	of	wishes,	ends,	and	general	rules	interchangeably.	The	task	of	practical	reason	is	thus	to	find	out	how	and	when	to	apply	general	rules.	But	there	seems	to	be	a	problem	with	this	picture.	For	Aristotle	maintains	that	practical	reason	cannot	work	with	general	or	absolute	rules.	For	Aristotle,	doing	what	we	 think	best	cannot	simply	be	achieved	by	 following	a	specific	set	of	rules:	it	requires	endless	practice,	through	which	our	practical	rea-son	becomes	better	at	determining	what	should	be	done	in	each	and	every	spe-cific	 situation.	 ‘When	we	 are	 discussing	 actions,’	 he	writes,	 ‘although	 general	
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statements	 have	 a	 wider	 application,	 particular	 statements	 are	 closer	 to	 the	truth.	This	is	because	actions	are	concerned	with	particular	facts’	(NE	1107a:	30-3).	“What	should	I	do	now?”	is	not	a	question	which	can	be	answered	by	appeal-ing	to	a	general	rule,	but	to	which	may	require	a	different	answer	in	every	single	situation.	But	there	is	a	way	out	of	this	problem.	With	Broadie	(1994),	I	assume	that	practical	reason	has	a	dual	function.	It	is	not	just	responsible	for	figuring	out	
how	a	general	rule	can	be	applied	at	tx:	it	also	assesses	whether	or	not	this	rule	
should	be	applied	at	tx.	The	mere	fact	that	we	hold	certain	imperatives	to	be	gen-erally	true	does	not	entail	they	should	always	be	applied	(this	would,	indeed,	be	absurd:	it	is	definitely	good	for	my	health	to	take	walks,	but	I	should	not,	there-fore,	spend	every	minute	of	my	entire	life	walking).	For	this	reason,	practical	rea-son,	though	it	works	with	general	rules,	is	still	concerned	with	particulars,	since	it	needs	to	figure	out	which	rules	to	apply	when.	Broadie	makes	this	point	by	saying	that	any	deliberation	about	how	to	achieve	a	certain	end	at	tx	always	en-tails	deliberation	about	whether	or	not	this	end	should	be	achieved	at	tx.	Deliber-ation	might	reveal	that	a	certain	end	may	only	be	achieved	in	such	a	way	at	tx	that	it	is	not,	at	tx,	desirable	all	things	considered.	‘Deliberating	on	the	means	to	O’,	Broadie	writes,	 ‘may	show	that	pursuing	O	under	the	actual	circumstances	would	cost	something	one	values	more	or	something	without	which	O	would	be	useless	or	unsatisfying’	(Broadie,	1994:	239).	Deliberating	is	not	just	figuring	out	which	means	are	available	at	tx	to	achieve	a	certain	end,	it	also,	and	simultane-ously,	means	figuring	out	whether	it	is	best	to	effectively	achieve	this	end	at	tx	given	how	this	may	be	done	there	and	then.		One	might	think	this	explanation	flies	in	the	face	of	Aristotle’s	statement	
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that	deliberation	is	about	means,	not	ends:	for	this	second	function	of	practical	reason	seems	to	amount	to	deliberation	about	ends.	But	this	is	only	apparently	so.	This	is	because	whether	or	not	an	agent	thinks	a	certain	end	should	be	pur-sued	at	tx	will	depend	on	whether	she	thinks	this	is	the	best,	or	even	a	good,	thing	to	do	at	tx	–	given	how	it	can	there	and	then	be	pursued.	As	such,	this	is	itself	a	deliberation	about	the	best	means	to	the	highest	end	of	doing	what	is	best.	As	Broadie	points	out,	Aristotle’s	remark	that	deliberation	is	only	about	means,	just	means	‘that	the	practical	agent	does	not	ask	whether	[s]he	would	pursue	[her]	
formal	end,	i.e.	doing	what	is	best	under	the	circumstances’	(Broadie,	1994:	241,	emphases	mine).14	This	is	always	the	ultimate	objective	of	the	agent,	according	to	Aristotle,	and	this	is	itself	never	deliberated	on.		In	sum,	on	this	interpretation,	our	practical	reason	does	work	with	gen-eral	rules,	but	in	figuring	how	they	can	be	applied	at	tx	it	simultaneously	deter-mines	whether	 it	 is	best,	all	 things	considered,	 to	effectively	apply	 them	at	 tx.	Before	concluding	this	interpretation	of	Aristotle’s	account	of	deliberation,	one	obvious	problem	requires	addressing.	The	term	“deliberation”	seems	to	refer	to	a	fairly	conscious,	and	time-consuming,	process.	But,	most	of	the	time,	we	do	not	consciously	reflect	on	what	we	should	do	–	we	simply	do.	If	deliberative	action	must	feature	deliberation,	it	seems	that	the	scope	of	this	kind	of	action	is	quite	narrow	for	Aristotle.	Does	this	mean	our	actions	are	not	deliberative	most	of	the	time?	This	seems	a	questionable	implication,	since	deliberative	action	refers	to	
																																								 																					14	 Similar	points,	 that	deliberation	 can	be	about	 ends	 insofar	 as	 they	are	 themselves	means	to	the	formal	end	of	the	good,	are	made	by	Cooper	(1986),	Thornton	(1982),	and	Wiggins	(1975-6).	
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rational	 and	 distinctively	 human	 action.	 Surely,	 even	 when	 we	 do	 not	 con-sciously	reflect	about	what	to	do,	our	actions	are	often	both	rational	and	distinc-tively	human:	our	actions	often	still	exhibit	practical	intelligence.	To	my	mind,	the	most	 reasonable	 solution	 to	 this	problem	 is	 to	assume	 that	Aristotle	 con-ceives	of	deliberation	quite	broadly.	Broadie	(1994)	suggests	that,	even	though	Aristotle	depicts	deliberation	as	a	quite	conscious	process,		
it	would	have	been	natural	 for	him	to	extend	the	concept	so	 that	 it	relates	 to	situations	which	psychologically	(or	phenomenologically)	differ	from	delibera-tion,	but	which	exemplify	the	sort	of	logical	and	explanatory	structure	that	de-liberation	exemplifies.	(Broadie,	1994:	80)15		On	my	reading,	therefore,	practical	reason	does	not	necessarily	involve	thought,	or	at	least	not	in	any	straightforward	sense.	It	regulates	action	through	applying	general	rules	whilst	weighing	up	whether	these	general	rules	should	indeed	be	applied	in	a	given	situation.	The	outcome	of	this	process	yields	an	imperative,	which	can	be	described	as	an	“I	should”.	But	neither	the	starting	point	of	practical	deliberation,	nor	 the	outcome,	 is	necessarily	consciously	 formulated	or	 inten-tionally	implemented.	(Indeed,	on	Aristotle’s	view,	the	practical	syllogism	is	sup-posed	to	immediately	produce	action.)			(2) The	Irrational	Part	Initiating	Action	In	sum,	on	the	reading	I	propose,	the	function	of	practical	reason	is	to	determine,	in	every	particular	situation,	what	the	best	course	of	action	is	in	that	situation.	If	
																																								 																					15	This	point	is	developed	more	extensively	by	Coope	(2010).	Another	similar	interpreta-tion	of	Aristotelean	deliberation	can	be	found	Segvic	(2009).	
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all	goes	well,	this	should	immediately	result	in	action:	if	all	goes	well,	for	exam-ple,	I	immediately	decline	the	cake.	Of	course,	as	most	of	us	know,	all	does	not	always	go	well.	Aristotle	recognises	that	human	beings	don’t	always	manage	to	act	as	they	think	they	should.	On	his	explanation,	this	is	down	to	our	appetitive	faculty,	belonging	to	the	irrational	part	of	the	soul.	Like	practical	reason,	recall,	the	appetitive	faculty	has	the	power	to	initiate	action:	‘Desire’,	Aristotle	writes,	‘can	set	the	various	parts	of	the	body	in	motion’	(NE	1147a:	35).	The	problem	is	that	 its	 motivational	 power	 can	 operate	 independently	 of	 practical	 reason.	Whilst	our	wishes	are	after	what	we	think	is	good,	our	desires	aren’t	necessarily:	the	motivational	power	of	practical	judgment	is	connected	to	what	is	best,	whilst	the	motivational	power	of	the	appetitive	part	is	often	connected	to	pleasure.	At	times,	we	lust	for	things	that	aren’t	good.	Though	pleasure	and	the	good	are	not	inherently	incompatible	for	Aristotle,	they	often	are	in	practice,	at	the	level	of	particular	situations:	our	faculty	of	desire	is	often	after	pleasures	that,	at	tx,	do	
not	contribute	to	what	we	judge	best.	For	example,	when	I	am	offered	the	cake,	I	could	decline	the	offer	and	so	contribute	to	my	rational	end	of	healthy	eating	–	but	I	might	also	long	for	the	pleasure	of	consuming	it.	For	this	reason,	our	two	faculties	are	often	in	conflict.	According	to	Aris-totle,	then,	our	appetitive	faculty	has	the	power	to	disrupt	the	workings	of	prac-tical	reason.	Whilst	practical	reason	aims	to	help	us	achieve	our	rational	wishes,	desire	 can	make	 this	 quite	 difficult:	 ‘the	 rational	 part	 of	 the	 soul	 ‘urges	 [the	agent]	in	the	right	direction	and	encourages	[her]	to	take	the	best	course’,	Aris-totle	writes,	but	sometimes	our	appetitive	faculty	‘struggles	and	strains	against	the	rational’	(NE	1102b:	17-18).	Thus	far	our	sketch	of	Aristotle’s	mereology	of	the	agent.	Depending	on	
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the	interplay	of	these	different	parts,	an	agent	will	display	different	regulatory	styles.	But	before	we	can	turn	to	our	discussion	of	these,	one	more	notion	needs	to	be	introduced:	Aristotle’s	notion	of	choice.	This	way,	we	can	take	this	notion	into	account	when	constructing	our	taxonomy	of	regulatory	styles.		
B.3 Aristotle’s	Conception	of	Choice	Aristotle’s	term	for	choice	is	prohairesis.16	It	is	clear	that	he	very	closely	connects	choice	with	practical	reason.	On	his	view,	choice	concerns	the	particular	means	which	help	achieve	our	wishes:	Aristotle	explains	that	‘wish	is	more	concerned	with	the	end,	and	choice	with	the	means:	e.g.	we	wish	to	be	healthy,	but	choose	things	that	will	make	us	healthy’	(NE	111b:	26-28).	Choice,	in	other	words,	con-cerns	the	selection	of	the	middle	term	of	the	practical	syllogism;	accordingly,	it	is	 the	outcome	of	 rational	deliberation:	 ‘the	object	of	choice’,	Aristotle	writes,	‘has	been	selected	as	the	result	of	deliberation’	(NE	1113a:	3-5).	In	book	III	of	the	NE,	Aristotle	even	explicitly	defines	choice	as	‘voluntary	action	preceded	by	de-liberation’	(NE	1112a:	17).	As	Broadie	puts	it,	practical	deliberation	and	choice	‘are	conceptually	inseparable:	just	as	the	aim	of	deliberation	is	to	reach	a	rea-soned	choice,	so	rational	choice	is	reached	only	through	deliberation’	(Broadie,	1994,	179).	Choice,	for	Aristotle,	is	clearly	something	that	practical	reason	does:	I	submit,	therefore,	that	practical	reason	can	be	considered	our	faculty	of	choice.	But,	on	Aristotle’s	definition,	choice	is	connected	with	reason	as	well	as	with	desire.	Further	on	in	book	III,	he	writes	that	‘choice	is	a	deliberate	desire’	
																																								 																					16	Though	some	translate	this	 term	differently,	e.g.	as	decision	(Irwin,	2010)	or	pursuit	(Ross,	1954).		
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(NE	1113a:	12,	trans.	Rackham,	emphasis	mine),17	and	in	book	VI,	it	reads	that	‘the	origin	of	choice	 is	appetition	and	purposive	reasoning’	(NE	1139a:	32-33,	emphasis	mine).	Judging	from	these	passages,	Aristotle’s	view	is	that	choice	def-
initionally	results	from	a	combination	of	reason	as	well	as	desire.	It	thus	appears	to	bear	a	connection	with	both	our	motivational	faculties	(though	matters,	as	we	will	see	shortly,	are	not	that	simple).		
C. A	TAXONOMY	OF	REGULATORY	STYLES	Finally,	then,	we	can	turn	to	our	taxonomy	of	regulatory	styles.	In	the	NE,	Aris-totle	describes	a	set	of	moral	dispositions,	which	I	will	study	as	a	set	of	regulatory	styles:	I	will	consider	their	differing	underlying	structures,	and	disregard	their	moral	status.	 It	must	be	noted,	here,	 that	Aristotle	considers	 these	regulatory	styles	to	be	more	or	less	chronic	configurations,	since	they	are	dispositions	of	character:	they	do	not	describe	the	structure	of	agency	in	individual	actions,	but	rather	the	overall	manner	of	organising	action	in	 individual	agents.	Neverthe-less,	these	dispositions	still	describe	how	an	agent	so	disposed	will	be	inclined	to	act	in	every	singular	instance.		In	what	 follows,	 I	 will	 discuss	 three	 of	 the	 dispositions	 he	 describes:	
sōphrosunē,	akrasia,	and	enkrateia.18	Note	 that,	 in	 the	NE,	 these	 three	disposi-tions	all	pertain	to	the	sphere	of	(physical)	pleasure	and	pain:	they	concern	our	self-regulation	in	the	context	of	food,	sex,	sleep,	and	the	like.	I	will,	however,	take	
																																								 																					17	Trans.	Thomson:	‘choice	is	a	deliberate	appetition’.		
18	Aristotle	describes	many	more	moral	dispositions	 in	 the	NE,	pertaining	 to	different	spheres	including	fear	and	confidence,	anger,	and	honour.		
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them	to	represent	general	regulatory	styles.	In	this	section,	I	will	show	how	these	three	regulatory	styles	be	differentiated	with	reference	to	Aristotle’s	mereology	of	 the	agent,	 and	discuss	whether	 (as	well	 as	how)	choice	 features	 in	each	of	them.	 	
C.1 Sōphrosunē	The	first	regulatory	style	I	will	discuss	is	called	sōphrosunē,	often	translated	as	temperance.19	This	is	a	very	harmonious	style	of	regulation:	in	sōphrosunē,	prac-tical	reason	and	desire,	though	distinct	faculties	still,	pull	the	agent	toward	the	same	course	of	action.	In	sōphrosunē,	Aristotle	writes,	the	faculty	of	desire	‘is	in	complete	harmony	with	the	rational	principle’	(NE	1102b:	26-8).	This	is	because	the	temperate	agent	only	desires	what	she	thinks	is	best:	the	temperate	agent,	Aristotle	writes,	‘is	so	constituted	as	to	take	no	pleasure	in	anything	contrary	to	[her]	principle’	(NE	1152a:	2-3).	According	to	Aristotle,	this	is	possible	because	the	irrational	part	‘does	in	a	way	participate	in	reason,	in	the	sense	that	it	is	sub-missive	and	obedient	to	it’	(NE	1102b:	30-34).	The	temperate	agent	has	success-fully	subjugated	her	desires	to	her	reason.	As	a	result,	chasing	what	is	good	and	chasing	pleasure	are	not	incompatible	for	her.	In	sōphrosunē,	therefore,	the	prac-tical	syllogism	works	efficiently	and	without	disruption.	When	I	am	offered	the	cake,	I	am	not	even	tempted	to	accept	it:	I	don’t	have	a	desire	to	eat	anything	I	don’t	think	is	good	for	me.	I	decline	the	offer	without	any	problems.	Strictly	speaking,	however,	these	are	not	the	sole	defining	characteristics	
																																								 																					19	I	will	leave	sōphrosunē	untranslated,	but	will	adopt	the	term	‘temperate’	as	the	accom-panying	adjective.		
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of	sōphrosunē.	Aristotle	considers	sōphrosunē	a	virtue,	which	is	a	normatively	ro-bust	classification:	only	those	agents	who	have	the	right	better	judgment	can	be	considered	temperate	for	him.	The	temperate	agent,	strictly	speaking,	does	not	only	as	she	judges	best,	but	also	makes	a	correct	judgment.	Aristotle’s	character-isation	of	 it,	 therefore,	also	takes	 into	account	the	content	of	the	agent’s	 judg-ment.	A	more	precise	characterisation	of	sōphrosunē,	in	this	regard,	is	found	later	in	the	NE:	in	book	VI,	Aristotle	writes	that	sōphrosunē	requires	the	right	kind	of	reasoning,	and	a	correct	corresponding	desire	(see	NE	1139a:	22-26).	But	in	this	thesis,	I	am	bracketing	the	morally	objectivist	dimension	of	Aristotle’s	views.	On	my	adapted,	content-neutral	reading	of	sōphrosunē,	its	characteristics	are	simply	that	reason	and	desire	align.	What	the	judgment	of	the	agent	in	question	consists	in	does	not	matter.		So	how	can	we	classify	sōphrosunē	within	our	taxonomy?	It	is	clear	that	it	belongs	to	the	genus	of	voluntary	actions,	since	the	origin	of	action	lies	within	the	agent.	But	what	are	the	differentiae	of	sōphrosunē?	First,	since	action	is	the	result	of	successful	deliberation,	we	must	classify	sōphrosunē	as	a	form	of	delib-
erative	action	(praxis).	As	such,	it	is	also	clear	that	sōphrosunē	features	choice,	since	 choice	 was	 defined	 as	 ‘voluntary	 action	 preceded	 by	 deliberation’	 (NE	1112a:	17).20	But	choice	was	not	merely	connected	to	deliberation	and	practical	reason:	it	also	involved	desire.	But	since,	in	sōphrosunē,	the	appetitive	faculty	is	subjugated	to	reason	and	so	aligns	with	it,	we	can	see	how	this	choice	is	at	once	
																																								 																					20	 It	might	seem,	at	 this	point,	as	 if	 the	differentiae	 ‘is	a	 form	of	praxis’	 and	 ‘features	choice’	are	the	very	same	thing.	But,	as	we	will	see,	matters	are	more	complicated	(see	section	C.3	in	this	chapter).		
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connected	to	the	appetitive	part.	Sōphrosunē	is	thus	a	form	of	deliberative,	vol-untary	agency,	which	features	choice.		
C.2 Enkrateia	Our	second	regulatory	style	is	called	enkrateia,	often	translated	as	continence	or	self-control.21	In	enkrateia,	the	two	motivational	faculties	of	the	soul	are	in	con-flict:	the	agent	wants	to	do	as	she	judges	right,	but	is	at	the	same	time	tempted	by	an	opposing	pleasure.	On	our	example,	I	recognise	that	refusing	the	cake	is	the	right	thing	to	do	for	me,	given	my	wish	to	be	healthy.	The	sight	of	the	cake,	however,	also	triggers	a	desire	for	the	pleasure	of	consuming	it.	In	the	face	of	this	conflict,	 the	enkratic	agent	manages	 to	subdue	her	desires	 to	her	reason,	and	does	eventually	act	in	accordance	with	the	latter:	in	enkrateia,	Aristotle	writes,	the	‘irrational	element	which	opposes	and	runs	counter	to	reason	[…]	is	obedient	to	reason’	(NE	1102a:	24-26).	Though	severely	tempted	to	eat	the	cake,	I	manage	to	pull	myself	together	and	decline.	In	enkrateia,	therefore,	the	workings	of	the	practical	syllogism	are	threatened	but	not	disrupted.	Since	it	originates	from	within	the	agent,	enkrateia	must	be	classified	as	another	form	of	voluntary	action.	Further,	like	in	sōphrosunē,	actions	are	the	re-sult	of	rational	deliberation.	This	means	enkrateia	is	also	a	deliberative	form	of	action.	On	the	same	grounds,	it	must	also	feature	choice:	and	Aristotle,	indeed,	confirms	that	the	enkratic	agent	‘acts	from	choice’	(NE	1111b:	14).	Enkrateia	can	be	differentiated	 from	sōphrosunē	because,	 in	enkrateia,	 the	appetitive	 faculty	
																																								 																					21	I	will	also	leave	enkrateia	untranslated	–	partially	because	I	will	attribute	a	different	place	to	the	notion	of	self-control	within	this	picture	of	agency	(see	section	C.3	in	this	chapter).	
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does	not	align	with	reason.	The	enkratic	agent’s	actions	are	determined	by	her	practical	reason,	but	not	by	her	appetitive	faculty:	she	does	what	she	judges	to	be	right,	without	fully	wanting	to.	There	remains	an	inner	conflict.	This	characterisation	of	enkrateia,	however,	seems	problematic.	Choice,	we	saw,	was	connected	to	both	the	rational	and	the	appetitive	faculty.	So	how	can	enkrateia	 feature	 choice,	 if	 the	 appetitive	part	 is	 subdued	by	 the	 rational	part?	 A	 simple,	 and	 plausible,	 solution	would	 be	 to	 suggest	 that	 the	 enkratic	agent	experiences	conflicting	desires,	one	for	pleasure	and	one	for	what	is	best.	If	–	as	Aristotle	explicitly	states	–	the	enkratic	agent	makes	a	choice,	this	means	she	must	have	a	desire	to	do	so.	But	the	enkratic	agent	also	desires	to	do	other-wise,	which	means	she	must	also	have	a	conflicting	desire	for	pleasure.	But	this	solution	is	complicated	by	an	apparent	contradiction	on	Aristotle’s	part:	in	book	III,	he	asserts	that	it	is	impossible	to	desire	two	conflicting	things	at	once:	‘a	de-sire’,	he	writes,	cannot	‘be	contrary	[…]	to	another	desire’	(NE	1111b:	15).	But	how,	then,	is	enkrateia	possible?	This	apparent	mystery	 can	be	 solved	by	 looking	at	 the	original	Greek	terms	used	by	Aristotle.	Interestingly	–	and	crucially	–	it	turns	out	that	he	uses	several	different	words,	which	can	all	be	translated	as	“desire”.	These	different	terms	each	carry	different	meanings	and	nuances.	It	might	thus	be	that	Aristotle,	rather	than	contradicting	himself,	is	speaking	of	different	kinds	of	desire	in	the	relevant	passages.	The	different	Aristotelean	terms	for	desire	are	neatly	distin-guished	by	Giles	Pearson	in	his	book	Aristotle	on	Desire	(2012).	Pearson	argues	that,	with	the	term	‘orexis’,	Aristotle	denotes	a	broad	category	of	desires,	which	includes	three	different	forms:	(1)	epitumia,	understood	as	the	desire	for	pleas-ure;	(2)	thumos,	understood	as	the	desire	for	retaliation;	and	(3)	wish	or	boulêsis,	
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understood	as	a	desire	for	what	we	rationally	grasp	as	good	(see	Pearson,	2012:	68-74).	Pearson	thus	classifies	our	wishes,	for	the	things	we	judge	to	be	good,	as	
rational	desires.	The	idea	is	that,	if	we	wish	for	something	because	we	judge	it	to	be	good,	we	have	a	rational	desire	for	it.	When	we	think	we	should	aim	for	some-thing,	we	must	also,	in	some	sense,	want	to	do	it.	To	support	his	interpretation,	Pearson	 refers	 to	 a	 crucial	 passage	 in	De	Anima	 [DA],	where	Aristotle	writes	about	the	human	soul	that	‘in	the	rational	part	there	will	be	boulêsis,	and	in	the	non-rational	part	epithumia	and	thumos;	and	if	the	soul	is	tripartite	there	will	be	
orexis	in	each	part’	(DA	432b:	4-7).	This	establishes	that	orexis	can	encompass	both	rational	and	non-rational	desires,	whilst	epithumia	denotes	a	non-rational	desire	specifically,	and	boulêsis	denotes	a	specifically	rational	desire.	Crucially,	Aristotle	often	uses	the	more	general	term	orexis	to	refer	to	a	specifically	rational	desire,	distinct	from	epithumia.	This	 solves	our	mystery.	When	we	return	 to	 the	passages	 in	Aristotle	which	appear	contradictory,	we	can	see	that	he	uses	a	different	term	for	desire	in	each.	When	defining	choice	as	deliberate	appetition,	Aristotle	uses	the	more	general	term	orexis.	We	can	posit	that	he	uses	this	more	general	term	here	to	denote	boulēsis,	a	wish	or	specifically	rational	desire.	This	seems	plausible.	Mak-ing	choices	indeed	involves	some	desire	of	sorts,	namely	our	wishes:	they	are	desires	by	practical	reason	for	what	we	judge	to	be	good.	Thus,	choice	is	indeed	connected	with	desire,	but	only	with	boulêsis	(i.e.	orexis	insofar	as	it	is	rational).	Crucially,	then,	when	stating	that	desires	cannot	be	conflicting	amongst	them-selves,	Aristotle	uses	the	word	epithumia.	What	Aristotle	means,	in	this	passage,	is	just	that	an	agent	cannot	at	once	have	an	epithumia	to	φ	and	an	epithumia	not	to	φ:	I	cannot,	at	once,	long	to	eat	the	cake	and	long	not	to	eat	it.	But	one	can	have	
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a	certain	epithumia	to	φ	whilst	rationally	desiring	not	to	φ:	I	can	long	the	pleas-ure	of	consuming	the	cake,	and	at	the	same	time	rationally	desire	not	to	 eat	it.22	For	Aristotle,	the	latter	scenario	would	not	entail	an	inherent	conflict	between	desires,	since	they	are	desires	of	a	different	kind.		This,	then,	is	precisely	what	happens	in	enkrateia:	the	agent	experiences	a	conflict	between	two	kinds	of	desire,	one	rational	and	one	irrational.	In	his	de-scriptions	of	enkrateia,	Aristotle	indeed	uses	the	word	epithumia	to	describe	the	desires	that	rebel	against	reason	(see	e.g.	NE1145b:	14).	Thus,	we	can	differen-tiate	enkrateia	as	follows:	like	sōphrosunē,	it	is	a	form	of	deliberative	voluntary	action,	 which	 features	 choice.	 But	 in	 sōphrosunē,	 the	 agent’s	 rational	 desire	(orexis/boulêsis)	 and	 her	 appetite	 (epithumia)	 align,	whilst	 in	 enkrateia,	 the	agent’s	rational	desire	is	in	conflict	with	her	appetite.			
C.3 Akrasia	This	brings	us	to	our	last	regulatory	style:	akrasia,	often	translated	as	weakness	of	the	will,	or	sometimes	as	incontinence.23	In	akrasia,	the	appetitive	and	the	ra-tional	part	of	the	soul	are	also	in	conflict,	pulling	the	agent	in	opposing	directions.	
																																								 																					22	Rackham	interprets	this	passage	in	the	same	way.	In	a	footnote,	he	explains	that	Aris-totle	means	‘you	cannot	feel	two	contradictory	desires	at	once’,	meaning	that	‘you	can-not	strictly	 speaking	at	 the	same	 time	desire	 to	eat	 the	cake	and	desire	not	 to	eat	 it’	(Rackham,	1934:	130).	But,	he	adds,	‘you	can	of	course	desire	two	incompatible	things:	you	may	want	to	eat	your	cake	and	have	it’	(Rackham,	1934:	130).	23	Translating	akrasia	as	“weakness	of	will”	seems	to	me	mistaken.	On	Aristotle’s	view,	as	will	be	discussed	later	on	(see	section	A	in	the	next	chapter),	there	seems	to	be	no	conceptual	space	for	something	like	a	will,	that	is,	some	faculty	independent	of	practical	
reason	that	can	choose	to	do	wrong.	Hence,	I	will	also	leave	akrasia	untranslated.	Richard	Sorabji	(2004)	agrees	with	this	point:	he	writes	that	the	discussion	of	akrasia	is	‘spoken	
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Aristotle	writes	 that	 ‘in	 [akratic]	 persons	 their	 impulses	 run	 counter	 to	 their	principle’	 (NE	1102b:	24,	 trans.	Rackham).	But,	unlike	 the	enkratic	agent,	 the	akratic	agent	does	not	manage	to	subdue	her	appetitive	faculty:	she	gives	in	to	her	impulses,	against	the	directs	of	her	reason.	On	our	example,	I	devour	the	of-fered	piece	of	cake,	despite	judging	it	better	not	to.	Akrasia	thus	refers	to	those	instances	of	agency	which	I	have	preciously	called	impulsive.		When	desire	trumps	reason	in	this	way,	this	seems	to	corrupt	practical	reason.	For,	according	to	Aristotle,	we	still	use	it,	but	for	an	end	we	do	not	judge	to	be	good.	We	can	still	find	the	right	means	to	achieve	our	desired	end	(I	know,	for	example,	that	I	must	eat	the	cake	to	achieve	my	end	of	pleasure),	and	so	our	actions	still	result	from	a	practical	syllogism	of	sorts	(see	NE	1147a:	25-1147b:	3).	But	the	starting	point	of	the	syllogism	–	the	practical	end	it	is	after	–	is	not	endorsed	by	practical	reason	at	tx.	We	could	say,	therefore,	that	the	practical	syl-logism	is	here	corrupted	by	desire:	it	no	longer	operates	in	the	service	of	reason,	but	is	corrupted	by	the	appetitive	faculty.		What	does	this	mean	for	our	classification	of	akrasia?	Like	sōphrosunē	and	enkrateia,	akrasia	belongs	to	the	class	of	voluntary	actions:	for	the	origin	of	the	action,	the	appetitive	faculty,	is	internal	to	the	agent	(this	was,	indeed,	em-phasised	by	Aristotle	when	he	defined	the	category	of	voluntary	actions).24	But	is	it	a	deliberative	form	of	voluntary	action?	And	does	it	feature	choice?	These	questions,	as	will	shortly	become	apparent,	are	quite	hard	to	an-swer.	But	before	we	can	address	them,	we	need	to	introduce	a	further	nuance	
																																								 																					of	as	Aristotle’s	explanation	of	weakness	of	will.	But	this	is	a	misnomer’	(Sorabji,	2004:	11).	24	See	section	B.1	in	this	chapter.		
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into	our	picture	of	akrasia.	For,	according	to	Aristotle,	akrasia	comes	in	two	dif-ferent	forms.	At	times,	he	explains,	the	inner	conflict	between	reason	and	desire	is	overt.	But	in	other	cases,	desire	befalls	the	agent	so	suddenly	that	she	fails	to	even	consider	what	the	best	course	of	action	would	have	been.	Accordingly,	Ar-istotle	distinguishes	between	two	types	of	akrasia:	weakness	(astheneia)	and	im-petuosity	(propeteia).	The	weak	agent	goes	through	a	process	of	deliberation,	yet	fails	to	act	in	accordance	with	its	outcome:	these	agents	‘deliberate	and	then	un-der	the	influence	of	their	feelings	fail	to	abide	by	their	decision’	(NE	1150b:	20).	The	impetuous	agent,	in	contrast,	skips	the	process	of	deliberation	and	acts	im-mediately	upon	a	desire,	which	only	later	she	finds	at	to	be	at	odds	with	her	rea-son:	these	people	‘are	carried	away	by	their	feelings	because	they	have	failed	to	deliberate’	(NE	1150b:	20-21).	At	the	time	of	the	action,	therefore,	the	impetuous	agent	experiences	no	inner	conflict,	but	afterwards	she	regrets	it:	this	indicates	that	her	rational	faculty,	in	retrospect,	rejects	the	course	of	action	taken.	This	is	why	her	actions	also	count	as	akratic.	We	saw	that	akrasia	is	a	form	of	voluntary	action,	and	this	clearly	holds	for	both	these	types.	But	does	akrasia	belong	to	the	narrower	category	of	delib-
erative	action?	This	is	debatable.	At	first	glance,	it	seems	that	akrasia	cannot	be	a	 form	 of	 deliberative	 action,	 because	 akratic	 actions	 are	 generated	 inde-pendently	–	indeed,	in	spite	–	of	practical	reason	and	its	deliberations.	Since	it	is	only	 in	virtue	of	our	practical	reason	that	we	are,	 for	Aristotle,	 capable	of	de-liberative	action,	one	might	want	to	conclude	that	akratic	actions	fall	outside	of	this	category.	This,	however,	seems	to	have	some	strange	implications.	 On	this	read-ing,	akrasia	would	be	a	reversal	to	animal	action:	for	it	would	amount	to	 mere	
				
62	
voluntary	action,	in	which	nonhuman	animals	also	take	part.	But	this	seems	too	strong	of	 a	 claim.	 For	akrasia	 still	 is	 a	 distinctively	human	 form	 of	 voluntary	action:	in	both	its	forms,	it	still	involves	rational	deliberation.	In	the	case	of	weak-ness,	this	is	plain	to	see:	for	what	is	distinct	about	the	weak	agent	is	that	she	does	form	a	better	judgment,	yet	fails	to	translate	it	 into	action.	This	sort	of	action,	surely,	does	not	occur	in	nonhuman	animals	–	they	do	not	act	against	any	better	judgments.	Even	though	the	weak	agent	does	not	follow	her	better	judgment,	the	sheer	fact	that	she	has	formed	one	surely	sets	her	kind	of	agency	apart	from	mere	voluntary	action.	Moreover,	this	also	seems	true	for	impetuosity.	Granted,	one	could	argue	that	this	form	of	akrasia	really	is	like	animal	action,	since	the	faculty	of	practical	reason	appears	to	be	entirely	bypassed.	I	would,	however,	argue	against	this	in-terpretation.	For,	as	Aristotle	sketches	it,	impetuosity	is	only	a	form	of	akrasia	because	it	involves	post	factum	regret.	The	wanton	agent,	who	acts	on	impulse	but	does	not	regret	her	actions	later,	would	–	I	take	it	–	not	be	impetuous	for	Aristotle.	Regret,	in	other	words,	is	a	constitutive	element	of	impetuosity.	And	since	this	regret	 is	only	possible	 in	 light	of	rational	deliberation	after	 the	 fact,	impetuosity	 is	 a	 form	of	 agency	which	necessarily	 involves	deliberation.	 It	 is,	therefore,	also	a	distinctively	human	form	of	agency	–	again,	regretting	a	past	impulsive	action	is	a	situation	a	nonhuman	animal	will	just	not	find	itself	in.	Nevertheless,	 it	 seems	 that,	 for	Aristotle,	deliberative	actions	are	 those	which	effectively	result	 from	rational	deliberation,	and	not	 those	which	merely	involve	it.	At	the	very	start	of	the	NE,	Aristotle	makes	it	clear	that	praxis	is	always	
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aimed	at	the	good	(see	NE	1094a:	18-22).25	We	must	thus	conclude	that	akratic	actions	are	not	deliberative,	since	they	do	not	aim	at	the	good.	Akrasia	may	involve	some	activity	of	practical	reason,	but	since	this	deliberation	does	not	affect	action,	akratic	actions	are	not	deliberative.		Thus,	akrasia	is	excluded	from	the	category	of	deliberative	action,	whilst	also	seeming	more	distinctly	human	than	the	more	general	class	of	mere	volun-tary	action.	As	such,	there	seems	to	be	a	blank	spot	in	Aristotle’s	classification	of	agency.	This,	in	fact,	is	precisely	suggested	by	Ursula	Coope	(2010).	She	argues	that	the	category	of	‘human	intentional	action’,	which	features	heavily	in	modern	philosophical	discussions,	has	no	real	place	in	Aristotle’s	theory	of	action	(Coope,	2010:	 439).	 Aristotle’s	 category	 of	 voluntary	 action,	 she	 suggests,	 seems	 ‘too	broad	a	category’	to	capture	it,	whilst	that	of	praxis	seems	‘too	narrow’	(Coope,	2010:	439).	And	it	 is	precisely	akrasia	which	would	fall	 in	between	these	two	Aristotelean	categories	for	Coope.	Her	reason	for	this,	however,	is	different	from	mine.	Coope’s	reason	is	that	the	akratic	agent	can	still	use	a	distinctively	human	form	of	calculation	in	order	to	obtain	her	desired	end,	even	if	this	end	is	not	ra-tionally	endorsed:	for	Aristotle,	she	writes,	‘the	akratic	person	can	calculate	how	to	get	the	object	of	[her]	desire’,	and	‘[t]he	capacity	for	calculation	is	a	reasoning	power	and	is	distinctively	human’	(Coope,	2010:	444.)	She	thus	refers	to	the	fact	that,	even	though	it	 is	corrupted,	akrasia	still	 involves	a	practical	syllogism	of	sorts,	which	is	a	specifically	human	kind	of	reasoning.	My	reason	for	classifying	
akrasia	as	a	distinctively	human	form	of	agency	was,	instead,	that	it	still	involves	
																																								 																					25	He	writes	that	‘among	the	ends	at	which	our	actions	(praktōn)	aim	there	be	one	which	we	wish	for	its	own	sake,	while	we	wish	the	others	only	for	the	sake	of	this	[…]	It	is	clear	that	this	one	ultimate	End	must	be	the	Good’	(NE	1094a:	18-22).		
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rational	deliberation,	even	if	its	outcomes	are	not	translated	into	action.	Coope,	therefore,	offers	an	additional	reason	as	to	why	we	might	want	to	invoke	a	sepa-rate	category	of	agency,	which	 is	narrower	than	voluntary	action	but	broader	than	deliberative	action,	and	to	which	instances	of	akrasia	belong.		This	point	does	not	further	matter	here.	In	any	case,	it	is	clear	that	akra-
sia	 is	 not	 deliberative	 for	 Aristotle.	 Our	 next	 question	 is	 whether	 it	 features	choice.	Prima	facie,	it	would	seem	that	it	does	not.	We	saw	that	choice	refers	to	actions	which	 follow	 the	outcome	of	 rational	deliberation.	Deliberative	action	and	choice,	therefore,	seem	to	come	together.	Indeed,	Aristotle	states	that	‘[t]he	irrational	animals’,	which	have	no	share	in	deliberative	action,	also	‘do	not	exer-cise	 choice’	 (NE	 1111b:	 12,	 trans.	 Rackham).	 It	 seems	 to	 follow	 that	akrasia,	which	we	established	was	not	deliberative,	doesn’t	feature	choice.	Aristotle	even	appears	to	confirm	this	when	he	writes	that,	when	our	actions	do	not	follow	from	reason,	they	do	not	count	as	chosen:	the	akratic	agent,	he	writes,	acts	‘not	from	choice	but	in	opposition	to	it	and	to	[her]	reasoning’	(NE	1148a:9).	Notwithstanding,	I	want	to	argue	that	akrasia	can	feature	choice.	Indeed,	Aristotle	explicitly	writes	about	the	akratic	agent	that	her	‘moral	choice	is	sound’	(NE	1152a:	17,	trans.	Rackham).	How	can	we	understand	this	claim?	And	about	which	akratic	agent	is	he	speaking?	The	key	to	understanding	this	claim,	I	sub-mit,	is	to	distinguish	between	choice	on	the	one	hand,	and	chosen	action	on	the	other.	Though	Aristotle	defines	choice	as	voluntary	action	resulting	from	delib-eration,	I	propose	to	understand	choice	as	the	mental	resolve	to	act	in	accordance	with	the	outcome	of	deliberation.	Choice,	on	this	interpretation,	refers	not	to	an	action,	but	to	an	agent’s	commitment	or	resolution	to	act.	Being	the	outcome	of	deliberation,	choice	refers	to	the	moment	an	agent	decides	on	the	best	possible	
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course	of	action	 in	a	particular	situation.	Chosen	action,	 then,	 refers	 to	action	which	is	in	accordance	with	the	choice	one	has	already	made.26	If	we	understand	choice	this	way,	we	can	see	that	one	type	of	akrasia	does	not	feature	choice,	whilst	the	other	does.	Clearly,	impetuosity	does	not.	This	form	 of	 agency,	 recall,	 did	 not	 involve	 any	 deliberation	 before	 action:	 these	agents	‘are	carried	away	by	their	feelings	because	they	have	failed	to	deliberate’	(NE	1150b:	20-21).	It	follows	that	the	impetuous	agent	does	not	make	a	choice	about	what	to	do	–	she	just	acts.	But	what	distinguishes	impetuosity	from	weak-ness,	I	submit,	is	that	the	weak	agent	does	make	a	choice.	This	type	of	akratic,	Aristotle	writes,	 ‘does	not	keep	to	the	resolve	[s]he	has	formed	after	delibera-tion’	(NE	1152a:	17-18,	trans.	Rackham).	This	means	that	she	has	gone	through	a	process	of	deliberation,	and	made	a	decision	how	she	should	act	on	this	basis.	Thus,	I	submit,	she	has	made	a	choice.	The	problem	is	that	her	desires	keep	her	from	acting	upon	it:	the	weak	’deliberate,	but	then	are	prevented	by	passion	from	keeping	to	their	resolution’	(NE	1150b:	20,	trans.	Rackham).27	Thus,	I	suggest,	what	happens	in	weakness	is	that	the	appetitive	faculty	prevents	the	agent	not	from	making	a	choice,	but	from	translating	that	choice	into	action.	When	Aristo-tle	writes	about	the	akratic	agent	that	her	‘moral	choice	is	sound’	(NE	1152a:	17,	
																																								 																					26	 In	 this	context,	 it	 is	also	worth	mentioning	Aristotle’s	claim,	made	 in	book	VI,	 that	‘[t]he	origin	of	action	(the	efficient,	not	the	final	cause)	is	choice’	(NE	1139a	32-33).	If	choice	is	the	cause	of	action,	then	surely	it	does	not	coincide	with	action.		27	Admittedly,	in	these	two	passages,	Aristotle	does	not	use	the	Greek	word	for	choice	(prohairsesis).	But	the	words	which	Rackham	translates	as	‘resolve’	and	‘resolution’	re-fer	to	the	outcome	of	deliberation	–	they	are	forms	of	the	verb	bouleuō,	which	means	“to	deliberate”	 (see	Liddell	 and	Scott,	1843/1940:	324).	On	 this	basis,	 and	given	 that	he	speaks	of	akratic	choice	 in	other	passages	(e.g.	NE	1148a:	9,	1152a:	17),	 I	 take	these	terms	to	mean	the	same	thing	as	choice	(prohairesis)	in	this	context.		
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trans.	Rackham),	and	that	she	acts	‘in	opposition	to	it’	(NE	1148a:9),	therefore,	I	assume	he	is	speaking	specifically	about	the	weak	akratic.	But	whether	akrasia	 involves	choice	or	not,	akratic	actions	are	clearly	never	chosen:	they	are,	in	the	end,	controlled	by	the	appetites	and	not	by	reason.	It	is	for	this	reason,	I	submit,	that	akrasia	is	not	a	form	of	deliberative	action:	it	is	only	when	choices	are	also	 translated	 into	action	that	we	have	deliberative	actions	for	Aristotle.	What	is	distinctive	about	deliberative	action	is	not	just	that	it	features	choice,	but	that	this	choice	is	also	converted	into	action.	This	happens	in	neither	form	of	akrasia.		We	have	now	differentiated	our	two	forms	of	akrasia.	But	there	might	be	a	 significant	 issue	with	 the	 reading	 I	 have	 advanced.	 In	 a	 2007	 paper,	 Devin	Henry	discusses	Aristotle’s	concept	of	weakness,	which	he	calls	‘genuine	akra-sia’.	Genuine	akrasia,	Henry	explains,	presents	us	with	a	more	serious	philosoph-ical	riddle	than	impetuosity	(which	he	calls	‘drunk-akrasia’):	whilst	we	can	ex-plain	 instances	 of	 impetuosity	 by	 pointing	 to	 the	 absence	 of	 deliberation,	 in-stances	 of	 weak	 akrasia	 cannot	 be	 explained	 in	 this	 manner.	 The	 genuinely	akratic	agent	knows	very	well	what	she	should	do.	As	such,	genuine	akrasia	ap-pears	 as	 a	mystery:	 on	what	 basis	 does	 she	 fail	 to	 act	 on	 this	 knowledge?	Of	course,	we	could	say	that	it	is	her	desire	for	an	opposing	pleasure	which	prevents	her	from	doing	so.	But	this	answer,	Henry	argues,	fails	to	explain	the	case	at	hand:	for,	as	we	have	seen,	the	enkratic	agent	(which	Henry	calls	‘self-controlled’)	also	desires	 a	 pleasure	 opposed	 to	 her	 reason.	 This	means	 that	 the	weak	 and	 the	enkratic	agent	share	the	same	disposition,	and	so	this	disposition	is	in	itself	not	a	sufficient	explanation	for	weak	akrasia.	On	this	basis,	Henry	concludes,	Aristo-tle	fails	to	 explain	why	 the	 genuinely	 akratic	 person	 yields	 to	 her	 pleasures	
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whilst	 the	enkratic	agent	doesn’t:	‘genuine	akrasia	cannot	be	explained	solely	in	terms	of	 the	 agent’s	beliefs	because	 [her]	beliefs	 are	 identical	 to	 those	of	 the	enkratic	person	who	exhibits	self-control	 in	the	same	situation’	(Henry,	2002:	267).		 Henry’s	solution	to	this	problem	is	to	posit	that	genuine	akrasia	lacks	in	rational	desire:	‘for	Aristotle’,	he	asserts,	‘genuinely	akratic	behaviour	is	due	to	the	absence	of	an	internal	conflict	that	a	desire	for	the	proper	pleasures	of	tem-perance	would	create	if	the	akratic	person	could	experience	them’	(Henry,	2002:	257).	That	is,	whilst	the	weak	akratic	shares	a	desire	for	bad	pleasure	with	the	enkratic	agent,	she	does	not	have	a	conflicting	desire	for	the	pleasure	that	acting	on	her	better	judgment	will	bring.	The	enkratic	agent,	in	contrast,	does	possess	a	desire	for	the	good.	This,	Henry	suggests,	can	explain	why	the	enkratic	goes	on	to	to	the	right	thing,	whilst	the	weak	akratic	doesn’t.	It	is	through	the	force	of	this	desire	that	the	enkratic	person	can	control	herself:	 ‘the	source	of	the	self-con-trolled	 person’s	 ability	 to	 restrain	 her	 appetite	 is	 an	 opposing	 desire	 for	 the	pleasures	 associated	 with	 being	 temperate’	 (Henry,	 2002:	 265).	 Conversely,	Henry	argues,	 it	 is	 the	 absence	of	 this	 sort	of	desire	which	 leads	 the	genuine	akratic	to	err:	‘the	source	of	the	genuinely	akratic	man’s	inability	to	restrain	his	appetite	 should	 be	 the	 lack	 of	 an	 opposing	 desire	 for	 those	 same	 pleasures’	(Henry,	2002:	265).	Henry’s	suggestion	has	serious	implications	for	my	argument	that	weak	akrasia	features	choice.	Though	the	author	does	not	refer	to	these	notions,	his	claim	 is	 clearly	 that	 weakness	 does	 not	 involve	 any	 rational	 desire	(orexis/boulêsis).	For	this	is	precisely	‘a	desire	for	the	pleasures	associated	with	being	temperate’.	But	since	choice,	as	we	have	seen,	requires	rational	desire	for	
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Aristotle,	this	would	imply	that	weakness	cannot	involve	choice.	Consequently,	Henry’s	solution	to	the	problem	of	weakness	presents	a	challenge	to	my	inter-pretation	of	it.		The	worry	in	dismissing	Henry’s	reading	is	that,	if	we	maintain	that	gen-uine	akrasia	does	involve	choice,	we	cannot	explain	why	the	akratic	agents	acts	differently	 from	the	enkratic	agent.	 In	a	response	to	Henry,	however,	Byron	 J.	Stoyles	(2007)	proposes	a	less	strict,	and	very	appealing,	rendition	of	Henry’s	argument.	One	of	Stoyles’	worries	regarding	Henry’s	suggestion	is	that	it	is,	in-deed,	‘inconsistent	with	Aristotle’s	assertion	that	the	akratic	[person]’s	choice	is	good’	(Stoyles,	2007:	200).	But,	Stoyles	argues,	we	can	hold	on	to	Henry’s	solu-tion	to	the	problem	of	weakness,	without	subscribing	to	his	conclusion	that	the	weak	agent	necessarily	 lacks	any	rational	desire.	His	suggestion	is	simple	and	effective:	we	can	assume,	he	suggests,	 that	 the	weak	agent’s	rational	desire	 is	
outweighed	by	her	desire	for	the	wrong	pleasure,	without	being	entirely	absent.	He	writes	that	‘Henry	has,	perhaps,	overstated	his	case	here	–	it	is	not	clear	that	we	need	to	assume	the	akratic	[person]	lacks	all	desire	for	the	proper	pleasures	of	temperance.	It	could	be	that	[her]	desire	is	simply	outweighed	by	the	desire	for	bodily	pleasures’	(Stoyles,	2007:	199).	Put	differently,	on	this	weaker	read-ing,	akrasia	does	involve	an	inclination	towards	the	good	(i.e.	orexis/boulêsis),	but	an	even	stronger	inclination	towards	pleasure	(i.e.	epithumia).		On	this	interpretation,	we	can	take	the	weak	agent	to	make	choices	also:	‘On	 this	 reading,’	 Stoyles	 writes,	 ‘both	 the	 self-controlled	 [person]	 and	 the	akratic	[person]	choose,	or	form	deliberative	desires	for	a	temperate	course	of	action,	but	 the	akratic	 [person]’s	choice	 is	outweighed	by	 [her]	appetitive	de-sires’	(Stoyles,	2007:	201).	It	is	for	this	reason	that	she	fails	to	convert	her	choice	
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into	action.	As	such,	we	can	maintain	that	weak	akrasia	involves	choice,	but	not	chosen	 action:	 ‘On	 the	 weaker	 version	 of	 Henry’s	 thesis	 considered	 above,’	Stoyles	concludes,	‘the	akratic	[person]	does	choose	correctly,	but	this	choice,	in	the	form	of	a	deliberative	desire,	lacks	sufficient	force	to	overcome	[her]	appetite	for	pleasure’	(Stoyles,	2007:	205).	I	thus	maintain,	with	Stoyles,	that	the	weak	akratic	does	make	a	choice.	This	is	an	interpretation	also	supported,	inter	alia,	by	Broadie	(1994):	‘Sometimes,	she	writes,		
an	agent	reaches	a	rational	choice	–	a	judgment	of	what	it	is	best	to	do	given	his	situation	–	and	fails	to	act	on	it,	not	for	any	good	reason	nor	because	of	external	interference,	but	because	[s]he	does	not	want	to	do	it	or	wants	to	do	something	else	more.	[…]	That	is	what	the	incontinent	person	does:	so	far	as	[her]	choice	fails	to	affect	[her]	behaviour,	[s]he	might	as	well	never	have	made	it.	(Broadie,	1994:	266-267)		In	sum,	on	the	reading	I	have	advanced,	choice	is	a	mental	resolve	to	do	the	right	thing	which	involves	reasoning	(deliberation	or	bouleusis)	and	an	ac-companying	 rational	 desire	 (orexis/boulêsis).	 Choice,	 if	 translated	 into	 action,	produces	deliberative	action.	If	it	is	to	be	translated	into	action,	the	agent’s	ra-tional	 desire	 must	 be	 stronger	 than	 any	 opposing	 irrational	 desires.	 In	
sōphrosunē,	the	agent	has	both	a	rational	desire	(orexis/boulêsis)	and	an	appetite	(epithumia)	for	what	is	good.	She	makes	a	choice	to	do	what	is	good	and	effort-lessly	translates	it	into	deliberative	action.	In	enkrateia,	the	agent	has	a	rational	desire,	as	well	as	a	conflicting	appetite.	She	chooses	to	do	what	is	right,	and	be-cause	her	rational	desire	is	stronger,	she	effectively	manages	to	do	so.	The	weak	akratic,	then,	also	chooses	to	do	what	is	right,	but	has	conflicting	appetites	which	are	stronger	than	her	rational	desire.	As	a	result,	she	does	not	manage	to	turn	
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this	choice	into	action.	Lastly,	the	impetuous	agent,	under	the	spell	of	her	appe-tites,	forgets	about	her	rational	desires	altogether	and	follows	her	desires	with-out	even	making	a	choice.		
C.4 Aristotle’s	Moral	Objectivism	I	have	now	presented	my	interpretation	of	Aristotle’s	theory	of	agency	in	full,	and	extracted	from	it	a	basic	taxonomy	of	regulatory	styles.	A	last	issue,	however,	is	whether	Aristotle’s	theory	is	sufficiently	content-neutral	for	our	purposes.	Argu-ably,	Aristotle’s	view	of	agency	seems	all	too	interwoven	with	his	moral	objectiv-ism.	His	notions	of	deliberation	and	choice,	for	example,	have	a	robustly	norma-tive	undertone.	The	reason	for	this	is	that,	according	to	Aristotle,	what	is	good	is	an	objective	given.	On	Aristotle’s	view,	the	ultimate	highest	good	for	humans	is	
Eudaimonia,	which	may	be	translated	as	happiness	or	human	flourishing.	Eudai-
monia,	Aristotle	writes	in	the	first	chapter	of	the	NE,	is	what	all	human	actions	must	 eventually	 aim	 at:	 it	 is	 ‘the	 end	 to	which	 our	 actions	 are	 directed’	 (NE	1097b:	20-21).	Even	though	it	cannot	be	spelled	out	in	absolute	terms	what	ex-actly	this	good	life	consists	in,	Aristotle	does	think	people	can	be	clearly	on	the	wrong	 or	 the	 right	 path	 towards	 it.	 In	 light	 of	 this	 view,	 Aristotle	 thinks	 our	choices	about	what	to	do	can	be	misguided.	In	book	III	of	the	NE,	he	distinguishes	between	a	wish	for	the	good,	and	a	wish	for	the	apparent	good:	‘absolutely	and	in	truth	the	object	of	wish	is	the	good,	but	for	the	individual	it	is	what	seems	good	to	[her]’	(NE	1113a:	24-25,	emphasis	mine).	Our	wishes	and	choices	can	thus	be	right	 or	 wrong	 independently	 of	 what	we	 think.	 Aristotle,	 in	 fact,	 describes	 a	fourth	regulatory	style,	akolasia	or	self-indulgence,	in	which	the	agent	makes	the	
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wrong	 choice.	 On	 his	 description,	 the	 self-indulgent	 agent	 is	misguided:	 she	‘yields	to	[her]	appetites	from	choice,	considering	it	right	always	to	pursue	the	pleasure	 that	offers’	 (NE	1146b:	23-24,	 trans.	Rackham).	 She	 chases	pleasure	without	realising	this	is	not	the	right	thing	to	do.	This	conveys	the	idea	that	our	practical	 reason,	on	Aristotle’s	picture,	 functions	as	a	moral	compass	of	sorts,	meant	to	track	the	true	good:	he	writes,	indeed,	that	‘the	best	part	of	us	[…]	is	thought	to	rule	and	lead	us	by	nature,	and	to	have	cognizance	of	what	is	noble	and	divine’	(NE	1177a:	13-16,	trans.	Rackham).	This	seems	to	imply	that,	for	Ar-istotle,	our	deliberations	take	place	not	in	light	of	what	we	personally	judge	to	be	best,	but	rather	in	light	of	what	is	best.	Yet	we	can,	without	much	trouble,	bracket	Aristotle’s	moral	objectivism	here.	For,	crucially,	Aristotle	still	takes	the	self-indulgent	agent	to	make	choices:	this	agent,	he	writes,	‘is	carried	away	at	[her]	own	choice’	(NE	1146b	24).	Even	though	 she	 pursues	 her	 every	 appetite,	 her	 actions	 count	 as	 chosen;	 for	 she	judges	it	best	to	do	so.	This	demonstrates	that	Aristotle	does	assume	the	agent’s	individual	judgment	remains	deeply	subjective.	Whilst	the	possibility	of	making	a	wrong	 choice	 does	 reflect	 Aristotle’s	 moral	 objectivism,	 it	 equally	 demon-strates	that,	essentially,	it	is	still	the	agent	who	makes	choices	on	his	view.	The	self-indulgent	agent	makes	wrong	choices	–	but	she	makes	choices	all	the	same.	This	suggests	that	choice,	for	Aristotle,	has	a	structural	component	also:	it	is	the	outcome	of	individual	deliberation,	which	takes	place	in	light	of	what	the	agent	herself	thinks	is	best.	And	it	is	this	individual	process	precisely	which	interests	us	in	this	thesis.	When	considering	the	structures	of	agency	at	work	within	the	individual	agent,	the	only	relevant	element	for	us	is	how	an	agent	makes	her	sub-
jective	judgment	about	what	to	do.	As	such,	it	is	of	little	relevance	for	us	whether	
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or	not	this	judgment	is	‘mistaken’	in	reference	to	an	ultimate	objective	good	or	not.	 Thus,	we	can	simply	understand	deliberation	and	choice	as	a	process	and	its	outcome	that	take	place	in	light	of	an	individual’s	idea	of	that	is	good.	Admit-tedly,	this	 implies	a	slight	deviation	from	Aristotle’s	view.	But	 it	 is	only	slight.	The	most	 significant	 implication	 for	our	 taxonomy	 is	perhaps	 that	bracketing	this	 morally	 objectivist	 dimension	 of	 akolasia	 dissolves	 its	 distinction	 with	
sōphrosunē.	For	both	agents	do	what	they	think	 is	right,	without	experiencing	conflicting	desires.	Structurally,	 therefore,	akolasia	 is	 the	same	as	sōphrosunē:	the	only	thing	that	sets	them	apart,	on	Aristotle’s	picture,	is	that	the	temperate	agent	does	what	is	morally	right,	whilst	the	self-indulgent	agent	makes	morally	bad	choices.	For	this	reason,	the	self-indulgent	agent	has	no	place	in	our	taxon-omy	of	regulatory	styles	–	the	category	disappears	along	with	the	moral	objec-tivism	it	is	grounded	in.		
D. HYPERKRASIA:	AN	ADDITIONAL	REGULATORY	STYLE	
D.1 The	Locus	of	Self-Control	Now	we	have	sketched	our	taxonomy	of	regulatory	styles,	we	can	finally	turn	to	our	main	question:	can	we	include	a	philosophically	satisfactory	conception	of	self-oppression	within	this	taxonomy?	Our	preliminary	characterisation	of	self-oppression,	recall,	was	that	it	is	a	form	of	agency	featuring	a	form	of	self-control	
which	compromises	choice.	In	order	to	answer	this	question,	therefore,	we	first	need	to	establish	where	on	Aristotle’s	architectonic	of	agency	we	can	locate	self-
control.	Thus	far,	we	have	constructed	our	taxonomy	without	reference	to	this	
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notion.	As	I	see	it,	we	should	understand	self-control	as	the	ability	to	act	in	ac-cordance	with	one’s	better	judgment:	the	self-controlled	agent	is	the	agent	who	manages	 to	 act	 as	 she	 thinks	 she	 should.	 Within	 Aristotle’s	 framework,	 this	means	that	practical	reason	 is	our	 faculty	of	self-control.	Actions	are	self-con-trolled	if	and	only	if	they	are	controlled	by	practical	reason.	This	means,	in	turn,	that	self-control	is	exclusive	to	the	class	of	deliberative	actions.	On	 this	picture,	neither	 type	of	akrasia	 features	self-control.	Since	 the	akratic	agent	acts	against	her	reason,	she	does	not	exhibit	self-control.	In	fact,	“akrasia”	is	a	conjunction	of	krateia,	the	Greek	word	for	‘power’,	and	the	prefix	
a,	which	indicates	an	absence.28	In	akrasia,	practical	reason	is	not	 in	power,	 it	does	not	control	action.	When	we	succumb	to	our	desires,	self-control	is	lost.	In	contrast,	 both	 sōphrosunē	 and	 enkrateia	 feature	 self-control.	 In	 the	 case	 of	
enkrateia,	this	is	rather	obvious:	indeed,	as	mentioned,	this	notion	is	often	trans-lated	as	self-control.	Conjoining	krateia	with	the	prefix	en,	it	literally	translates	to	‘in	power’.	But	it	seems	reductive	to	classify	only	enkrateia	as	featuring	self-control:	for	in	sōphrosunē	also,	actions	are	in	accordance	with	reason.	It	just	costs	less	effort:	since	there	are	no	desires	going	against	reason,	there	is	nothing	that	needs	to	be	overcome.	But	to	suggest	that	the	temperate	agent,	who	does	as	she	judges	best	without	trouble,	has	no	self-control	seems	counterintuitive.		It	becomes	clear,	then,	that	none	of	the	regulatory	styles	described	match	our	description	of	self-oppression.	There	are	no	forms	of	agency,	in	this	taxon-omy,	which	 feature	 self-control	 but	 compromised	 choice:	 for	 both	 regulatory	styles	which	feature	self-control	(sōphrosunē	and	enkrateia)	also	feature	choice.	
																																								 																					28	See	Liddell	and	Scott	(1843/1940:990).		
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Thus,	this	category	of	agency	appears	to	be	a	blank	spot	on	Aristotle’s	taxonomy	of	regulatory	styles.		
D.2 Anaisthesia	
	Aristotle,	however,	mentions	yet	another	regulatory	style	in	the	NE,	which	has	been	left	out	of	our	discussion	so	far:	anaisthesia,	or	insensitivity.	He	describes	this	as	a	very	rare	disposition,	 in	which	the	agent	has	a	 ‘defective	response	to	pleasures’	(NE	1107b:	6).	It	is	an	agent	‘to	whom	nothing	is	pleasant	and	every-thing	indifferent’	(NE	1119a:	9-10).	On	this	basis,	he	presents	it	as	the	opposite	of	akrasia	(see	NE	1151b:23-32).	It	may	sound	like,	in	anaisthesia,	there	is	too	much	self-control,	such	that	it	destroys	the	agent’s	capacity	for	pleasure.	Might	this	description	capture	the	phenomenon	of	self-oppression?	It	seems	not.	Aris-totle	writes	that	the	anaesthetic	agent	does	not	act	in	accordance	with	reason:	this	agent,	he	writes,	‘finds	too	little	enjoyment	in	bodily	pleasures,	and	fails	to	
abide	by	the	right	principle	in	this	respect’	(NE	1151b:	23-32,	emphasis	mine).	Indeed,	in	this	passage,	Aristotle	presents	anaisthesia	as	the	counterpart	of	akra-
sia.	His	suggestion,	therefore,	seems	to	be	that	the	anaesthetic	agent	would	fail	to	abide	by	her	own	principles,	just	like	the	akratic.	But	instead	of	doing	so	be-cause	she	is	too	tempted	to	do	something	else,	her	problem	is	that	she	can’t	be	bothered	to	do	as	she	seems	right.	It	is	not	clear	what	Aristotle	thinks	anaisthesia	looks	like,	but	we	might	imagine	someone	who	is	feeling	quite	depressive,	and	who,	though	she	thinks	it	would	be	better	to	eat,	or	go	for	a	walk,	just	can’t	bring	herself	to.	She	would	thus	act	against	her	better	judgment.	On	this	picture,	it	is	clear	that	the	anaesthetic	agent	does	not	act	from	practical	reason.	As	such,	we	must	conclude	that	the	anaisthetic	agent	does	not	exercise	self-control.	
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Admittedly,	it	is	unclear	whether	the	anaisthetic	agent	fails	to	abide	by	her	own	principle,	or	whether	she	fails	to	do	what	is	best	in	reference	to	Aristo-tle’s	objective	standard.	Aristotle	mentions	anaisthesia	twice	in	the	NE.	In	book	VII,	as	we	have	seen,	he	presents	it	as	the	counterpart	of	akrasia.	But	in	book	II,	he	presents	it	as	the	counterpart	of	akolasia,	in	which,	recall,	the	agent	mistak-enly	 thinks	 one	 ought	 to	 always	 pursue	 pleasure.	 This	 suggests	 that	 the	anaisthetic	agent,	conversely,	mistakenly	 judges	that	pleasure	ought	not	to	be	pursued	at	all.	This	would	mean	that	the	anaisthetic	agent	is	defective	in	her	re-sponse	to	pleasures	not	by	her	own	judgment,	but	by	Aristotle’s	objectivist	judg-ment	about	the	right	amount	of	pleasure	required	for	the	good	life.	On	this	pic-ture,	the	anaisthetic	agent	does	exercise	self-control	–	just	in	a	way	which	Aris-totle	deems	objectively	excessive.	On	this	reading,	however,	anaisthesia	is	a	reg-ulatory	style	which,	just	like	self-indulgence,	is	grounded	in	the	moral	objectiv-ism	that	I	am	bracketing.	The	category	of	anaisthesia,	therefore,	cannot	help	us	conceptualise	self-oppression	on	either	interpretation.	But	most	 importantly,	 on	 either	 interpretation,	 the	 phenomenon	 this	category	attempts	to	capture	seems	different	from	that	of	self-oppression.	For	a	deeply	insensitive	agent	would	not	regulate	herself	with	the	urgent	kind	of	pres-sure	which	characterises	self-oppression.	The	anaisthetic	agent,	as	Aristotle	de-scribes	her,	does	not	want	enough	–	whilst	the	self-oppressive	agent,	if	anything,	wants	 too	much.	 She	 is	 hyper-motivated,	 rather	 than	 under-motivated.	 If	my	sketch	 of	 the	 anaisthetic	 agent	 as	 depressive	 and	 unbothered	 is	 correct,	 she	seems	far	removed	from	the	self-oppressive	agent.		
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D.3 Hyperkrasia:	Practical	Reason	Becoming	Authoritarian	So	I	maintain	that	Aristotle’s	taxonomy	does	not	include	a	category	for	self-op-pression.	Using	the	conceptual	building	blocks	offered	in	the	NE,	however,	we	can	construct	an	additional	regulatory	style,	designed	to	capture	the	possibility	of	self-oppression.	If	we	recall	our	initial	sketch	of	the	phenomenon,	we	remem-ber	 that	 self-oppression	 is	 marked	 by	 a	 distinct	 manner	 of	 self-regulation:	namely	a	very	controlled	one.	Yet,	this	control	is	exercised	by	the	agent	herself,	and	not	by	another	party.	As	such,	I	propose,	it	makes	sense	to	assume	that	the	faculty	of	practical	reason	plays	a	significant	role	in	self-oppression,	since	this	is,	on	the	picture	I	have	presented,	the	faculty	of	self-control.	But,	crucially,	there	was	 something	 particular	 about	how	 the	 agent	 controls	 her	 actions:	 the	way	agency	is	controlled	is	of	an	oppressive	kind.	For	this	reason,	I	hypothesise	that	in	self-oppression,	practical	reason	becomes	oppressive.		Practical	reason,	on	this	scenario,	would	cease	to	be	merely	authorita-tive,	and	become	authoritarian.	In	this	context,	it	is	worth	emphasising	how	prac-tical	reason,	as	Aristotle	sketches	it,	is	already	authoritative.	Aristotle	argues	that	it	 must	 discipline	 and	 subdue	 our	 appetites,	 which	 becomes	 clear	 at	 several	points	in	the	NE.	At	the	end	of	book	I,	he	explains	how	the	faculty	of	desire	‘does	in	a	way	participate	in	reason,	in	the	sense	that	it	is	submissive	and	obedient	to	it’	(NE	1102b:	31-32).	At	the	end	of	book	III,	he	reiterates	this	point	more	strongly:	‘appetites’,	he	contends,	must	be	
rendered	docile	and	submissive	to	authority	[…].	These	appetites	[…]	must	in	no	way	[be]	opposed	to	the	dictates	of	principle	–	this	is	what	we	mean	by	‘docile’	and	‘restrained’	–	and	just	as	the	child	ought	to	live	in	accordance	with	the	di-rections	of	his	tutor,	so	the	desiderative	element	in	us	ought	to	be	controlled	by	rational	principle.	(NE	1119b:	7-15,	emphases	mine)	 	
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	He	also	writes	that	the	rational	part	‘is	thought	to	rule	and	lead	us	by	nature’	(NE	1177a:	13-16,	trans.	Rackham),	and	repeatedly	describes	this	part	as	‘the	most	dominant	part’	 in	us	(NE	1168b:	34,	 trans.	Rackham).	When	we	exercise	self-control,	we	indeed	feel	the	weight	of	our	self-prescribed	rules,	exerting	a	certain	pressure.	My	assumption,	then,	is	that	this	quality	of	practical	reason	is	liable	to	excess:	its	authority	runs	the	danger,	that	is,	of	becoming	authoritarian.	The	very	self-relation	that	makes	self-control	possible	can	turn	oppressive.	And	this,	I	sub-mit,	is	what	happens	in	self-oppression.	How	might	we	imagine	this?	My	proposal	is	that,	in	self-oppression,	the	agent	places	extreme	value	upon	a	certain	end,	or	set	of	ends.	That	is,	she	has	a	set	of	extremely	powerful	wishes.	As	a	result,	the	agent	feels	an	extreme	pressure	to	achieve	these	ends	whenever	she	can:	if	there	are	any	means	available,	she	will	feel	like	she	must	take	them.	Normally,	as	we	have	seen,	a	wish	is	a	general	preference.	 It	 functions	as	 the	general	 rule	 that	 something	 is	worth	pursuing.	Part	of	the	function	of	practical	reason,	as	we	saw,	is	to	assess	not	only	how	it	can	be	 applied,	 but	 also	when	 it	 should	 be:	 practical	 reason	 assesses,	 that	 is,	when	a	general	wish	 is	effectively	worth	pursuing	 in	practice.	 In	hyperkrasia,	however,	 the	wishes	are	so	powerful	 that	practical	 reason	will	almost	always	judge	them	worth	applying:	the	agent	will	pursue	this	wish,	or	set	of	wishes,	al-most	whenever	she	can.	This	means	she	will	tend	to	pursue	these	ends	at	the	cost	of	other	ends.	When	several	different	rules	may	be	applied	at	tx,	and	one	of	them	is	a	rule	she	is	fixated	on,	she	will	feel	pressured	to	pursue	this	one	over	others.	What	is	more,	given	her	fixation	on	these	ends,	the	self-oppressive	agent	may	find	ever	more	
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intricate	means	 to	 achieve	 them.	 She	may	 find	ways	 to	 pursue	 these	wishes	which,	to	another	agent,	might	not	even	occur.	Thus,	in	self-oppression,	the	agent	not	only	feels	extremely	pressured	to	pursue	specific	wishes	whenever	she	finds	a	way,	she	will	also	tend	to	find	many	ways.	She	will	find	more	situations,	in	other	words,	in	which	these	general	rules	can	be	applied.	On	this	depiction,	self-oppression	would	feature	self-control	as	we	de-fined	it:	for	the	agent	successfully	follows	the	regulations	of	her	practical	reason.	She	feels	pressured	to	pursue	them,	but	this	pressure	is	fuelled	by	her	own	valu-ation	of	them.	When	she	prioritises	a	certain	end	above	others,	it	is	because	she	values	it	more.	It	 is	on	this	basis	that	we	can	distinguish	self-oppression	from	compulsion	on	the	popular	understanding:	for	compulsion,	recall,	 typically	in-volves	a	pressure	which	is	experienced	as	alien,	 induced	by	a	factor	the	agent	dissociates	 from.	 In	 self-oppression,	however,	 the	pressure	 is	 in	 line	with	 the	agent’s	own	aims	and	projects.	Crucially,	however,	I	hypothesised	that	the	pressure	featuring	in	self-op-pression	was	oppressive,	meaning	it	compromises	the	agent’s	choice.	When	the	agent	sees	a	way	to	pursue	a	certain	kind	of	wish	at	tx,	practical	reason	exerts	such	a	pressure	on	the	agent	to	do	so	that	she	no	longer	feels	this	is	her	choice.	We	saw	that	practical	reason	judges	what	is	the	best	thing	to	do	in	a	given	situa-tion,	 yielding	what	 I	 called	 an	 “I	 should”.	 In	 self-oppression,	 I	 submit,	 this	 “I	should”	is	an	“I	must”,	such	that	the	agent	feels	like	she	has	no	choice.	The	mental	resolve	to	act	this	way	is	not	a	choice,	but	something	that	has	to	be	done.	Her	self-control	thus	compromises	her	choices.	On	this	basis,	we	can	construct	self-oppression	as	a	mirror	case	of	akra-
sia.	In	akrasia,	the	agent’s	actions	aren’t	chosen,	because	she	is	overtaken	by	her	
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appetitive	faculty.	Her	agency	is	compromised	by	the	sway	of	her	desires.	In	self-oppression,	 in	contrast,	 the	agent’s	actions	aren’t	chosen	because	she	 is	over-taken	by	her	practical	reason.	The	idea,	then,	would	be	that	choice	is	compro-mised	as	it	is	in	akrasia,	but	due	to	the	sway	of	a	different	part	of	the	agent:	in	
akrasia,	it	is	the	appetitive	part	which	disrupts	agency	and	compromises	choice;	in	self-oppression,	it	would	be	practical	reason	that	does	so.	The	agent	does	not	fail	to	follow	her	regulations,	but	they	demand	such	rigorous	accordance	that	she	feels	pressured	into	doing	so.	Instead	of	a	loss	of	self-control,	there	is	too	much	of	it.	Accordingly,	I	propose	to	term	this	new	regulatory	style	hyperkrasia	–	con-joining	the	Greek	krateia	and	the	prefix	hyper,	which	indicates	an	excess.	Hyper-krasia,	then,	would	be	a	deliberative	form	of	agency,	since	it	is	controlled	by	rea-son,	but	hyperkratic	actions	would	not	be	chosen.	As	such,	I	hypothesise	that	
self-oppression,	or	hyperkrasia,	is	a	real	form	of	human	agency,	in	which	
practical	reason	becomes	authoritarian,	exercising	a	form	of	self-control	which	
compromises	choice.	Further,	I	hypothesised	that	self-oppression	also	tends	to	compromise	choice	in	a	secondary	way:	because	it	tends	to	take	over	her	life.	This	can	also	be	explained	on	this	characterisation.	Insofar	as	the	agent	feels	that	she	must	φ	be-cause	it	offers	a	means	towards	an	end	she	is	fixated	on,	not	only	is	her	choice	to	φ	compromised:	she	also	cannot	really	choose	any	alternative	routes	of	action.	Thus,	whenever	she	pursues	the	ends	she	is	fixated	on,	a	whole	variety	of	other	wishes	 are	 pushed	 to	 the	 background.	Moreover,	 if	 the	 self-oppressive	 agent	finds	every	more	intricate	ways	to	pursue	her	most	powerful	wishes,	this	will	happen	in	more	and	more	situations.	As	a	result,	these	wishes	can	take	over	most	
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of	her	life.	In	light	of	this	characterisation,	we	can	refer	back	to	the	potential	exam-ples	of	self-oppression	mentioned	in	the	introduction.	Beth,	Shani,	and	Jaimi	all	act	in	accordance	with	their	own	values	and	projects.	Yet,	the	manner	in	which	they	do	so	involves	a	high	degree	of	pressure:	pressure,	moreover,	which	seems	to	tamper	with	their	sense	of	choice.	They	feel	they	can	only	but	pursue	a	certain	set	of	ends.	What	is	more,	their	lives	seem	taken	over	by	this:	most	situations	are	experienced	to	offer	opportunities	to	further	their	ends.	They	feel	like	they	must	take	these	up,	at	 the	cost	of	other	opportunities	they	may	encounter.	Perhaps	these	agents	will	also,	in	addition,	perceive	more	opportunities	to	further	these	ends:	they	might	find	more,	often	far-fetched	and	intricate,	ways	to	achieve	their	aim	than	would	a	non-hyperkratic	agent.	Shani	may	pursue	further	weight	loss	by	getting	up	at	4.30	in	the	morning	to	exercise,	or	she	may	learn	sophisticated	ways	to	hide	her	food	in	her	napkin	during	dinner	to	avoid	consuming	it.	And	Beth	sees	ever	more	elaborate	ways	of	minimising	her	ecological	impact,	to	the	extent	that	it	dominates	most	of	her	life:	her	habit	of	boiling	cabbage	during	the	night	to	only	use	electricity	at	night	rate,	in	fact,	is	an	example	of	how	she	finds	
ever	more	ways	to	further	her	ends.	Before	concluding	this	section,	it	must	be	noted	that	at	least	one	author	has	picked	up	on	the	possibility	of	hyperkrasia.	George	Ainslie,	in	his	Breakdown	
of	Will	 (2001),	 explicitly	 wonders	 whether	 the	 capacities	 of	 practical	 reason	could	become	so	powerful	that	they	end	up	compromising	choice.	He	writes	that,	to	exercise	self-control,	
we	need	to	think	 in	terms	of	our	general	preferences,	not	our	particular	ones.	This	is	something	Aristotle	already	knew:	he	constructs	agency	with	reference	
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to	general	and	particular	premises,	and	explains	that	akrasia	is	in	fact	a	“victory”	of	a	particular	preference	over	a	general	preference.	Personal	rules	are	‘general	premises’.	It	is	difficult,	as	a	human	being,	to	learn	to	think	in	those	terms,	but	we	do	have	the	capacity	to.	But	what	if	this	capacity	actually	becomes	so	power-ful	that	we	cannot	but	think	in	general	terms	–	do	we	not	lose	freedom	of	choice	in	any	particular	situation?	(Ainslie,	2001:87)		Ainslie,	however,	just	mentions	this	idea	in	passing	–	he	does	not	unpack	it	much	further.	I	will	try	to	do	so	in	the	rest	of	this	thesis.		
D.4 Problems	with	Hyperkrasia	The	concept	of	hyperkrasia	thus	seems	to	broadly	capture	the	phenomenon	of	self-oppression.	Moreover,	it	allows	us	to	address	part	of	our	first	problem:	who	
is	oppressing	whom	in	self-oppression?	For	we	can	now,	thanks	to	Aristotle’s	mer-eology	of	the	agent,	identify	practical	reason	as	the	specific	part	of	the	agent	that	is	oppressive	(that	is,	as	the	part	of	the	self	operating	in	the	nominative	mode).	There	 is,	however,	a	significant	 issue	with	the	concept	of	hyperkrasia.	Within	Aristotle’s	 framework,	 it	 is	a	conceptual	 impossibility.	 I	have	suggested	that,	in	hyperkrasia,	choice	would	be	compromised	due	to	the	sway	of	practical	reason.	Underpinning	the	concept	of	hyperkrasia,	therefore,	is	the	assumption	that	practical	reason	can,	as	much	as	impulses	and	undue	influences,	undermine	choice.	But	this	assumption	is	explicitly	at	odds	with	Aristotle’s	understanding	of	choice.	Actions,	for	Aristotle,	are	chosen	if	and	only	if	they	are	controlled	by	practical	reason:	as	soon	as	an	agent	manages	to	act	in	accordance	with	practical	reason	–	 that	 is,	 as	 soon	 as	 she	 exercises	 self-control	 –	 she	 is	 translating	her	
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choice	into	action.	Any	action	which	is	controlled	by	practical	reason	is,	there-fore,	necessarily	chosen	on	his	view.	Thus,	as	the	attentive	reader	may	have	al-ready	figured,	to	exercise	self-control	as	I	understand	it	simply	is,	on	Aristotle’s	framework,	to	translate	one’s	choice	into	action.	All	deliberative	action	is,	there-fore,	by	default	the	result	of	choice.	Though	there	can	be	choice	without	self-con-trol	(as	happens	in	weak	akrasia),	for	Aristotle	there	cannot	be	self-control	with-out	 choice.	 Consequently,	 it	 is	 impossible	 for	 Aristotle	 that	 practical	 reason	would	both	control	action	and	compromise	choice.		This	is	not	to	say	that	Aristotle	would	not	consider	hyperkrasia	to	be	a	case	of	agency	gone	wrong.	One	may	 think,	 in	 this	context,	of	an	Aristotelean	concept	which	hitherto	has	not	been	mentioned:	the	idea	of	the	mean	(meson),	commonly	referred	to	as	“the	golden	mean”.	This	notion	plays	a	central	role	in	Aristotle’s	ethics.	He	argues	in	the	NE	that	we	must,	as	a	rule	of	thumb,	strive	for	the	right	balance	between	vices	of	excess	and	vices	of	deficiency:	he	writes	that	‘every	 knowledgeable	 person	 avoids	 excess	 and	 deficiency,	 but	 looks	 for	 the	mean	and	chooses	it’	(NE	1106b:	5-6)	and	that	‘virtue	aims	to	hit	the	mean’	(NE	1106b:	16).	We	shouldn’t	eat	too	much,	nor	too	little;	we	should	be	courageous,	but	not	cowardly	or	brazen;	and	so	on.	In	light	of	this,	one	might	suggest	to	un-derstand	hyperkrasia	as	a	vice	of	excess:	 just	as	agents	should	chase	the	right	amount	of	pleasure,	they	should	perhaps	also	exercise	the	right	amount	of	self-control.	But	this	is	not	a	viable	route	of	argument,	and	this	for	two	reasons.	(1)	First,	this	move	would	rely	on	Aristotle’s	moral	objectivism:	we	can	only	classify	hyperkrasia	as	a	vice	of	excess	in	reference	to	an	objective	measure	of	where	the	golden	mean	lies.	Since	the	hyperkratic	agent	does	follow	her	own	regulations,	her	actions	are	not	excessive	by	her	own	judgment.	(2)	But,	second,	even	within	
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the	Aristotelean	 framework,	 excess	 and	deficiency	do	not	per	 se	 compromise	choice.	The	self-indulgent	agent,	recall,	chooses	to	indulge	in	excessive	pleasures.	The	mere	fact	that	someone	doesn’t	hit	the	mean	–	whether	this	mean	is	an	ob-jective	given	or	not	–	does	not	entail,	for	Aristotle,	that	she	doesn’t	make	a	choice.	Classifying	hyperkrasia	as	a	vice	of	excess	thus	still	wouldn’t	allow	us	to	explain	how	it	compromises	choice.	But	there	may	be	an	obvious	reason	why	hyperkrasia	may	compromise	choice.	Because	the	agent	is	so	pressured	to	pursue	a	certain	set	of	ends,	it	may	happen	that	she	finds	herself	unable	to	pursue	any	other	valued	ends	even	when	she	wants	to.	We	saw	that	the	self-oppressive	agent	both	feels	an	enormous	pres-sure	to	aim	for	certain	ends	where	possible,	and	tends	to	find	ever	more	possi-bilities	to	do	so.	As	a	result,	it	may	happen	that	practical	reason	ends	up	sabotag-ing	its	own	workings.	We	saw	how	practical	deliberation	is	responsible	not	only	for	finding	out	how	a	certain	wish	can	be	achieved	at	tx,	but	also	for	assessing	whether	it	should	be	achieved	at	tx,	given	how	this	is	possible	there	and	then.	We	can	see	how	hyperkrasia	may	lead	an	agent	to	aim	for	certain	ends	even	at	times	when,	all	things	considered,	she	herself	 judges	it	better	not	to.	When	this	hap-pens,	practical	reason	sabotages	its	very	own	workings:	for	it	fails	to	implement,	at	tx,	the	route	of	action	which	it	judges	to	be	best	at	tx.	Jaimi	may,	at	certain	times,	actually	think	it	better	to	prioritise	her	own	health	over	her	children:	she	also	has	a	wish	to	prosper	personally.	But	she	finds	herself	incapable	of	compromis-ing	on	the	care	 for	her	offspring	when	these	situations	arise.	As	such,	she	be-comes	unable	to	reach	her	other	goals	and	bring	into	practice	her	other	values.	In	such	situations,	the	agent	arguably	loses	her	self-control.	For,	given	the	circumstances,	her	judgment	is	that	she	should	not	pursue	her	most	valued	
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end	there	and	then.	Yet	she	finds	herself	unable	to	act	accordingly,	and	pursues	it	anyway.	It	is	clear,	then,	that	the	agent	here	does	not	act	from	choice,	and	in-deed	in	opposition	to	it.	Her	agency,	in	fact,	closely	resembles	that	of	the	akratic	agent.	The	key	difference	is	that	she	is	not	swayed	by	an	appetite	for	pleasure,	but	by	her	own	valuation	of	a	certain	end:	she	fails	to	yield	to	the	overall	judg-ment	made	by	her	practical	reason	due	to	its	excessive	valuation	of	this	one	end.	We	thus	really	have	a	case	of	practical	reason	sabotaging	itself.	In	such	cases,	hyperkrasia	does	compromise	choice	as	Aristotle	under-stands	the	notion.	But,	on	my	characterisation,	this	self-sabotage	of	practical	rea-son	is	merely	a	common	effect	of	hyperkrasia,	and	not	one	of	its	core	features.	An	agent	may	be	self-oppressive	even	when	she	does	not	lose	self-control	in	this	way.	Hyperkrasia	compromises	choice	because	of	the	pressure	it	 inflicts	upon	the	agent,	and	not	because	–	and	if	and	when	–	she	wants	to	go	against	it.	On	such	a	view,	practical	reason	would	only	oppress	in	moments	where	the	agent	would	choose	to	act	differently	than	she	does.	But	those	moments,	as	I	see	it,	merely	
reveal	the	agent’s	underlying	hyperkratic	disposition,	which	 is	present	also	 in	other	moments.	Practical	reason	can	exercise	a	pressure	which	can	properly	be	called	oppressive	even	if	the	agent	does	not	wish	to	go	against	this	pressure	in	a	specific	instance.	The	extent	to	which	this	pressure	is	oppressive	just	becomes	most	visible	in	moments	where	she	does	wish	to	go	against	it,	but	this	does	not	mean	it	is	only	then	oppressive.	In	other	words,	in	hyperkrasia,	practical	reason	compromises	choice	also	when	it	does	not	self-sabotage.		Thus,	so	 far,	we	cannot	explain	 that	or	how	choice	 is	compromised	 in	hyperkrasia	within	the	Aristotelean	framework.	This	means	that,	at	this	point,	the	category	of	hyperkrasia	does	not	and	cannot	solve	our	second	problem:	the	
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question	how	exactly	choice	is	compromised	in	self-oppression.	Relatedly,	and	consequently,	Aristotle’s	theory	also	cannot	fully	resolve	our	first	problem:	for,	on	his	mereology	of	 the	agent,	 it	 is	unclear	which	part	 could	be	oppressed	by	practical	reason.	An	obvious	suggestion	might	be	that	practical	reason	oppresses	the	appetitive	part	–	was	it,	in	fact,	not	in	its	nature	to	do	so?	But	the	appetitive	faculty,	 as	 Aristotle	 sketches	 it,	 is	 a	mere	 animalistic	 faculty	 of	 impulses	 and	urges.	As	such,	it	is	not	the	kind	of	thing	which	can	be	said	to	be	meaningfully	
oppressed.	It	can	be	subjected,	subdued,	controlled	and	overcome	–	but	oppres-
sion	denotes	the	subjugation	of	something	which	has	a	more	meaningful	form	of	agency,	something	which	is	capable	of	making	choices.	My	assumption,	indeed,	is	 that	pressure	 is	oppressive	when	 it	compromises	choice.	Thus,	 if	we	cannot	explain	how	choice	is	compromised	in	hyperkrasia,	we	also	cannot	explain	which	part	of	the	agent	is	oppressed.	Our	first	issue,	therefore,	also	remains	partially	unresolved.	This	problem	is	further	reflected	in	Aristotle’s	wholemeal	identification	of	(practical)	reason	with	the	self.	On	several	occasions	in	the	NE,	Aristotle	indi-cates	that	reason,	or	the	rational	part	of	the	individual,	should	be	considered	her	true	self.	In	book	X,	for	example,	he	writes	that	reason	‘is	the	true	self	[einai	ekas-
tos]	of	the	individual’	(NE:	1178a:	2),	and	in	book	IX,	he	writes	that	‘the	intellec-tual	part	[…]	appears	to	be	a	[person]’s	real	self	[ekastos	einai]’	(NE	1166a:	19,	trans.	Rackham),	and	that	the	intellect	is	the	[person]	[her]self’	(NE	1168b:	34-35	–	1169a:	1).	Thus,	Aristotle	refers	explicitly	to	reason	as	most	truly	represent-ing	the	agent:	
as	in	the	state	it	is	the	dominant	part	that	is	deemed	especially	to	be	that	whole,	so	it	is	with	[hu]man[s].	[…]	Also	it	is	our	reasoned	acts	that	are	felt	to	be	in	the	
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fullest	sense	our	own	acts,	voluntary	acts.	It	is	therefore	clear	that	a	[person]	is	or	is	chiefly	the	dominant	part	[i.e.	reason]	of	[her]self.	(NE	1169a:	4-5,	trans.	Rackham)		Cooper	(1986),	discussing	these	passages,	confirms	that	Aristotle		is	thinking	of	a	person	as	identical	with	that	in	[her]	which	properly	ought	to	decide	what	[s]he	is	to	do	and	which	controls	and	guides	[her]	inclinations	and	desires	 in	 their	 job	 of	moving	 [her]	 limbs	 and	 generating	 actions—in	 short,	with	[her]	practical	reason.	(Cooper,	1986:	172)		Since	practical	reason	holds,	as	starting	points	for	guiding	action,	our	values	and	projects,	this	of	course	makes	sense.	Equally,	when	identifying	practical	reason	as	our	faculty	of	self-control,	I	agree	that	this	part	of	the	agent	indeed	reflects	her	self.	I	would,	however,	disagree	with	Aristotle’s	wholemeal	identification	of	prac-tical	reason	with	the	self.	For,	on	this	picture,	there	seems	to	exist	no	‘self’	beyond	practical	reason,	which	could	be	meaningfully	oppressed	by	it.	To	make	sense	of	self-oppression,	we	have	 to	posit	 a	 separate	 faculty	 of	 choice,	which	 could	be	meaningfully	oppressed	by	practical	reason.	It	thus	seems	that	we	need	a	different	account	of	choice.	When	Aristotle	speaks	 of	 choice,	 he	 is	 describing	 another	 kind	 of	 thing:	 the	 kind	 of	 rational	choice	which	prohairesis	refers	to	is	not	the	kind	of	choice	which	seems	compro-mised	in	cases	of	self-oppression.	If	we	are	to	explain	how	hyperkrasia	compro-mises	choice,	we	will	need	an	alternative	account	of	choice.	Furthermore,	this	alternative	account	would	also	require	an	alteration	of,	or	an	addition	 to,	our	mereology	of	 the	agent.	For	we	would	have	 to	 link	our	account	of	choice	 to	a	faculty	separate	from	practical	reason:	only	this	way	will	we	be	able	to	explain	
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how	choice	can	be	compromised	by	practical	reason,	and	point	to	the	part	of	the	agent	which	is	oppressed.		
E. CONCLUDING	REMARKS	In	 conclusion,	 we	 cannot	 coherently	 construe	 a	 category	 for	 self-oppression	within	Aristotle’s	theory	of	action.	But	this	outcome,	though	seemingly	negative,	is	in	fact	hugely	useful.	First	of	all,	Aristotle	allowed	us	to	refine	our	initial	hy-pothesis:	we	will	hold	on	to	the	idea	that	in	self-oppression,	practical	reason	be-comes	authoritarian.	The	notion	of	hyperkrasia	thus	remains	useful.	Secondly,	we	know	what	we	need	to	do	next:	our	task	is	to	find	an	approach	to	choice	which	ties	it	less	strictly	to	practical	reason	and	self-control.	Of	course,	this	does	not	mean	these	notions	aren’t	strongly	connected:	this	connection	is	after	all	deeply	intuitive.	We	are	not	after	a	conceptualisation	of	choice	that	entirely	severs	 it	from	practical	reason.	Ideally,	we	want	to	conceive	of	choice	in	a	way	that	con-
nects	it	with	self-control,	but	without	making	this	connection	overly	strong.	This	would	allow	us	to	distinguish	between	self-control	which	is	simply	authoritative	and	self-control	which	has	become	authoritarian.	It	is	only	the	latter	that	seems	to	come	in	the	way	of	choice.	In	the	next	chapter,	this	set	of	requirements	will	lead	me	to	the	works	of	St	Augustine.		
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II. St	Augustine	
A. INTRODUCTION	In	this	chapter,	I	turn	to	the	works	of	St	Augustine	for	new	source	materials	to	further	develop	our	conception	of	hyperkrasia.	Again,	this	turn	may	seem	sur-prising.	But	Augustine,	as	I	will	show,	offers	us	a	crucial	piece	of	the	puzzle	that	is	self-oppression:	namely	the	notion	of	the	will,	understood	as	a	faculty	of	choice	separate	from	practical	reason.	This	notion	is	of	interest	to	us,	I	will	argue,	since	it	loosens	the	connection	between	practical	reason	and	choice.	Once	we	include	a	notion	of	the	will	 into	our	picture	of	the	agent,	the	idea	of	hyperkrasia	is	no	longer	incoherent:	if	the	will,	rather	than	practical	reason,	is	our	faculty	of	choice,	we	can	posit	that	it	is	the	will	which	is	oppressed	by	practical	reason.	We	can	thus	answer	our	first	hard	question	in	full:	who	oppresses	whom	in	self-oppres-sion?	 What	is	more,	Augustine’s	conception	of	the	will	can	also	help	us	address	our	second	hard	question:	it	helps	us	think	about	how	choice	would	be	compro-mised	in	hyperkrasia.	As	we	will	see,	the	account	of	choice	which	Augustine	links	to	the	will	is	fairly	complicated,	but	in	a	way	that	seems	useful	for	our	purposes.	More	precisely,	he	depicts	the	human	will	as	corrupted,	meaning	that	it	is	dispo-
sitioned	to	choose	a	certain	way,	and	hardly	(if	at	all)	able	to	choose	otherwise.	I	will	argue	that,	insofar	as	any	will	is	so	dispositioned,	the	choices	it	makes	are	compromised;	yet,	since	it	is	still	making	a	choice,	agency	is	not	overridden.	Au-gustine’s	notion	of	a	corrupted	will	thus	offers	us	the	sort	of	account	of	choice	needed	to	make	sense	of	self-oppression:	for	it	offers	a	way	to	understand	how	
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choice	can	be	compromised	without	agency	being	overridden	(as	it	would	be,	for	example,	when	a	domineering	husband	forbids	his	wife	to	leave	the	house).	This	is	promising	because,	in	self-oppression,	it	is	the	agent	herself	who	–	through	the	exercise	of	her	own	agency	–	compromises	her	own	choices:	so	if	we	are	to	ex-plain	how	it	works,	we	need	an	account	of	how	choice	can	be	compromised	with-out	agency	being	bypassed	or	overridden.	I	will	hypothesise	that,	in	self-oppres-sion,	we	can	understand	the	will	to	be	corrupted	by	practical	reason,	which	com-promises	the	agent’s	own	choices	without	preventing	choices	from	being	made.	As	such,	Augustine	will	aid	our	project	in	two	ways:	invoking	the	notion	of	the	will	renders	it	conceptually	possible	that	practical	reason	compromises	choice,	and	his	notion	of	the	corrupted	will	helps	us	think	about	how	this	may	happen.	It	 will	 turn	 out,	 however,	 that	 Augustine	 can	 only	 help	 us	 so	 much.	Firstly,	as	I	will	show,	he	still	ties	his	notion	of	the	will,	and	his	related	notion	of	choice,	very	tightly	to	reason.	As	a	result,	the	idea	of	hyperkrasia	remains	incon-ceivable	on	his	framework:	it	seems	that,	for	Augustine,	practical	reason	could	never	corrupt	our	will	and	compromise	our	choices.	Secondly,	Augustine	overall	offers	 little	explanation	as	 to	how	our	will	could	be	corrupted	by	a	 factor	 like	practical	reason.	His	claim	is	that	our	will	is	corrupted	through	the	power	of	di-vine	punishment,	which	does	not	further	help	explain	the	possibility	of	hyper-krasia.	For	this	reason,	 the	next	chapter	will	 turn	to	yet	another	set	of	source	materials.		
B. INTRODUCING	THE	NOTION	OF	THE	WILL	It	is	fairly	widely	–	though	not	univocally	–	accepted	that	Aristotle	did	not	have	
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a	notion	of	the	will.1	The	will	 is	usually	understood	as	a	 faculty	which	has	the	power	to	choose	between	different	courses	of	action:	shall	I	keep	the	secret	or	spill	 it?	 Shall	 I	 eat	 the	 cake	 or	 not?	 On	 Aristotle’s	 picture,	 an	 agent	 does	 not	choose	between	actions	in	this	way.	How	she	acts	is	determined,	as	we	saw,	by	whichever	desire	–	rational	or	irrational	–	happens	to	have	the	strongest	pull,	and	there	is	no	decisive	mental	moment	at	which	the	agent	wills	the	one	or	the	other	route	of	action.	This	point	is	clearly	summarised	by	Michael	Frede	(2011).	On	Aristotle’s	picture,	he	explains,	‘[o]ne	acts	either	on	a	rational	desire,	a	will-ing,	or	on	a	nonrational	desire,	an	appetite.	In	the	case	of	conflict,	there	is	not	a	further	 instance	which	would	 adjudicate	or	 resolve	 the	matter’	 (Frede,	 2011:	24).	There	is	no	additional	mental	moment	of	choice	between	the	conflicting	de-sires.	The	outcome	is	determined	not	by	a	moment	of	weak	or	strong	will,	but	by	the	respective	force	of	the	competing	desires.	For	this	reason,	Aristotle	saw	no	need	to	invoke	an	additional	faculty	with	the	power	to	determine	action,	as	he	believed	that	the	sheer	force	of	reason	and	the	sheer	force	of	desire	both	suffice	to	explain	all	our	actions.	Of	course,	as	we	have	seen,	Aristotle	does	assume	that	we	make	choices,	and	so	assumes	a	faculty	of	choice	–	practical	reason.	But	the	kind	of	choice	made	by	 practical	 reason,	 for	 Aristotle,	 only	 concerns	 the	means	 by	which	we	 can	achieve	what	we	already	judge	best.	On	Aristotle’s	account,	Frede	states,	‘choice	does	play	an	important	role.	But	choices	are	not	explained	in	terms	of	a	will	but	in	terms	of	[…]	the	exercise	of	reason’s	cognitive	abilities	to	determine	how	in	this	situation	 the	good	might	best	be	attained’	 (Frede,	2011:	27).	Thus,	 if	and																																									 																					1	See,	inter	alia,	Sorabji	(2004)	and	Frede	(2011).	Of	course,	this	is	not	univocally	agreed	upon.	Irwin	(1992),	for	example,	argues	that	it	was	Aristotle	who	“discovered”	the	will.		
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when	the	agent	acts	rationally,	the	specific	ways	in	which	she	does	so	are	chosen.	But	if	she	fails	to	act	rationally,	this	is	not	by	choice,	and	does	not	involve	any	choice.	For	Aristotle,	the	capacity	for	choice	is	associated	with	reason	only,	and	choices	are	either	rational	or	not	made	at	all.	As	Frede	explains,	for	Aristotle,	
[o]ne	can	choose	to	follow	reason.	But	if	one	fails	to	follow	reason	and	acts	on	a	nonrational	desire,	it	is	not	because	one	chooses	not	to	follow	reason	and,	rather,	
chooses	to	do	something	else.	So	the	choice	one	makes	in	Aristotle	is	not,	at	least	necessarily,	 a	 choice	between	doing	X	and	not	doing	X,	 let	 alone	a	 choice	be-tween	doing	X	and	doing	Y.	It	is	a	matter	of	choosing	to	do	X	or	failing	to	choose	to	do	X,	such	that	X	does	not	get	done.	(Frede,	2011:	28-29)		Of	course,	when	he	describes	the	self-indulgent	agent,	Aristotle	does	assume	her	choice	is	irrational:	but	it	is,	as	we	saw,	only	objectively	so,	and	the	agent	herself	mistakenly	thinks	she	ought	to	choose	this	way.	In	this	sense,	the	self-indulgent	agent	does	not	make	an	irrational	choice	proper,	since	she	does	not	act	against	her	own	better	judgment.	Thus,	however	odd	it	may	sound	to	modern	ears,	on	Aristotle’s	view	choice	does	not	require	multiple	options.	Arguably,	Aristotle’s	picture	of	agency	does	not	manage	to	explain	the	whole	array	of	human	action.	For	example,	 it	seems	that	his	 theory	 leaves	no	space	for	the	possibility	of	weakness	of	the	will.2	Although	akrasia	is	often	trans-lated	as	such,	it	seems	to	me	that	weakness	of	the	will	refers	to	another	kind	of	phenomenon:	namely	to	a	form	of	agency	in	which	an	agent	chooses	to	do	the	wrong	thing,	rather	than	fails	to	do	the	right	thing.	It	refers,	in	other	words,	to	
																																								 																					2	One	author	who	agrees	that	Aristotle	indeed	does	not	yet	speak	of	weakness	of	the	will	is	Sorabji	(2004).	Another	author	who	agrees	akrasia	and	weakness	of	the	will	should	be	treated	as	distinct	phenomena,	but	on	different	grounds	than	me,	is	Holton	(1999).	
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the	possibility	of	irrational	choice.	The	akratic	agent,	as	should	now	be	clear,	does	not	choose	to	act	as	she	does.	She	is	a	mere	vessel	for	her	irrational	appetites.	But	some	may	feel	–	myself	included	–	that	we	can	also	do	the	wrong	thing	by	choice,	and	willingly	disregard	our	better	judgments.	Furthermore,	 in	 the	 last	 chapter,	 we	 saw	 how	 Aristotle’s	 theory	 of	agency	also	failed	to	capture	the	possibility	of	self-oppression.	Aristotle’s	notion	of	choice	commits	him	to	the	claim	that	if	an	agent	exercises	self-control	by	trans-lating	her	better	judgment	into	action,	this	action	is	de	facto	her	choice.	As	such,	he	 cannot	 conceive	 the	possibility	 that	 choice	 could	be	meaningfully	 compro-mised	by	an	oppressive	exercise	of	practical	reason.	As	such,	 it	seems	that	on	Aristotle’s	picture,	two	forms	of	agency	remain	unaccounted	for.	This	is	due,	in	both	cases,	to	the	tight	connection	he	draws	between	practical	reason	and	choice.	On	 his	 picture,	 when	 actions	 do	 not	 follow	 better	 judgments,	 they	 are	 not	properly	choices	at	all,	which	excludes	 the	possibility	of	weakness	of	 the	will.	Conversely,	when	actions	are	motivated	by	better	judgments,	they	are	automat-ically	seen	as	full-blown	choices,	which	excludes	the	possibility	of	self-oppres-sion.	 The	notion	of	a	will,	then,	seems	to	resolve	the	first	issue	–	the	apparent	possibility	of	irrational	choice.	Introducing	the	notion	of	the	will	as	a	faculty	of	choice	which	is	 independent	from	reason	(as	well	as	desire)	yields	a	radically	different	account	of	choice.	If	we	choose	with	our	will	and	not	just	with	reason,	we	can	choose	not	only	amongst	different	means	 to	 the	 rational	end	of	doing	what	is	best,	but	also	amongst	other,	irrational	ends.	When	we	have	conflicting	rational	and	irrational	desires,	the	outcome	is	not	settled	by	whichever	desire	is	
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strongest:	the	outcome	is	settled	by	our	will,	which	chooses	amongst	the	differ-ent	options.	We	could	refer	to	this	kind	of	choice	as	elective	choice.	It	is	clear,	then,	that	the	idea	of	elective	choice	helps	account	for	the	ap-parent	possibility	that	humans	can	make	bad	choices	–	it	accounts,	indeed,	for	the	possibility	of	a	weak	will.	I	want	to	examine,	however,	whether	this	notion	of	the	will,	and	its	accompanying	account	of	choice,	can	also	address	our	problem:	the	apparent	possibility	of	self-oppression.	To	do	so,	I	will	rely	on	the	views	of	Augustine,	who	–	at	least	according	to	a	popular	narrative	–	was	among	the	first	to	develop	such	a	notion.3	His	most	extensive	discussion	of	the	will	is	found	in	On	
the	Free	Choice	of	the	Will	(Latin:	De	Libero	Arbitrio,	henceforth:	DLA).	This	work,	which	he	wrote	between	387	and	395,	consists	in	three	books	and	is	written	as	a	dialogue	between	Augustine	and	his	friend	Evodius.	In	this	chapter,	I	will	con-fine	my	discussion	of	Augustine’s	views	on	the	will	and	choice	to	this	work.		
C. AUGUSTINE’S	CONCEPTION	OF	THE	WILL	In	a	sense,	Augustine	is	concerned	with	the	very	problem	we	just	discussed:	he	wants	to	explain	the	possibility	of	irrational	choice.	His	concerns,	however,	are	of	a	theological	nature.	In	the	DLA,	his	investigations	into	the	structures	of	hu-man	agency	are	part	of	a	theodicy:	Augustine	is	concerned	with	explaining	the	possibility	of	evil	in	the	face	of	his	belief	in	a	good	and	almighty	God.	How	can	it	
																																								 																					3	This	narrative	was	famously	defended	by	Albrecht	Dihle	in	his	Sather	Lectures	(pub-lished	in	1982),	but	is	not	without	its	critics.	It	was	challenged,	for	example,	by	Frede	(2011)	in	his	Sather	Lectures:	Frede	argues	that	Augustine’s	notion	of	the	will	is	essen-tially	adopted	from	the	Stoics	(see	Frede,	2011:	153	et	seq.).	Meanwhile,	Irwin	(1992)	maintains	that	it	was	Aristotle,	and	not	Augustine,	who	discovered	the	will.		
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be	that	people	do	evil	if	God	created	them,	and	the	whole	universe	in	which	they	exist?	Surely,	so	Augustine	reasons,	we	cannot	hold	God	responsible	for	evil.	So	how	can	it	be	that	the	people	created	by	him	do	bad	things?	In	his	elaborate	an-swer	to	this	question,	Augustine	outlines	his	own	mereology	of	the	agent,	which	includes	 the	 faculty	 of	 the	will,	 and	 so	 brings	with	 it	 a	 distinctive	 account	 of	choice.	I	will	discuss	this	mereology,	and	the	accompanying	account	of	choice,	in	what	follows.	In	doing	so,	I	will	–	where	possible	–	bracket	the	theological	under-pinnings	of	Augustine’s	views,	and	focus	only	on	its	structural	features.	In	many	respects,	Augustine’s	mereology	rings	very	Aristotelean.	For	ex-ample,	he	shares	Aristotle’s	starting	point	that	nonhuman	‘animals	lack	reason’	(DLA	1716.53)	and	takes	reason	to	be	a	central	defining	feature	of	human	agents.	Augustine	places	humans	above	other	animals	 in	 light	of	 this:	he	asserts	 that	‘reason	[ratio]	or	understanding	[intelligentia]’	is	that	‘in	virtue	of	which	a	hu-man	being	is	superior’	(DLA	1.7.16.55).	This	human	feature,	Augustine	writes,	resides	in	the	soul	(animus),	and	is	referred	to	either	as	reason	(ratio),	as	mind	(mens),	or	as	spirit	(spiritus).	Though,	to	be	precise,	reason	does	not	seem	to	be	exactly	the	same	as	the	mind,	but	rather	a	faculty	of	the	latter:	Augustine	speci-fies	that	 ‘even	if	reason	[ratio]	and	mind	[mens]	are	not	the	same,	surely	only	mind	can	make	use	of	reason’	(DLA	1.19.68).	Thus,	much	like	 in	Aristotle,	 the	human	soul	has	a	rational	part,	here	referred	to	as	the	mind,	which	‘has’	reason.	Equally,	on	Augustine’s	picture,	human	agency	differs	from	mere	animal	action	in	virtue	of	this	faculty	of	reason.	According	to	Augustine,	nonhuman	ani-mals	merely	follow	their	impulses:	‘every	action	in	an	animal’s	life	is	pursuing	physical	 pleasures	 [voluptates	 corporis]	 and	 avoiding	 discomforts’	 (DLA	1.8.18.62).	Human	souls	also	have	irrational	impulses,	to	which	Augustine	refers,	
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interchangeably,	as	lust	(libido)	or	desire	(cupiditas).4	But	next	to	irrational	im-pulses,	our	souls	also	have	a	mind,	our	faculty	of	reason,	which	allows	us	to	reign	these	in:	Augustine	asserts	that	‘the	mind	must	be	more	powerful	than	desire	for	the	very	reason	that	it	rightly	and	justly	dominates	desire’	(DLA	1.10.20.71)	and	that	lust	can	be	‘subjugated	to	the	mind’s	full	governance’	(DLA	1.9.19.69).	Thus,	in	contrast	to	other	animals,	human	beings	can	manage	their	impulses	through	their	reason:	Augustine	claims	that	‘a	human	being	should	be	called	“in	order”	when	these	selfsame	impulses	of	the	soul	[irrationales	animi	motus]	are	domi-nated	by	reason’	(DLA	1.8.18.63).	Clearly,	 for	 Augustine,	 being	 guided	 by	 reason	means	 doing	 the	 right	thing.	It	is	evident	that	the	faculty	of	reason	is	capable	of	distinguishing	bad	from	good,	and	can	dominate	lower	desires	in	light	of	what	is	best.	Granted,	whether	or	not	an	action	is	irrational	for	Augustine	does	not	just	depend	on	the	agent’s	own	better	judgment.	His	theory	of	agency	is,	again,	embedded	in	morally	objec-tivist	assumptions:	he	speaks	of	‘the	law	referred	to	as	“supreme	reason”	[summa	
ratio]’,	which	‘should	always	be	obeyed’	(DLA	1.6.15.48)	and	which	‘is	the	law	according	 to	 which	 it	 is	 just	 for	 all	 things	 to	 be	 completely	 in	 order’	 (DLA	1.6.15.51).	Accordingly,	for	Augustine,	a	human	agent	lives	the	right	 life	when	she	follows	this	eternal	law	through	employing	her	faculty	of	reason:	‘when	rea-son	 (or	mind	or	 spirit)	 governs	 irrational	mental	 impulses,	 a	 human	being	 is	dominated	by	the	very	thing	whose	dominance	is	prescribed	by	the	law	we	have	
																																								 																					4	These	are	synonymous:	Augustine	writes	in	Book	I	‘that	lust	[libido]	is	also	called	“de-sire”	[cupiditas]’	(DLA	1.4.9.22).	It	is	not	made	explicit	by	Augustine	whether	nonhuman	animals	also	experience	lust	and	desire,	or	merely	irrational	 impulses	which	 in	human	
beings	amount	to	lust	and	desire.		
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found	to	be	eternal’	(DLA	1.8.18.65).		It	is	thus	clear	that	for	Augustine,	even	more	explicitly	than	for	Aristotle,	it	is	objectively	given	which	actions	and	decisions	are	good	and	which	aren’t.	But,	here	as	well,	I	will	bracket	the	moral	objectivism	in	which	this	theory	is	embed-ded.	This	is	possible	because	Augustine,	like	Aristotle,	does	consider	our	better	judgments	 to	be	 first	and	 foremost	 individual	 judgments.	He	assumes,	 indeed,	that	agents	can	be	mistaken	in	their	judgments:	he	differentiates	between	those	who	sin	in	ignorance	–	those	who	‘do	not	see	how	they	should	be’	–	and	those	who	try	to	do	right,	but	fail	to	–	those	who	‘see	it	but	[…]	are	not	able	to	be	such	as	 they	see	 that	 they	should	be’	 (DLA	3.18.51.174,	 see	also	DLA	3.18.52.177).	Since	he	assumes	that	one	can	do	wrong	in	ignorance,	it	is	clear	that	actions	are	judged	to	be	wrong	on	his	view	in	light	of	the	objective	rational	order	of	the	uni-verse,	and	not	simply	because	the	agent	 judges	them	to	be.	But,	given	that	he	distinguishes	between	agents	who	are	ignorant	of	what	is	good,	and	those	who	know	but	fail	to	act	on	this	knowledge,	Augustine	also	assumes	that	reason	is	an	individual	faculty,	separately	at	work	in	individual	agents.	It	is	only	through	our	individual	minds	that	we	have	access	to	the	law	of	supreme	reason.	I	thus	con-sider,	again,	the	faculty	of	reason	first	and	foremost	as	a	part	of	the	individual	agent,	capable	of	making	 individual	better	 judgments	–	regardless	of	whether	these	judgments	are	considered	objectively	errant	or	just.	Thus,	on	Augustine’s	picture	also,	our	 reason	 functions	as	a	 faculty	of	better	judgment.	For	Augustine,	however,	such	a	faculty	of	reason	does	not	guar-antee	that	one	acts	 in	 line	with	it.	The	mere	fact	that	someone	possesses,	and	uses,	a	mind	does	not	mean	that	their	mind	is	effectively	in	charge:	‘most	people	are	fools’,	he	asserts,	and	‘the	fool	is	someone	in	whom	the	mind	does	not	have	
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supreme	power’	(DLA	1.9.19.66-67).	These	people,	of	course,	do	have	a	mind,	but	‘it	does	not	govern’	(DLA	1.9.19.70).	Thus,	a	‘mind	may	be	present	in	a	human	being	without	being	dominant’	(DLA	1.9.19.70).	People	regularly	do	irrational	things	–	this	is	precisely	the	problem	his	theodicy	intends	to	explain.	Of	course,	Augustine	here	has	in	mind	both	situations	in	which	agents	sin	in	ignorance,	and	those	 in	which	 they	sin	despite	knowing	better.	Since	 I	am	bracketing	Augus-tine’s	moral	objectivism,	my	discussion	of	irrational	action	on	his	account	only	considers	instances	of	irrational	action	in	which	an	agent	acts	against	her	own	best	judgment,	and	not	those	in	which	she	ignorantly	fails	to	abide	by	an	objec-tive	moral	standard.	Thus	far,	Augustine’s	theory	of	agency	seems	fairly	similar	to	Aristotle’s.	Augustine’s	picture	diverges,	however,	when	he	explains	how	irrational	action	is	possible.	For	Augustine,	this	situation	cannot	be	explained	by	appealing	to	the	sheer	force	of	irrational	desire.	It	cannot	be	explained,	that	is,	by	assuming	that	the	agent	has	a	desire	which	is	stronger	than	the	pull	of	better	judgment.	On	Au-gustine’s	picture,	irrational	desires	have	no	such	power.	The	reason	for	this	is	that,	according	to	Augustine,	that	which	is	lower	cannot	dominate	that	which	is	higher.	Since	irrational	desire	is	lower	than	reason,	the	former	cannot	possibly	subjugate	 the	 latter:	we	should	not	 think,	Augustine	writes,	 ‘that	 lust	 is	more	powerful	 than	 the	mind	 itself’,	 for	 this	would	be	a	case	of	 ‘[t]he	weaker	com-manding	the	stronger’	(DLA	1.10.20.71).	When	someone	is	dominated	by	desire,	therefore,	this	cannot	be	down	to	desire	being	the	stronger	force.	But,	Augustine	reasons,	neither	can	it	be	that	reason	empowers	an	irra-tional	desire	by	endorsing	it.	For	reason,	being	superior	and	just,	would	never	enslave	the	mind	to	an	irrational	desire	(even	though,	being	superior,	it	has	the	
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power	to):	‘whatever	the	nature	may	be	that	is	appropriately	superior	to	a	mind	powerful	in	virtue,’	he	writes,	‘it	cannot	be	unjust.	Thus,	even	this	nature,	despite	having	the	power,	will	not	enslave	a	mind	to	lust’	(DLA	1.11.21.75).	It	makes	no	sense,	for	Augustine,	to	assume	that	we	could	do	something	irrational	through	the	power	of	reason.	Thus,	desire	cannot,	and	reason	would	never,	authorise	irrational	action.	As	such,	Augustine	concludes,	this	phenomenon	can	only	be	explained	by	invok-ing	the	notion	of	the	will	(voluntas):	
since	anything	equal	or	superior	to	a	governing	mind	possessed	of	virtue	does	not	make	it	the	servant	of	lust,	[…]	and	since	in	addition	anything	inferior	to	it	could	not	do	this,	[…]	we	are	left	with	this	conclusion:	Nothing	makes	the	mind	a	devotee	of	desire	but	its	own	will	[voluntas]’	(DLA	1.11.21.76)			This	way,	Augustine	adds	a	significant	element	to	Aristotle’s	moral	psychology:	he	introduces	the	notion	of	the	will,	which	is	a	faculty	separate	from	both	reason	and	desire.	On	Augustine’s	picture,	the	will	is	a	faculty	of	choice:	he	links	his	notion	of	the	will	with	the	possibility	of	free	choice	[liberum	arbitrium].	More	precisely,	the	will	has	the	power	to	choose	between	reason	and	desire,	by	electing	which	one	to	endorse	in	action.	Augustine	explains	that	the	mind	is	sensitive	both	to	the	judgments	of	reason	and	to	desire:	‘the	mind	is	affected	by	impressions	de-rived	from	higher	things	and	derived	from	lower	things’	(DLA	3.25.74.255).	Cru-cially,	it	has	the	power	to	choose	which	impression	to	authorise:	the	mind,	Au-gustine	writes,	‘accepts	what	it	wants	from	each	source’	(DLA	3.25.74.255).	And	this	is	possible	by	virtue	of	the	will:	‘what	each	person	elects	to	pursue	and	em-brace	is	located	in	the	will’	(DLA	1.16.34.114).	Thus,	when	an	agent	acts,	a	better	
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judgment	in	itself,	nor	an	irrational	desire	in	itself,	suffices	to	explain	this	action	for	Augustine.	On	his	picture,	the	agent	needs	to	assent	to	either	form	of	motiva-tion	through	her	will	before	it	can	actually	result	in	action.	As	such,	Augustine’s	account	of	choice	differs	radically	from	Aristotle’s.	Choice,	for	Augustine,	is	a	mental	resolve	to	act	a	certain	way,	independent	from	one’s	better	judgment.	The	sort	of	choice	that	he	associates	with	the	will	seems	
elective	rather	than	intellectualistic	(though,	as	we	will	see	shortly,	the	matter	is	more	complicated	than	that).	We	saw	that	for	Aristotle,	the	faculty	of	choice	was	practical	reason:	as	a	result,	one	could	not	make	irrational	choices	on	this	view.	Augustine,	in	contrast,	locates	the	moment	of	choice	not	in	the	faculty	of	the	in-tellect,	but	in	the	separate	faculty	of	the	will.	This	marks	a	significant	difference	with	the	Aristotelean	picture,	and	Ancient	Greek	intellectualism	more	broadly.	As	a	result,	Augustine’s	account	of	choice	seems	more	elective	(or	voluntaristic):	both	rational	and	irrational	courses	of	action	may	be	chosen.	This	also	means	there	can	be	no	significant	gaps,	on	Augustine’s	view,	between	the	mental	moment	of	choice	and	chosen	action.	On	Aristotle’s	picture,	an	agent	could	choose	to	act	a	certain	way	but	fail	to	translate	it	into	action.	On	Augustine’s	picture,	if	an	agent	chooses	to	do	something,	this	is	how	she	will	act.	Or,	how	an	agent	acts	reveals	what	she	has	chosen	to	do.	(The	only	way	in	which	an	agent	could	choose	to	act	a	certain	way,	yet	fail	to	also	do	 it,	 is	 if	there	are	external	interferences:	I	resolve	to	drive	to	the	supermarket	but	a	snow	storm	has	lead	the	roads	to	be	closed	off.	But	an	agent	cannot	due	to	herself	fail	to	act	upon	her	own	choice:	her	action	tells	us	which	choice	she	has	made.)	This	picture	of	human	agency	and	choice,	then,	allows	Augustine	to	ad-dress	the	problem	of	evil	which	worried	him.	To	the	question	as	to	why	we	do	
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evil,	Augustine	answers	that	‘we	do	it	out	of	free	choice	of	the	will	[ex	libero	vol-
untatis	arbitrio]’	(DLA	1.16.35.117).	It	is	a	bad	will	which	is	the	origin	of	evil	ac-tions:	‘the	mind	becomes	a	slave	to	lust	only	through	its	own	will:	it	cannot	be	forced	to	this	ugliness	by	what	is	higher	or	by	what	is	equal,	since	it	is	unjust;	nor	by	what	is	lower,	since	it	is	unable’	(DLA	3.1.2.8).	By	placing	the	locus	of	agency	here,	he	places	the	origin	of	evil	actions	within	human	agents,	and	not	within	God:	‘Surely	I	find	nothing	I	might	call	mine	if	the	will	–	by	which	I	am	willing	or	unwilling	–	 is	not	mine!	Accordingly,	 if	 I	do	anything	evil	 through	it,	 to	whom	should	it	be	attributed	but	me?’	(DLA	3.1.3.12).	Since	my	evil	actions	are	the	re-sult	of	my	own	choice,	I	am	ultimately	responsible	for	them.5	As	such,	the	notion	of	the	will	helps	address	Augustine’s	principal	worry.	In	more	general	terms,	this	means	Augustine’s	notion	of	the	will	can	ex-plain	the	possibility	of	irrational	choices.	For	Augustine,	every	instance	of	irra-tional	action	implies	irrational	choice.	When	I	do	bad	things,	this	is	never	because	of	a	‘surrender’	to	my	desires:	it	is	because	my	will	has	allowed	it.	There	is	thus	no	thing	as	akrasia	for	Augustine.	Alternatively,	however,	we	could	simply	add	the	possibility	of	weak-willed	action	to	our	taxonomy	of	regulatory	styles,	along-side	akrasia.	If	an	agent	follows	her	desires	against	reason,	this	is	can	either	be	because	she	succumbed	to	an	overwhelming	desire,	or	because	she	willingly	as-sented	to	her	desire.	But	can	this	notion	of	the	will,	and	its	related	notion	of	elective	choice,	
																																								 																					5	Strangely,	 this	seems	 to	hold	both	 for	evil	actions	done	 in	 ignorance	and	 those	done	despite	a	better	judgment.	Though	I	am	not	considering	those	done	out	of	ignorance	in	this	thesis,	it	is	remarkable	that	Augustine	thought	humans	who	mistakenly	do	the	wrong	thing	are	fully	and	ultimately	responsible	for	this.	
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also	help	solve	our	problem?	On	Aristotle’s	picture,	practical	reason	could	not	possibly	compromise	choice,	since	 it	was	 itself	 the	 faculty	of	choice.	But	 if	we	locate	the	faculty	of	choice	in	the	will,	we	can	examine	the	possibility	that	prac-tical	 reason	 could	 compromise	 choice.	 We	 can	 imagine,	 more	 precisely,	 that	practical	 reason	 reigns	 with	 such	 tyrannical	 power	 that	 it	 compromises	 the	power	of	choice	of	the	will.	On	this	picture,	practical	reason	would	hamper	the	agent’s	 capacity	 to	 choose	amongst	 different	 ends,	 by	 compelling	 her	 to	 each	time,	where	possible,	to	pursue	the	very	same	ends.	Accordingly,	I	hypothesise	that	
hyperkrasia	is	a	real	form	of	agency,	in	which	practical	reason	becomes	
authoritarian,	exercising	a	form	of	self-control	which	compromises	choice	by	op-
pressing	the	will.		On	this	formulation,	our	hypothesis	now	addresses	our	first	major	prob-lem:	the	question	of	who	oppresses	whom	in	self-oppression.	If	we	assume	that	practical	reason	oppresses	the	will,	we	can	locate	both	the	‘oppressor’	(the	nom-inative	element	of	self-oppression)	and	the	‘oppressed’	(the	accusative	element)	within	a	single	agent.	Furthermore,	since	the	will	is	a	faculty	of	choice	for	Augus-tine,	his	model	also	allows	us	to	address	our	second	hard	question:	namely	how	choice	is	compromised	in	self-oppression.	But	to	properly	address	this	question,	we	must	closely	consider	the	kind	of	choice	Augustine	links	to	the	will,	and	how,	if	at	all,	it	can	be	compromised.	These	questions	will	be	tackled	in	the	next	sec-tion.	 	
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D. THE	CORRUPTION	OF	THE	WILL	When	Augustine	speaks	of	the	choice	of	the	will,	he	speaks	of	the	free	choice	of	the	will	specifically:	his	term	for	the	elective	capacity	of	the	will	is	liberum	ar-
bitrium.	Thus,	on	his	picture,	freedom	is	an	important	element	of	choice.	But	the	exact	 status	 of	 this	 freedom	 is	 quite	 ambiguous.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 Augustine	seems	to	understand	it	as	the	freedom	to	do	otherwise.	At	times,	he	sounds	very	optimistic	about	the	potential	strength	of	the	human	will,	and	the	kind	of	free-dom	 to	 choose	 it	 possesses.	 For	 example,	 he	writes	 about	 sin	 –	 i.e.	 doing	 the	wrong	thing	–	that,	‘since	it	is	voluntary,	[it]	is	placed	within	our	power.	If	you	fear	it,	you	must	not	will	it;	if	you	do	not	will	it,	it	will	not	exist’	(DLA	2.20.54.205).		At	other	times,	however,	we	can	sense	a	deep	pessimism	in	Augustine’s	picture	of	the	freedom	of	the	will	–	especially	in	book	III.6	In	this	book,	he	dis-cusses	the	fallen	condition	of	humankind,	and	its	effects	on	the	human	will.	He	posits	that,	because	of	the	punishment	received	for	Original	Sin,	human	beings	are	dispositioned	to	sin.	This	means	we	are	dispositioned	to	act	irrationally.	In	Augustine’s	words,	we	are	afflicted	with	what	he	calls	 ‘ignorance’	[ignorantia]	and	‘trouble’	[difficultas]:	we	are	either	unable	to	distinguish	wrong	from	right,	or	we	are	unable	to	do	the	right	thing	even	though	we	try.	It	should	be	no	sur-prise,	Augustine	writes,	‘that	we	do	not	have	free	choice	of	the	will	to	elect	what	we	do	rightly,	due	to	ignorance;	or	we	see	what	ought	to	be	done	rightly	and	will	it,	 but	 we	 cannot	 accomplish	 it	 due	 to	 the	 resistance	 of	 carnal	 habits’	 (DLA	3.18.52.177).	As	a	result,	we	seem	effectively	unable	 to	do	 the	right	 thing:	 ‘as	
																																								 																					6	This	pessimism	only	grew	stronger	in	Augustine’s	later	writings,	such	as	On	Reprimand	
and	Grace	(De	Corruptione	et	Gratia)	and	On	Grace	and	Free	Choice	(De	Gratia	et	Libero	
Arbitrio).		
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matters	stand	now,’	Augustine	writes,	‘human	beings	are	not	good,	and	they	do	not	have	it	in	their	power	to	be	good	–	either	because	they	do	not	see	how	they	should	be,	or	because	they	see	it	but	they	are	not	able	to	be	such	as	they	see	that	they	should	be’	(DLA	3.18.51.174).	The	human	will,	therefore,	does	not	seem	to	be	 free	exactly	on	this	picture.	Even	if	we	bracket	the	possibility	of	“ignorant”	actions,	which	are	objectively	irrational	for	Augustine,	we	are	left	with	a	picture	of	human	agency	on	which	we	are	doomed	to	act	against	our	own	better	judg-ments.		Of	 course,	 the	 theological	 dimension	 of	 Augustine’s	 thought	 reaches	much	 farther	 than	 his	 divine,	 and	 so	 objective,	moral	 standard	 for	 right	 and	wrong.	As	mentioned,	he	takes	this	plagued	human	condition	to	be	the	result	of	the	Fall	from	Eden.	Before	the	Original	Sin	committed	by	Adam,	Augustine	ex-plains,	 the	human	will	was	 free	and	able	 to	choose	 the	 right	 thing:	 ‘When	we	speak	of	free	will	to	act	rightly,’	he	explains,	‘obviously	we	are	speaking	of	it	as	human	beings	were	originally	made’	(DLA	3.18.52.179).	Ever	since	Original	Sin,	however,	the	human	condition	has	been	condemned,	and	its	nature	has	become	corrupt:	‘to	not	be	able	to	hold	oneself	back	from	lustful	actions	due	to	the	re-lentless	and	tortuous	affliction	of	carnal	bondage,	is	not	human	nature	as	origi-nally	 established,	 but	 the	 penalty	 after	 being	 damned’	 (DLA	 3.18.52.179).	 As	such,	in	the	moment	 of	 Original	 Sin,	 human	 beings	 seem	 to	 have	 lost	 their	freedom	 of	 the	will:	postlapsarian	agents	do	not	have	a	free	will	to	act	rightly,	but	are	enslaved	to	the	flesh.	It	is	no	mystery	why	Augustine	complicated	his	picture	in	this	way.	He	was	worried	that	an	emphasis	on	the	freedom	of	the	will	would	invite	the	as-
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sumption	that	human	agents	can	achieve	the	good	without	the	assistance	of	di-vine	grace.	This	was	an	assumption	made	in	Pelagianism,	a	belief	which	Augus-tine	vehemently	opposed.	But	it	does	make	Augustine’s	account	of	choice	very	complex.	If	we	are	unable	to	do	the	right	thing,	this	surely	seems	to	imply	that	our	evil	choices	are	not	exactly	free.	For,	in	that	case,	we	have	lost	our	freedom	to	do	otherwise.	Augustine,	however,	strongly	emphasises	that	the	will	is	never-
theless	always	free	to	choose,	and	that	we	sin	by	our	free	choice	of	the	will.	He	maintains	that	it	is	through	the	free	choice	of	the	will	that	anyone	sins	(see,	for	example,	DLA	2.18.47.179).	This	certainly	is	puzzling.	How	can	we	have	the	free-dom	to	choose,	but	not	the	freedom	to	choose	the	right	thing?	This	is	the	tension,	and	the	difficulty,	which	lies	at	the	heart	of	Augustine’s	picture	of	human	agency.	Though	 this	 tension	obviously	 arises	 from	Augustine’s	 theological	 concerns,	 I	want	to	consider	it	more	closely.	My	reason	for	this	is	a	hunch	that,	despite	its	theological	context,	 this	 tension	 tracks	an	 idea	also	 interesting	outside	of	 this	context	–	and	which,	indeed,	might	prove	useful	for	developing	our	notion	of	hy-perkrasia.	So	how	can	we	understand	this	 tension?	 I	propose	 that	 the	 fallen	will	must	still	be	understood	as	a	faculty	of	choice,	but	one	which	has	been	corrupted.	Due	to	this	corruption,	the	will	is	disposed	to	endorse	desire,	and	thus	disposed	to	make	a	certain	choice.	On	this	interpretation,	although	we	technically	have	a	choice	between	different	options,	we	are	not	equally	capable	of	choosing	every	option.	But	 this	 does	not	 change	 the	 fact	 that	we	do	have	 a	 choice.	This	may	sound	paradoxical,	but	it	is	not	contradictory.	If	I	am	dispositioned	to	choose	a	certain	way,	I	am	still	dispositioned	to	choose.	Consider	this	simple	example:	if	I	ask	you	to	choose	between	a	red	and	a	green	lolly,	and	promise	to	give	you	ten	
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pounds	if	you	choose	the	green	one,	you	will	likely	be	dispositioned	to	choose	the	green	one.	But	you	will	still	choose:	I	am	not	directly	forcing	you	to	pick	the	green	lolly.	The	point	is	that	your	agency	is	not	bypassed	or	overridden:	it	remains	in-tact,	you	remain	an	agent	in	the	full	sense.	I	submit,	then,	that	Augustine	has	a	similar	thing	in	mind	when	describ-ing	the	human	disposition	to	sin.	For	Augustine,	our	fallen	condition	dispositions	us	to	make	sinful	choices,	but	it	is	still	us	who	do	the	choosing.	We	still	sin	of	our	own	accord	–	we	are	not	literally	forced	by	anyone	or	anything	to	commit	the	sins	we	commit,	in	which	case	our	will	would	be	bypassed.	Rather,	we	play	some	active	role	in	our	sins,	even	though	this	role	was	imposed	upon	us	by	our	fallen	condition.	Our	will	 is	 thus	not	overridden	or	bypassed	–	we	are	still	choosing	agents.	 The	fallen	human	will,	however,	is	not	just	influenced	in	the	way	that	I	influence	your	will	when	offering	financial	rewards	for	picking	the	green	candy.	Augustine	paints	the	fallen	will	to	be	corrupted.7	As	he	describes	the	situation,	the	fallen	agent	is	more	than	just	influenced:	she	is	practically	unable	to	choose	otherwise	than	she	is	dispositioned	to.	Humans,	on	Augustine’s	picture,	are	prac-tically	unable	not	to	sin:	they	try	to,	yet	cannot	do	the	right	thing.	It	is	on	this	basis	 that	 their	 will	 seems	 corrupted,	 rather	 than	 just	 influenced.	 Arguably	(though	this	may	depend	on	your	financial	situation),	offering	you	ten	pounds	will	not	corrupt	your	will,	and	you	should	remain	fairly	able	to	pick	the	red	lolly	if	you	so	please.	If	you	try	to,	but	cannot,	pick	the	red	lolly,	the	situation	would	indeed	seem	quite	concerning,	and	we	may	start	to	think	your	will	has	indeed																																									 																					7	Frede	speaks	of	an	‘enslaved’	will	(Frede,	2011:	166)	in	this	context.	Dihle	(1982)	writes	that	the	will	is	‘perverted’	(Dihle,	1982:	130).		
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been	corrupted	by	my	offer.	In	such	a	case,	it	seems	that	your	freedom	of	choice	has	been	affected.	Nevertheless,	you	are	still	doing	a	form	of	choosing.	When	 a	will	 is	 corrupted,	 I	 submit,	 the	 choices	 it	makes	 are	 compro-mised.	This	means,	first	of	all,	that	a	corrupted	will	is	still	capable	of	choice.	To	say	 that	the	will	 is	 corrupted	 is	 not	 to	 say	 that	 it	 is	 being	bypassed.	 I	 am	not	physically	forced	to	pay	my	sister’s	rent.	But	choices	made	by	a	corrupted	will,	I	argue,	are	significantly	compromised.	Since,	on	Augustine’s	picture,	we	do	not	have	 the	freedom	 to	 do	 the	 right	 thing,	 the	 elective	 element	 of	 our	 choices	seems	nearly	absent.	 Therefore,	 though	we	 still	 have	 a	 choice,	 the	 freedom	of	this	choice	is	compromised.	An	analogy	might	make	this	point	a	bit	clearer.	If	my	sister	threatens	to	reveal	a	dark	secret	to	my	parents	unless	I	pay	her	rent,	she	is	 clearly	 manipulating	me.	 But	 if	 I	 choose	 to	 pay	 her	 rent,	 this	 remains	my	choice:	I	can	technically	choose	not	to	do	so,	and	have	my	secret	exposed.	It	is	my	choice,	because	what	I	do,	regardless	of	the	circumstances,	remains	up	to	me.	Yet	it	seems	fair	to	say	 this	was	 a	 compromised	 choice	 on	my	part.	 Similarly,	for	Augustine,	we	sin	out	of	our	own	choice.	But,	I	suggest,	this	choice	is	com-promised	because,	after	Original	Sin,	our	will	has	been	corrupted,	and	our	free-dom	to	choose	diminished.	Admittedly,	this	interpretation	seems	at	odds	with	certain	parts	of	the	text.	Augustine,	as	we	have	seen,	maintains	that	our	sinful	choices	are	still	free.	There	are,	however,	several	 indications	 that	he	did	assume	our	 fallen	 state	 to	imply	diminished	freedom.	This	is	most	apparent	in	the	context	of	a	hitherto	un-discussed	element	of	Augustine’s	thought:	the	need	for	divine	grace.	As	briefly	mentioned	before,	Augustine	opposed	the	belief	of	Pelagianism	because	 it	de-
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nied	the	necessity	of	divine	grace	for	overcoming	sin.	Contra	Pelagianism,	Au-gustine	was	convinced	that	without	grace,	humans	are	doomed	to	remain	stuck	in	their	fallen	state	of	being.	Though	he	discusses	the	need	for	divine	grace	more	elaborately	 in	 later	works,	 this	assumption	 is	 already	present	 throughout	 the	DLA.	He	speaks,	for	example,	of	‘God	Who	set	us	free’	from	our	‘state	of	sin’	(DLA	2.13.37.143).	For	Augustine,	only	with	the	aid	of	grace	are	we	able	to	do	what	is	right.	But	this,	I	submit,	commits	him	to	the	claim	that	only	divine	grace	can	re-store	our	freedom	of	choice.	If	we	can	only	do	what	is	right	after	receiving	grace,	we	cannot	be	truly	free	before.	This	implies	that	the	state	of	sin	undeniably	con-tains	an	element	of	unfreedom:	the	freedom	of	our	choices	must	indeed	be	lim-ited	so	long	as	we	remain	in	sin.	This	supports	my	claim	that	these	choices	are,	at	the	very	least,	not	fully	free,	and	thus	compromised.	This	interpretation	is	in	part	supported	by	Frede	(2011).8	On	his	reading,	Augustine	must	 indeed	mean	 that	 after	 the	 Fall,	 our	will	 is	 no	 longer	 free	 to	choose.	He	argues	that,	‘according	to	Augustine,	in	our	present	[fallen]	state	we	are	not	free.	We	do	not	have	a	free	will	in	the	sense	that	we	have	a	will	which	is	actually	free	to	choose’	(Frede,	2011:	167).	For	Augustine,	Frede	claims,	only	the	sin	of	Adam	and	Eve	was	truly	chosen	in	freedom.	All	ensuing	sins	are	not:	
It	is	crucial	for	Augustine’s	position	that	we	committed	this	original	misdeed	of	our	own	free	choice.	This,	though,	does	not	mean	that	all	our	sins	are	a	matter	of	our	free	choice.	They	are	not.	Except	for	the	original	sin,	they	are	the	product	of	the	choices	of	our	already	enslaved	will.	(Frede,	2011:	166)		
																																								 																					8	Frede’s	reading	of	Augustine	is	not	entirely	the	same	as	mine.	But	we	share	the	view	that,	in	our	fallen	state,	our	choices	are	not	free,	even	though	we	still	make	choices.		
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On	Frede’s	reading,	therefore,	postlapsarian	choices,	though	still	choices,	are	in	fact	not	free.	They	are,	in	this	sense,	akin	to	the	kind	of	choice	I	make	when	I	pay	my	sister’s	rent.	Frede	acknowledges	that	this	interpretation	seems	at	odds	with	Augus-tine’s	recurring	claims	that	we	sin	out	of	free	choice	of	the	will.	Augustine’s	lan-guage	in	this	context,	Frede	admits,	is	indeed	confusing:	‘He	talks	as	if	the	choices	and	decisions	we	make	even	after	the	fall	were	an	exercise	of	our	 liberum	ar-
bitrium.	And	this	cannot	but	create	the	impression	that,	even	after	the	fall,	we	retain	a	free	will.	But	this	is	not	so’	(Frede,	2011:	167).	The	key	to	understanding	Augustine	here,	he	suggests,	resides	in	the	distinction	between	the	freedom	to	choose	(libertas)	and	simply	having	a	choice	(liberum	arbitrium):	‘It	is,	for	Au-gustine,	one	thing	to	have	freedom	(libertas)	and	hence	a	free	will	and	another	thing	to	have	 liberum	arbitrium’	(Frede,	2011:	167).	Even	though	his	term	for	choice	is	liberum	arbitrium,	which	literally	translates	to	free	choice,	to	have	libe-
rum	arbitrium	does	not	imply	that	one	also	has	libertas,	and	thus	it	does	not	im-ply	that	one’s	choices	are	free.	All	liberum	arbitrium	means	for	Augustine,	Frede	explains,	is	‘that	it	is	up	to	us,	that	it	is	in	our	power	to	give	assent	or	not,	that	it	depends	on	us	whether	or	not	we	choose	to	act	in	a	certain	way’	(Frede,	2011:	168).	After	the	fall,	Frede	explains,	our	will	lost	its	freedom	(libertas)	to	choose,	and	became	enslaved.	But	it	remains	capable	of	choice:	 ‘for	Augustine,	the	fact	that	we	enslaved	ourselves	does	not	mean	that	it	no	longer	depends	on	us	how	we	choose’	(Frede,	2011:	168).	It	merely	means	that	our	choices	are	no	longer	free.	 It	 is	on	this	basis,	 then,	 that	 I	consider	 fallen	choices	compromised	–	a	point	with	which	Frede	seems	to	agree.	As	he	puts	it,	after	the	Fall	‘our	choice	is	
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no	longer	free	but	forced’	(Frede,	2011:	168,	emphasis	mine).	Thus,	with	Frede,	I	am	assuming	that	postlapsarian	choice	is	compromised,	and	this	because	fallen	human	agents,	having	lost	the	freedom	to	choose,	can	only	really	choose	sin.	A	 few	 things	must	 be	noted	here.	On	my	 interpretation,	 a	will	 is	 cor-rupted	if	it	is	influenced	such	that	it	cannot	but	choose	a	certain	way,	and	so	its	freedom	to	choose	is	affected.	This	amounts	to	a	claim	that	the	corrupted	will	chooses	to	φ	and	cannot	choose	–	φ.	It	is	important	to	note	that	this	claim	has	physical	nor	metaphysical	underpinnings.	The	point	is	not	that	an	agent	with	a	corrupted	will	is	physically	incapable	of	choosing	–	φ	(it	remains	physically	pos-sible	 for	me	to	not	pay	my	sister’s	rent).	Neither	 is	 the	point	 that	 it	 is,	 in	 this	world,	metaphysically	impossible	for	her	to	choose	–	φ	(the	question	whether	or	not	causal	determinism	is	true	doesn’t	bear	on	anything	here:	if	I	say	I	couldn’t	but	pay	my	sister’s	rent,	my	claim	is	not	a	metaphysical	one).	The	agent	whose	will	is	corrupted	is	practically	unable	(not	to)	φ,	but	this	does	not	mean	she	is	
strictly	incapable	in	the	sense	that	she	would	be	if	there	was	a	physical	or	meta-physical	impossibility	at	play.	Indeed,	if	this	were	so,	it	seems	the	possibility	of	making	a	choice	at	all	would	collapse.	It	seems	that	Augustine	would	agree	with	the	last	point:	the	corruption	of	the	human	will	does	not	seem	to	entail,	for	him,	a	metaphysical	impossibility	not	to	sin.	This,	at	least,	seems	implied	in	his	discussions	about	free	will	in	the	face	of	divine	foreknowledge,	which	implies	a	form	of	determinism.	The	kind	of	corrupted	will	humans	possess	after	the	Fall,	for	Augustine,	is	not	metaphysically	determined,	for	then	the	possibility	of	choice	would	collapse	altogether:	’if	it	is	necessary	that	[someone]	sin	[…]	then	there	is	no	choice	of	the	will	in	his	sinning,	
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but	an	unavoidable	and	fixed	necessity	instead’	(DLA	3.3.6.21-22).	Whether	Au-gustine	thinks	a	corrupted	will	implies	a	physical	impossibility	of	sorts,	though,	is	less	clear:	for	he	does	emphasise	how	we	sin	‘due	to	the	resistance	of	carnal	habits’	(DLA	3.18.52.177).	But	this	need	not	mean	there	is	a	strict	physical	im-possibility	as	play:	it	may	just	be	a	very	strong	resistance.	Though	this	is	a	complicated,	and	slightly	paradoxical,	account	of	choice,	it	could	be	quite	useful	for	our	purposes.	For	a	key	idea	underpinning	this	ac-count	is	that	choice	may	be	compromised	even	though	the	agent	still	exercises	her	agency,	and	makes	choices.	On	this	view,	therefore,	choice	can	be	compro-mised	not	only	by	factors	which	override	our	agency	through	sheer	force,	but	also	by	 factors	which	 influence	our	 agency	 through	 influencing	our	will.	 Cru-cially,	in	self-oppression,	it	is	in	such	a	way	that	choice	must	be	compromised:	since	it	is	the	agent	herself	who	compromises	her	own	choices,	choice	cannot	be	compromised	in	a	way	which	bypasses	or	overrides	her	agency.	I	hypothesise,	therefore,	that	Augustine	can	help	us	refine	the	category	of	hyperkrasia	in	two	main	ways.	Firstly,	his	notion	of	the	will	as	a	separate	fac-ulty	of	choice	allows	us	to	locate	the	part	of	the	agent	which	is	being	oppressed:	I	will	posit	 that	practical	 reason	oppresses	 the	will,	 thus	 compromising	 choice.	Secondly,	the	idea	of	a	corrupted	will	makes	this	idea	more	comprehensible.	For	it	helps	us	understand	how	choice	could	possibly	be	compromised	even	 if	 the	will	remains	functional:	we	can	posit	that,	in	hyperkrasia,	practical	reason	op-presses	the	will	by	corrupting	it.	The	self-oppressive	agent	exercises	self-control	in	such	a	way	that	she,	practically	speaking,	cannot	but	follow	her	own	regula-tions.	When	she	finds	a	way	to	pursue	an	end	she	is	fixated	on,	she	feels	so	pres-sured	to	act	upon	it,	that	not	doing	so	seems	impossible.	Shani,	perhaps,	cannot	
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choose	between	having	dessert	or	not	since	she	cannot	break	her	general	rule	to	eat	nothing	after	dinner;	and	Jaimi	might	feel	like,	say,	she	cannot	but	give	up	on	her	personal	hobbies	in	order	to	spend	more	time	with	her	children.	Though	the	self-oppressive	agent	remains	an	agent	and	a	maker	of	choices,	these	choices	are	therefore	compromised.	My	hypothesis,	therefore,	is	now	as	follows:		
hyperkrasia	is	a	real	form	of	agency,	in	which	practical	reason	becomes	
authoritarian,	exercising	a	form	of	self-control	which	compromises	choice	by	
corrupting	the	will.	
	This	formulation	thus	allows	us	to	argue	that	choice	is	compromised	in	hyperkrasia,	 whilst	 simultaneously	 recognising	 the	 fact	 that	 hyperkrasia	 is	 a	form	of	agency.	One	of	our	challenges,	recall,	was	to	explain	how	an	agent	could	ever	compromise	her	own	choices.	The	notion	of	a	corrupted	will	goes	some	way	towards	explaining	this	possibility.	Of	course,	one	thing	we	will	need	to	do	is	fur-ther	explain	in	what	way	exactly	the	agent	‘cannot	but’	do	a	certain	thing	when	a	will	is	corrupted,	and	how	practical	reason	may	achieve	this	effect.	This	will	be	discussed	in	the	coming	chapters,	but	a	crucial	element	here	will	be	the	fact	that	self-oppression	 involves	a	self-inflicted	pressure.	 Its	power	 to	corrupt	 the	will	has	something	to	do	with	the	pressure	it	can	exert	upon	it.	When	one	thinks	of	Augustine’s	image	of	the	sinner,	whose	will	is	corrupted	to	chase	evil	pleasures,	we	may	not	think	in	terms	of	pressure	exactly	(but	rather,	for	example,	in	terms	of	impulse	or	temptation).	Evidently,	the	will	of	the	self-oppressive	agent	will	be	corrupted	in	a	slightly	different	way.	A	final	thing	to	note	here	is	that,	on	this	characterisation,	the	hyperkratic	agent’s	will	is	corrupted,	and	her	choices	compromised,	whether	or	not	she	wants	
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to	act	differently	than	she	is	dispositioned	to.	When	practical	reason	sabotages	its	own	workings,	as	mentioned,	the	agent	may	want	to	break	one	of	her	own	general	rules	without	feeling	able	to.	In	such	a	case,	her	choices	–	if	we	can	speak	of	choice	here	at	all	–	are	very	obviously	compromised.	This	is	a	possible	result,	and	a	sign,	of	a	corrupted	will.	But	even	when	the	agent	has	no	intention	of	break-ing	these	rules,	her	will	is	corrupted	if	she	is	so	strongly	dispositioned	to	follow	them	that	she	is	practically	unable	not	to.		
E. LIMITATIONS	OF	AUGUSTINE’S	FRAMEWORK	
But,	although	Augustine’s	theory	of	agency	helps	us	further	elaborate	our	picture	of	hyperkrasia,	it	can	only	help	us	so	much.	The	reason	for	this	is	twofold:	(1)	first,	as	I	will	demonstrate	shortly,	Augustine’s	account	of	choice	turns	out	to	be	fairly	intellectualist	after	all.	Though	he	introduces	the	will	as	a	separate	faculty	of	choice,	he	assumes	the	will	is	free	if	and	only	if	it	follows	reason.	Thus,	the	idea	that	practical	reason	would	corrupt	the	will,	and	so	compromise	its	freedom,	is	after	all	inconceivable	within	his	framework.	(2)	Second,	Augustine	also	fails	to	explain	how	exactly	a	will	can	be	corrupted.	Since	he	assumed	that	our	will	 is	corrupted	through	divine	intervention,	he	did	not	to	explain	how	such	corrup-tion	might	be	possible	due	to	other	factors	–	let	alone	an	internal	factor	such	as	our	practical	reason.	But	as	such,	Augustine’s	notion	of	a	corrupted	will	seems	conceptually	too	thin	to	serve	as	a	foundation	for	our	account	of	hyperkrasia.	Let	us	discuss	these	two	reasons	in	turn.	On	Augustine’s	view,	our	will	is	corrupted	as	the	result	of	divine	punish-ment.	My	hypothesis	is	that	our	practical	reason	could	have	a	similar	effect	on	
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our	will:	corrupting	it,	dispositioning	it	to	always	pursue	a	specific	set	of	wishes,	and	thereby	compromising	its	freedom	to	choose.	On	Augustine’s	picture,	how-ever,	such	a	scenario	seems	inconceivable.	To	see	this,	we	must	closely	consider	Augustine’s	understanding	of	 freedom.	 It	 is	 clear	 that	he	draws	a	very	strong	connection	between	freedom	and	reason.	This	connection	is	most	apparent	in	his	discussion	of	divine	grace.	We	saw	that,	on	Augustine’s	view,	the	only	way	we	can	achieve	true	freedom	is	through	the	aid	of	divine	grace.	Crucially,	on	his	de-scription,	divine	grace	sets	us	free	through	allowing	us	to	see	what	is	right:	he	writes	that	grace	‘reveals	all	true	goods’	(DLA	2.13.36.141).	It	thus	seems	to	re-store	our	freedom	by	restoring	our	intellect,	and	its	capacity	to	distinguish	good	from	bad.	In	 a	 2004	 paper,	 Joseph	 Lössl	 argues	 that	 divine	 grace	 indeed	works	through	a	restoration	of	sorts	of	the	human	intellect.	He	writes	that	‘the	primary	gift	of	grace	is	intellect.	The	work	of	grace	begins	in	the	intellect’	(Lössl,	2004:	67).	Thus,	grace	grants	us	freedom	through	restoring	our	intellect.	Our	will,	in	other	words,	is	only	free	if	our	intellect	is	in	full	function:	‘for	Augustine’	Lössl	writes,	 ‘freedom,	that	 is	 full	moral	 functioning,	of	 the	will	cannot	be	assumed,	unless	 the	 intellect,	 too,	 is	 in	 full	working	 order’	 (Lössl,	 2004:	 57).	 The	 idea,	therefore,	is	that	grace,	by	showing	us	what	is	good	and	what	is	not,	renders	us	finally	capable	of	doing	the	right	thing.	As	such,	grace	indeed	sets	us	free:	after	receiving	grace,	we	are	no	longer	dispositioned	to	sin,	but	able	to	act	as	we	think	right	(or,	more	precisely,	as	is	right	–	but	this	morally	objectivist	dimension	is	bracketed	in	my	interpretation).	At	 first	 glance,	 it	might	 seem	 that	 divine	 grace	 thus	 corrects	 our	 cor-rupted	will,	such	that	its	capacity	for	elective	choice	is	restored,	and	the	will	is	
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genuinely	free	to	choose	again	between	different	courses	of	action.	But	such	a	reading	would	underestimate	 the	strength	of	 the	connection	which	Augustine	draws	between	freedom	and	the	good.	True	freedom,	for	him,	does	not	just	mean	
being	able	to	do	the	right	thing,	it	means	actually	doing	it.	This	means,	however,	that	the	state	of	grace	almost	mirrors	the	state	of	sin.	In	our	fallen	state,	though	there	was	some	form	of	choice,	we	were	practically	unable	to	do	what	is	right.	After	divine	grace,	we	are	practically	unable	not	to.	As	such,	grace	reverses	the	situation	such	that	only	doing	the	right	thing	becomes	really	doable.	When	our	will	regains	its	original	freedom	through	divine	grace,	it	will	act	in	accordance	with	the	insight	of	our	intellect,	and	leads	us	to	do	what	we	think	right.	Lössl	shares	my	view	that	this	freedom	to	do	the	right	thing	might	seem	more	like	a	compulsion	to	do	the	right	thing.	But	this,	he	argues,	is	not	a	real	com-pulsion	on	Augustine’s	view:	‘if	under	the	spell	of	grace,	will	may	seem	at	first	as	if	under	duress.	This,	however,	rather	than	actually	being	duress,	may	turn	out	to	be	a	first	phase	of	liberation,	initiated	by	a	change	at	the	intellectual	level’	(Lö-ssl,	2004:	69).	If	the	will	runs	along	with	the	intellect,	and	cannot	but,	this	still	amounts	 to	 freedom	 for	Augustine	–	or,	more	precisely,	only	 this	amounts	 to	freedom.9	Being	 “compelled”	 by	 reason	 does	 not	 amount	 to	 being	compelled:	‘in	Augustine’s	view,’	Lössl	concludes,	 ‘in	 the	 intellect	 there	 is	no	compulsion’	(Lössl,	2004:	61).	This	 relates	 back	 to	 the	 question	 of	 intellectualism.	 In	 an	 important	
																																								 																					9	An	idea,	in	fact,	which	we	will	find	later	in	Kant.	Arguably,	Augustine’s	model	of	choice	is	a	forebode	of	many	more	to	come:	the	most	famous	example	being	the	Kantian	notion	of	autonomy,	according	to	which	free	actions	are	those	in	accordance	with	our	self-pre-scribed	rules,	and	thus	the	principle	of	reason.		
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sense,	invoking	the	will,	as	Augustine	does,	marks	an	important	move	away	from	Ancient	Greek	intellectualism,	toward	a	more	voluntaristic	model	of	agency.	It	is	tempting,	however,	to	overstate	this	move.	In	his	account	of	freedom,	we	hear	the	echoes	of	Greek	intellectualism:	if	we	choose	sin,	we	are	not	fully	choosing	freely.	Only	 if	 and	when	we	 follow	 reason	 are	we	making	 full-blown	 choices.	Though	there	is,	on	Augustine’s	model,	a	place	for	irrational	choice,	these	choices	are	by	default	compromised.	We	are	only	choosing	freely	if	we	choose	what	we	think	right.	On	this	reading,	therefore,	uncompromised	choice	is	not	really	elec-tive	either,	as	it	can	only	really	act	upon	the	good.	This,	of	course,	is	a	picture	deeply	embedded	in	Augustine’s	moral	objec-tivism.	Reason,	on	his	view,	refers	to	the	absolute	divine	principle	–	the	order	of	the	universe	as	God	designed	it.	To	receive	grace,	then,	is	to	be	able	to	see	and	do	what	is	right	in	accordance	with	this	absolute	principle.	But	if	we	bracket	this	moral	 objectivism	 (insofar	 as	 that	 is	 possible),	 the	 picture	 is	 as	 follows:	 our	choices	are	free	only	if	and	when	we	can	do	as	we	judge	best.	What	this	requires	is	a	deep	understanding	of	our	own	true	goods	–	the	things	we	find	valuable.	Once	we	have	such	an	understanding,	we	are	able	to	make	free	choices	and	resist	con-flicting	temptations	where	needed.	Of	course,	as	said	before,	some	connection	between	reason	and	choice	is	only	plausible:	the	things	I	rationally	value	should,	normally,	very	strongly	in-form	my	 choices.	 But	 if	 I	 cannot	 but	act	 in	 accordance	with	 practical	 reason,	aren’t	my	choices	compromised?	Such	a	situation,	I	submit,	sounds	exactly	like	self-oppression:	I	am	so	compelled	by	my	practical	reason	that	I	practically	can-
not	 but	 follow	 its	 regulations.	 But	 on	 such	 a	 scenario,	 for	 Augustine,	 I	 have	reached	the	epitome	of	freedom.	Thus,	even	though	I	can	only	practically	do	one	
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thing,	my	freedom	is	not	restrained	but	maximised	on	this	scenario.	We	can	thus	not	say	that,	though	there	is	some	choice,	it	is	compromised	because	I	cannot	but	act	this	way.	It	is	clear,	therefore,	that	self-oppression	is	inconceivable	on	this	kind	of	view.	Even	if	a	disposition	to	sin	indeed	compromises	our	free	choice,	it	would	make	no	sense	for	Augustine	to	suggest	that	a	disposition	to	follow	our	reason	could	do	so.	For	this,	on	his	view,	is	precisely	the	epitome	of	freedom	–	
the	manner	in	which	we	comply	with	our	reason	cannot	itself	compromise	our	choice.	 Thus,	 arguably,	 Augustine	would	 resist	 the	 idea	 that	 practical	 reason	could	corrupt	our	will.	Of	course,	this	does	not	keep	us	from	positing	it	could.	But	there	was	a	second	reason	why	Augustine	cannot	further	help	us:	he	does	not	offer	us	any	details	as	to	how	one’s	will	may	be	corrupted	by	profane	factors.	The	notion	of	a	corrupted	will,	for	Augustine,	only	makes	sense	within	the	context	of	divine	punishment.	This	makes	it	difficult	to	even	imagine	how	a	profane	factor	like	our	practical	reason	could	have	the	same	effect.	Thus,	regardless	of	whether	he	would	object	to	the	idea	that	practical	reason	can	corrupt	the	will,	he	could	not	help	explain	how	this	may	work.	Augustine’s	moral	psychology	is	embedded	within	a	specific	theological	framework,	and	at	some	points	it	becomes	difficult	to	use	his	concepts,	in	any	rigorous	manner,	outside	of	it.		
F. CONCLUSION	Even	though	we	cannot	fully	confirm	our	hypothesis	within	Augustine’s	frame-work,	we	can	retain	some	of	his	ideas:	we	will	keep	our	hypothesis	that	practical	reason	corrupts	the	will	 in	hyperkrasia.	The	next	step,	then,	will	be	to	further	
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elaborate	how	this	may	happen.	To	this	end,	we	must	obtain	a	sense	of	how	pro-
fane	factors	may	be	able	to	corrupt	our	will.	How	could	our	choices	be	compro-mised	without	our	agency	being	bypassed,	but	rather	through	a	certain	kind	of	influence	on	our	agency?	To	answer	these	questions,	the	next	chapter	will	turn	to	the	works	of	Michel	Foucault.	
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III. Foucault	
A. INTRODUCTION			In	the	last	chapter,	we	saw	how	Augustine’s	notion	of	a	corrupted	will	helps	fur-ther	conceptualise	self-oppression.	Augustine,	however,	could	not	help	explain	
how	the	will	may	be	corrupted	by	something	other	than	divine	punishment,	let	alone	our	practical	reason.	For	these	reasons,	this	chapter	will	appeal	to	an	en-tirely	different	scholarship:	in	order	to	further	develop	the	idea	of	a	corrupted	will,	I	will	consult	the	works	of	Michel	Foucault.	More	precisely,	I	will	argue	that	Foucault’s	account	of	domination	offers	a	profane	example	of	how	our	will	can	be	corrupted,	and	this	by	oppressive	structures	specifically.	In	brief,	I	will	argue	that	Foucault	allows	us	to	distinguish	between	two	different	 forms	 of	 oppression:	 repression	 and	 domination.	 Both,	 I	will	 argue,	compromise	 the	 choices	of	 the	oppressed	agent,	but	 they	do	 so	 in	a	different	manner.	On	the	reading	I	will	propose,	repression	denotes	a	form	of	oppression	which	employs	repressive	tactics,	which	directly	and	forcefully	steer	the	actions	of	the	oppressed	agent.	Domination,	in	contrast,	refers	to	a	form	of	oppression	which	works	 in	 a	more	 insidious,	 and	 indirect	manner:	 it	 controls	 the	 agent	
through	her	own	agency,	by	influencing	the	field	of	possible	action	within	which	she	can	act.	On	this	basis,	I	will	argue	that	repression	oppresses	the	agent	by	over-
riding	her	will,	whereas	domination	oppresses	the	agent	by	corrupting	it.	As	such,	Foucault’s	account	of	domination	offers	an	example	of	how	a	certain	 form	of	oppression	may	compromise	an	agent’s	choices	by	corrupting	
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her	will.	The	key	insight	to	take	away	from	this	chapter	will	be	that	certain	fac-tors	can	influence	which	possibilities	for	action	an	agent	will	see	as	viable	for	her,	thus	influencing	how	she	will	act.	If	this	influence	is	such	that	the	agent,	as	a	re-sult,	cannot	but	choose	certain	options,	this	corrupts	her	will.	In	a	next	step,	I	will	hypothesise	 that	 internal	 factors	–	more	precisely,	practical	reason	–	can	also	have	this	kind	of	effect	–	and	that	this	is	what	happens	in	self-oppression.	Constructing	 this	 Foucauldian	 account	of	 domination,	 admittedly,	will	require	a	fair	amount	of	interpretation.	First	of	all,	Foucault’s	terminology	is	far	removed	both	from	my	own	and	from	those	employed	by	Aristotle	and	Augus-tine:	Foucault	rarely	ever	uses	the	notion	of	the	will,	and	does	not	really	speak	of	choice.	 Indeed,	he	can	hardly	be	 said	 to	offer	a	 theory	of	agency	at	all.	His	 is,	amongst	other	things,	a	theory	of	power.	As	I	will	demonstrate,	however,	Fou-cault’s	 account	 of	 power	 pays	 considerable	 attention	 to	 the	 effects	 it	 has	 on	agency.	I	will	focus	on	these	and,	where	needed,	translate	his	views	into	the	ter-minology	of	this	thesis.	Most	importantly,	I	will	formulate	how	different	forms	of	power,	 as	 Foucault	 characterises	 them,	 can	 be	 said	 to	 have	 an	 effect	 on	 the	agent’s	will	and	choices.	Admittedly,	this	endeavour	will	not	be	simple,	partially	because	Foucault	himself	was	not	very	consistent	when	using	his	own	terminol-ogy.	For	example	–	as	he	readily	admits	–	he	did	not	use	the	term	domination	in	the	same	way	throughout	his	entire	oeuvre.	Thus,	before	I	can	translate	his	con-cepts	and	ideas	into	the	language	of	this	thesis,	I	must	first	of	all	interpret	them	on	their	own	terms.	Another	thing	to	note	is	that,	in	doing	so,	I	will	assume	a	relative	coher-ence	within	Foucault’s	thought	over	the	years.	Though	there	is	certainly	an	evo-lution	traceable	in	his	works,	I	think	his	earlier	and	later	works	can	be	read	as	
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part	of	the	same	project	(though	this,	admittedly,	is	a	contentious	issue	within	Foucault	 scholarship).1	Given	 this	 assumption,	 I	will	 draw	 on	 a	 variety	 of	 re-sources,	published	over	 the	years,	 to	 construct	my	reading,	without	 compart-mentalising	these	resources	into	specific	periods	of	thought.	But	 before	 developing	my	 interpretation,	 I	 want	 to	 emphasise	 that	 –	again	–	the	usefulness	of	my	reading	does	not	depend	on	its	hermeneutical	va-lidity.	My	primary	aim	is	not	to	present	an	ultimate	exegesis	of	Foucault’s	views	on	power	and	domination	(which	are	often	as	obscure	as	they	are	interesting).	My	reading	of	Foucault	is	developed	with	a	specific	aim	in	mind:	to	understand	how	certain	oppressive	structures	may	be	said	to	corrupt	our	will,	with	the	even-tual	aim	of	explaining	the	possibility	of	self-oppression.	That	being	said,	my	in-terpretation	of	Foucault	 lies	 fairly	close	 to	 that	of	Amy	Allen	(2000,	2008).	 In	developing	my	interpretation,	I	will	provide	some	additional	support	from	her	where	appropriate.			
B. POWER	VERSUS	REPRESSION		As	noted,	I	will	argue	that	Foucault	allows	us	to	distinguish	between	two	differ-ent	forms	of	oppression,	namely	repression	and	domination.	But	before	we	can	understand	Foucault’s	distinction	between	repression	and	domination,	we	must	first	understand	his	account	of	power.	For	both	forms	of	oppression	are,	for	Fou-cault,	specific	ways	in	which	power	can	operate.	Foucault	develops	his	view	on	power	in	opposition	to	what	he	takes	to	
																																								 																					1	Dews	(1989),	for	example,	argues	that	Foucault’s	later	works	entail	a	radical	break	with	his	earlier	works.		
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be	a	common	misunderstanding	of	it.	He	worries,	more	precisely,	that	common	conceptions	of	power	tend	to	reduce	it	to	repression.	According	to	Foucault,	we	think	of	power	as	essentially	a	negative	force,	capable	only	of	prohibition	and	elimination.	Though	Foucault	does	not	offer	a	rigorous	conception	of	the	term	‘repression’,	I	will	employ	this	term	to	denote	a	specific	category	of	power,	which	operates	in	this	negative	manner.	It	is	important,	Foucault	contends,	to	under-stand	that	repression	is	only	one	specific	manifestation	of	power,	and	that	power	is	in	fact	a	much	wider	category.	Though	it	is	true	that	power	sometimes	works	this	way,	Foucault	argues,	it	doesn’t	always:	our	mistake	is	that	we	conceive	of	power	in	general	as	repressive.	He	denounces	this	common	equation	of	power	and	repression,	for	exam-ple,	in	a	series	of	lectures	given	at	Collège	de	France	in	1976.	He	stated	there	that	‘what	is	now	the	widespread	notion	of	repression	cannot	provide	an	adequate	description	of	the	mechanisms	and	effects	of	power,	cannot	define	them’	(Fou-cault,	1976/1990a:	18).2	In	his	lectures,	Foucault	does	not	further	elaborate	on	this	matter.3	But	he	does	in	some	of	his	other	studies:	for	example	in	The	History	
of	Sexuality	vol.	I,	which	was	published	in	the	same	year.4	In	this	book,	Foucault	examines	the	development	of	discourses	around	sexuality.	In	doing	so,	he	chal-lenges	what	he	calls	the	‘repressive	hypothesis’:	the	idea	that,	from	the	17th	cen-tury	onwards,	we	have	lived	in	an	age	of	repression,	in	which	it	was	forbidden	to	
																																								 																					2	 This	 citation	 is	 taken	 from	 the	 David	Macey	 translation	 of	 these	 lectures	 (Foucault,	1976/1990a).	At	other	points	in	the	chapter	I	have	also	used	the	Katy	Soper	translation	(Foucault,	1976/1980).	3	Foucault,	in	fact,	promises	to	critically	re-examine	the	notion	of	repression	in	the	next	lecture,	but	this	promise	was	not	kept.	4	Some	editions	of	The	History	of	Sexuality	I	are	subtitled	The	Will	to	Knowledge.	
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speak	of	sex.	This	is	a	commonly	held	belief,	but	in	fact,	Foucault	contends,	sex	has	been	the	continual	object	of	discussion	during	these	past	centuries:	‘around	and	apropos	of	sex,’	he	writes,	‘one	sees	a	veritable	discursive	explosion’	(Fou-cault,	1976/1990b:	17).	Foucault	takes	these	discourses	to	be	manifestations	of	power	relations:	there	was	a	‘multiplication	of	discourses	concerning	sex	in	the	field	of	exercise	of	power	itself:	an	institutional	incitement	to	speak	about	it,	and	to	do	so	more	and	more;	a	determination	on	the	part	of	the	agencies	of	power	to	hear	 it	 spoken	 about’	 (Foucault,	 1976/1990b:	 18).	 For	 example,	 Foucault	 ex-plains	how	sex	became	the	subject	of	medical	investigation,	and	of	religious	ex-amination	 through	 the	 practice	 of	 confession	 –	 both	 insidious	 strategies	 of	power	to	control	our	sexuality.	Foucault	worried	that,	if	we	maintain	the	view	that	sex	was	simply	not	spoken	about,	we	are	blind	to	the	ways	in	which	power	relations	were	(and	are)	operative,	and	controlling	us,	in	the	domain	of	sexuality.	This	specific	study,	however,	has	implications	reaching	far	beyond	the	realms	of	sexuality.	Like	his	other	studies,	it	has	a	seemingly	narrow	focus,	but	is	embedded	in	a	larger	project:	to	lay	out	the	structures	and	techniques	of	mod-ern	power.5	When	formulating	the	wider	objective	of	this	book,	he	presents	it	as	challenging	a	certain	representation	of	power,	which	he	terms	the	’juridico-dis-cursive’	representation	(Foucault,	1976/1990b:	82).	This	representation,	Fou-cault	argues,	reduces	power	to	repression:	it	presents	power	as	pervasively	neg-
ative.	The	power	depicted,	Foucault	writes,	‘is	a	power	that	only	has	the	force	of	the	negative	on	its	side,	a	power	to	say	no;	in	no	condition	to	produce,	capable	
																																								 																					5	Examples	of	other	studies	which	focus	on	a	particular	topic	or	context,	but	in	doing	so	disclose	the	structures	of	power	more	generally,	are	Discipline	and	Punish	(1975/1977)	and	Madness	and	Civilisation	(1961/1967).		
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only	of	positing	limits,	it	is	basically	anti-energy’	(Foucault,	1976/1990b:	85).	As	a	result	of	this	widespread	conception,	we	generally	think	of	power	as	interfer-ing	with	our	actions	directly,	 chalking	 forcefully	 the	 limits	of	what	we	are	al-lowed	to	do:	it	presents	power,	Foucault	writes,	as	‘a	mere	limit	placed	on	[our]	desire	[…],	as	a	pure	limit	set	on	freedom’	(Foucault,	1976/1990b:	86).	Though	the	book	itself	focuses	on	power	in	the	context	of	sexuality,	Foucault	is	explicit	that	 this	 ‘juridico-discursive’	 representation	of	power	 transcends	 this	narrow	context,	and	is	in	fact	pervasive	throughout	Western	societies:	
one	must	not	imagine	that	this	representation	is	peculiar	to	those	who	are	con-cerned	with	the	problem	of	the	relations	of	power	with	sex.	In	fact	 it	 is	much	more	general;	one	frequently	encounters	it	in	political	analyses	of	power,	and	it	is	deeply	rooted	in	the	history	of	the	West.	(Foucault,	1976/1990b:	83)		Foucault	clearly	thinks	this	representation	to	be	false,	or	at	least	incom-plete.	On	this	representation,	he	writes,	power	is	not	recognised	‘except	in	the	negative	and	emaciated	form	of	prohibition’,	and	as	a	result	‘the	deployments	of	power	[are]	reduced	simply	to	the	procedure	of	 the	 law	of	 interdiction’	(Fou-cault,	1976/1990b:	86).	As	such,	this	representation	‘is	by	no	means	adequate	to	describe	 the	 manner	 in	 which	 power	 was	 and	 is	 exercised’	 (Foucault,	1976/1990b:	87-88).	This	misconception	of	power,	Foucault	argues,	has	always	been	partially	inadequate.	According	to	Foucault,	the	major	premodern	power	form	–	which	he	calls	sovereign	power	–	had	a	very	obvious	repressive	dimension.	Power	can	be	repressive,	and	especially	in	its	older	forms,	it	often	was.	But,	on	my	interpreta-tion	at	 least,	 sovereign	power	was	never	merely	repressive	according	 to	Fou-cault.	Thus,	juridico-discursive	representation	‘was	useful	for	representing’	this	
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power,	‘albeit	in	a	nonexhaustive	way’	(Foucault,	1976/1990b:	89).	But,	accord-ing	to	Foucault,	this	misrepresentation	of	power	has	become	particularly	press-ing	in	modernity.	Whilst	in	sovereign	power,	the	repressive	dimension	was	in-deed	significant,	modern	power	employs	fewer	and	fewer	repressive	tactics.	Ac-cording	to	Foucault,	 the	 juridico-discursive	conception	of	power	 ‘is	utterly	 in-congruous	with	the	new	methods	of	power	[…].	We	have	been	engaged	for	cen-turies	in	a	type	of	society	in	which	the	juridical	is	increasingly	incapable	of	cod-ing	power,	of	serving	as	 its	system	of	representation’	(Foucault,	1976/1990b:	89).	 Thus,	 whilst	 the	 juridico-discursive	 conception	 of	 power	 only	 partially	blinded	the	reality	of	sovereign	power,	it	misses	the	workings	of	modern	power	almost	entirely.	It	is,	therefore,	especially	unfit	to	capture	the	modern	power	sit-uation.	 It	 is	against	the	backdrop	of	this	observation	that	Foucault	sets	out	to	rethink	power.	If	we	want	to	understand	the	wider	reality	of	power,	especially	in	modernity,	we	must	overcome	our	purely	negative	way	of	thinking	about	it:	‘We	shall	try	to	rid	ourselves	of	a	juridical	and	negative	representation	of	power’	(Foucault,	1976/1990b:	90).	In	other	words,	Foucault	urges	us	to	stop	thinking	of	 power	 as	 repression.	 Notably,	 though,	 it	 is	 irrelevant	 for	 our	 purposes	whether	Foucault	is	entirely	right	in	claiming	that	power	is	commonly	misun-derstood	in	this	way.	Nor	does	it	matter	whether	older	forms	of	power	were	en-tirely	or	just	predominantly	repressive,	and	to	what	extent	modern	power	forms	no	longer	are.	What	is	important	is	that	Foucault	tries	to	conceptualise	a	specific	form	 of	 power	 which	 is	 not	 repressive.	 This	 conception	 of	 power,	 as	 I	 will	demonstrate,	 is	 useful	 for	 our	 purposes	 –	 regardless	 of	 the	 exact	 role	 of	 this	power	form	in	history.	I	will	spell	out	this	conception	of	power	in	the	following	
	 		
			
125	
section,	with	particular	focus	on	how	power,	thus	understood,	can	affect	agency.		
C. POWER	AND	AGENCY		
C.1 Power	as	a	Productive	Force		But	how,	then,	must	we	think	of	power	instead,	if	not	as	repression?	The	simplest	answer	to	this	question	seems	to	be	that	power	is	essentially	a	productive	force:	Foucault	writes	in	The	History	of	Sexuality	I	that	‘relations	of	power	[…]	have	a	directly	productive	role,	wherever	they	come	into	play’	(Foucault,	1976/1990b:	94).	What	he	means	is	that	power,	rather	than	merely	telling	us	what	not	to	do,	actively	shapes	the	society	we	live	in:	it	influences	what	we	do,	how	we	speak,	the	way	we	relate	to	each	other.	Foucault,	indeed,	submits	that	‘[p]ower	is	eve-rywhere;	not	because	it	embraces	everything,	but	because	it	comes	from	every-where’	(Foucault,	1976/1990b:	93).	It	produces	our	reality.	More	precisely,	on	Foucault’s	view,	power	does	so	through	complex	net-works	of	human	relations,	operating	at	all	its	levels:	power,	for	Foucault,	is	es-sentially	relational.	If	we	are	to	understand	how	power	can	shape	our	reality,	we	must	understand	that	it	 is	at	play	at	all	times,	between	all	people.	This	means	that	we	must	not	imagine	power	as	emanating	from	one	specific	source,	directed	at	another	person:	it	is	not	possessed	by	one	party	over	another,	be	it	the	sover-eign	or	the	state	over	its	citizens,	the	father	over	his	child,	or	the	tutor	over	her	pupil.	Rather,	 it	moves	between	all	people:	 ‘Power’,	Foucault	contends,	 ‘is	not	something	that	is	acquired,	seized,	or	shared,	something	that	one	holds	on	to	or	allows	to	slip	away;	power	is	exercised	from	innumerable	points,	in	the	interplay	of	nonegalitarian	and	mobile	 relations’	 (Foucault,	 1976/1990b:	94).	Power	 is	thus	not	only	operative	where	 it	represses	or	 forbids	(though	this	 is	where	 it	
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may	be	most	 visible):	 it	 is	 operative	 throughout	 the	whole	 of	 human	 society,	since	it	features	in	all	human	relations.	In	a	late	interview,	he	explains	that	‘in	human	relations,	whatever	they	are	–	whether	it	be	a	question	of	communicating	verbally,	as	we	are	doing	right	now,	or	a	question	of	a	love	relationship,	an	insti-tutional	 or	 economic	 relationship	 –	 power	 is	 always	 present’	 (Foucault,	1984/1987:	123).	It	 is	this	productive	dimension	which	is	the	essence	of	power	for	Fou-cault,	whilst	the	repressive	dimension	of	power,	if	at	all	present,	is	merely	acci-dental.	He	reiterates	this	point	in	an	interview	about	The	History	of	Sexuality	I:	‘In	general,’	he	states,	‘I’d	say	that	interdiction,	refusal,	prohibition,	far	from	be-ing	 the	essential	 forms	of	power,	 are	only	 its	 limits,	 its	worn,	 extreme	 forms.	Above	all,	 relations	of	power	are	productive’	 (Foucault,	1977/1980a:	9).	Note	that,	since	this	productive	dimension	is	the	essence	of	power	for	Foucault,	we	must	assume	that	it	is	also	present	in	repressive	power	forms	(a	point	to	which	I	will	 return).6	Foucault	 is	mostly	 concerned,	however,	with	modern	 forms	of	power,	which	are	almost	exclusively	productive.	According	to	Foucault,	the	spe-cific	tactics	and	strategies	which	modern	power	develops	–	which	we	will	discuss	shortly	 –	 are	 increasingly	 efficient	 in	 structuring	 and	 shaping	 the	social	body.	If	we	keep	thinking	of	power	as	just	repression,	we	remain	blind	to	the	ways	in	which	modern	power,	ever	more	profoundly,	is	producing	the	world	around	us	
																																								 																					6	Fraser	(1981)	agrees	with	this	assumption	(see	Fraser,	1981:	285).	This	is	also	sup-ported	by	Foucault’s	statements	in	another	1977	interview,	in	which	he	suggests	that	this	productive	dimension	of	power	was	the	condition	of	possibility	of	sovereign	power:	the	manifold	of	power	relations	between	all	people,	he	states,	are	‘the	concrete,	chang-ing	soil	in	which	the	sovereign’s	power	is	grounded,	the	conditions	which	make	it	pos-sible	for	it	to	function’	(Foucault,	1977/1980b:	187).		
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in	this	way.		
C.2 Power	and	its	Effect	on	Agency	As	Foucault	sketches	it,	the	productive	dimension	of	power	is	immense,	complex,	and	manifold:	on	his	view,	the	workings	and	effects	of	power	pervade	the	whole	of	 every	human	society.	Power	 reproduces	 itself	 amongst	all	people,	 in	every	kind	of	relationship,	and	from	there	runs	through	and	shapes	our	entire	reality.	Power,	indeed,	‘is	everywhere’	(Foucault,	1976/1990b:	93).	As	such,	the	produc-tive	dimension	of	power	is	hard	to	capture.	But	its	most	essential	effect	–	or,	at	the	very	least,	the	effect	which	is	most	interesting	for	our	purposes	–	is	that	it	influences	our	agency.	That	its	effect	on	agency	is	at	least	a	key	effect	of	power	for	Foucault	be-comes	very	apparent	in	a	1982	essay	entitled	The	Subject	and	Power.	In	this	es-say,	Foucault	suggests	that	the	essence	of	power	is	that	it	influences	our	actions.	The	 essay	 includes	 a	 section	 entitled	 ‘What	 constitutes	 the	 specific	 nature	 of	power?’,	 in	which	he	defines	a	relationship	of	power	as	a	mode	of	action	upon	
actions:	
what	defines	a	relationship	of	power	is	that	it	is	a	mode	of	action	which	does	not	act	directly	and	 immediately	on	others.	 Instead,	 it	acts	upon	their	actions:	an	action	upon	an	action,	on	existing	actions	or	on	those	which	may	arise	 in	 the	present	or	the	future.	(Foucault,	1982:	789)		Foucault’s	suggestion	here	is	that	what	defines	power	is	that	it	influences	how	individuals	act.	‘The	exercise	of	power’,	he	submits,	‘consists	in	guiding	the	pos-sibility	of	conduct	and	putting	in	order	the	possible	outcome’	(Foucault,	1982:	789).	
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The	question,	of	course,	is	how	power	relations	can	accomplish	this.	Fou-cault’s	answer,	 in	short,	 is	 that	 they	shape	our	 fields	of	possible	action:	he	de-scribes	the	exercise	of	power	‘as	a	way	in	which	certain	actions	may	structure	the	field	of	other	possible	actions’	(Foucault,	1982:	789).	This	means	that,	when	an	agent	is	‘faced	with	a	relationship	of	power,	a	whole	field	of	responses,	reac-tions,	 results,	 and	 possible	 inventions	 may	 open	 up’	 (Foucault,	 1982:	 789).	Power	relations	influence	the	horizon	of	our	agency:	they	influence	which	possi-
bilities	for	action	will	present	to	me.	Importantly,	this	means	that	the	individual	subjected	to	power	remains,	in	a	vital	sense,	an	agent:	Foucault	writes	that	‘the	one	over	whom	power	is	ex-ercised’	 is	 ‘thoroughly	recognized	and	maintained	to	the	very	end	as	a	person	who	acts	[…The	exercise	of	power]	is	always	a	way	of	acting	upon	an	acting	sub-ject	or	acting	subjects	by	virtue	of	their	acting	or	being	capable	of	action’	(Fou-cault,	1982:	789).	Agency,	in	other	words,	is	not	in	the	first	instance	bypassed	or	blocked	by	power:	power,	instead,	runs	through	it.	It	 is	 this	production	of	 fields	of	possible	action,	 I	propose,	which	truly	constitutes	 the	 essence	 of	 power	 on	 Foucault’s	 conception:	 ‘what	 would	 be	
proper	to	a	relationship	of	power’,	he	writes,	‘is	that	it	be	a	mode	of	action	upon	actions’	(Foucault,	1982:	791,	emphasis	mine).	Thus,	we	now	have	a	better	grasp	of	the	more	productive,	positive	dimension	of	power,	which	Foucault	takes	to	be	essential	to	it:	it	structures	human	societies,	by	structuring	the	possible	actions	of	the	people	which	constitute	them.		
C.3 Fields	of	Possible	Action:	Repression	vs	Subjection	Given	that	it	is	the	essence	of	power	to	act	upon	actions,	this	must	be	its	effect	
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regardless	of	how	it	operates.	Therefore,	on	the	reading	I	advance,	power	struc-tures	our	fields	of	possible	action	both	in	its	repressive	and	in	its	non-repressive	forms.	The	manner	in	which	power	achieves	this,	however,	is	vastly	different	in	both	cases.	Power	can	thus	achieve	its	object	–	structuring	fields	of	possible	ac-tion	–	in	different	ways.	In	what	follows,	I	will	lay	out	an	interpretation	of	how	both	forms	of	power	can	achieve	this,	building	on	Foucault’s	remarks	in	The	Sub-
ject	and	Power.	First	of	all,	power	can	structure	fields	of	possible	action	through	the	use	of	 repressive	 tactics.	This,	obviously,	 is	what	happens	 in	repression.	 It	 is	 true	that,	in	repression,	power	relations	are	predominantly	negative:	they	prohibit,	forbid,	or	apply	force.	This,	however,	is	not	the	essence	of	repressive	power:	it	is	merely	its	strategy.	The	essence	lies	in	its	effect	on	agency:	through	employing	its	repressive	tactics,	repressive	power	structures	the	field	of	possible	action	of	whomever	it	represses.	For	example,	if	we	imagine	a	sovereign	who	threatens	to	kill	a	citizen	if	she	doesn’t	obey,	this	threat	will	structure	her	field	of	possible	action:	presumably,	it	will	present	her	with	the	possibility	of	obeying.	This	means	that,	in	cases	of	repression,	power	does	act	‘directly	and	im-mediately	 on	 others’.	 Granted,	 Foucault	wrote	 in	The	 Subject	 and	 Power	 that	power	does	not	act	 immediately	on	others,	but	rather	acts	upon	their	actions.	This,	at	first	glance,	reads	as	an	exclusive	disjunction.	On	my	reading,	however,	power	can	act	immediately	on	others,	or,	more	precisely,	it	can	employ	tactics	which	do	so.	The	point	is	that	the	effect	 is	still	the	same:	through	acting	upon	agents	directly,	repression	also	acts	upon	their	actions.	There	is	thus	no	exclusive	disjunction	between	acting	directly	upon	others	and	acting	upon	their	actions.	It	is	just	that,	if	and	when	power	acts	upon	agents	directly,	this	is	not	the	essence	
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of	power,	but	merely	its	strategy.	Its	essence	is	that,	through	whatever	strategy,	it	structures	agents’	fields	of	possible	action.	This	 reading	 seems	 consistent	with	Foucault’s	 position	 in	The	 Subject	
and	Power.	Most	notably,	he	remarks	 that	power	may	sometimes	employ	vio-
lence:	‘the	bringing	into	play	of	power	relations	does	not	exclude	the	use	of	vio-lence	any	more	than	it	does	the	obtaining	of	consent;	no	doubt	the	exercise	of	power	can	never	do	without	one	or	the	other,	often	both	at	the	same	time’	(Fou-cault,	1982:	789).	This,	on	my	reading,	refers	to	the	fact	that	power	can	manifest	as	repression:	in	many	instances,	for	example,	sovereign	power	did	employ	vio-lence,	and	thus	operated	in	an	explicitly	negative	way.	But,	for	Foucault,	this	was	not	its	essence,	this	was	not	what	makes	it	power:	 ‘But	even	though	consensus	and	violence	are	the	instruments	or	the	results,’	Foucault	contends,	‘they	do	not	constitute	the	principle	or	the	basic	nature	of	power’	(Foucault,	1982:	789).	The	essence	of	power,	rather,	lies	in	its	effect	on	the	agency	of	those	affected.	In	sum,	on	my	reading,	repression	is	a	specific	form	of	power,	and	the	essential	element	which	makes	it	repression	–	that	it	acts	upon	subjects	directly	–	is	not	the	essential	element	which	makes	it	power	–	that	it	acts	upon	the	actions	of	individuals.	But	Foucault,	of	course,	is	more	concerned	with	modern	forms	of	power,	which	structures	agent’s	fields	of	possible	action	without	using	repres-sive	tactics.	Rather	than	explicitly	enforcing	or	closing	off	certain	possibilities,	modern	power	indirectly	steers	the	agent	towards	certain	courses	of	action.	It	is	here,	then,	that	power	acts	upon	the	actions	of	individuals,	without	acting	upon	them	‘directly	and	immediately’.	To	 understand	 how	modern	 power	 can	 achieve	 this,	we	must	 under-stand	one	of	its	main	strategies	–	or	perhaps	even	the	main	strategy	of	modern	
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power:	 the	 strategy	which	 Foucault	 calls	 subjection	 (assujettissement	–	 some-times	 translated	 as	 subjugation).	With	 this	 term,	 he	 refers	 to	 the	 process	 by	which	power	influences	individuals	through	influencing	the	kind	of	 individual	they	are.	Power,	Foucault	writes,	repeats	‘the	formidable	injunction	to	tell	what	one	is	and	what	one	does,	what	one	recollects	and	what	one	has	forgotten,	what	one	is	thinking	and	what	one	thinks	[s]he	is	not	thinking’	(Foucault,	1976/1990a:	60).	This,	for	Foucault,	is	a	key	effect	of	modern	power:	he	states	in	his	lectures	at	Collège	de	France	that	‘it	is	already	one	of	the	prime	effects	of	power	that	cer-tain	bodies,	certain	gestures,	certain	discourses,	certain	desires,	come	to	be	iden-tified	 and	 constituted	 as	 individuals’	 (Foucault,	 1976/1980:	 98).	 ‘In	 other	words’,	he	states,	‘individuals	are	the	vehicles	of	power,	not	its	points	of	applica-tion’	 (Foucault,	 1976/1980:	 99).	 Though	 this,	 on	 my	 reading,	 holds	 true	 for	power	in	all	its	forms,	modern	power	is	perfecting	the	strategy	of	subjection	for	Foucault.	Around	the	eighteenth	century,	he	writes	in	The	Subject	and	Power,	we	saw	‘a	new	distribution,	a	new	organization	of	this	kind	of	individualizing	power’	(Foucault,	1982:	783).		When	 power	 influences	 individuals	 in	 this	way,	 Foucault	 says,	 it	pro-duces	subjects:	 this	 ‘is	 a	 form	 of	 power	 which	 makes	 individuals	 subjects’	(Foucault,	1982:	781).7	The	subject,	on	his	account,	thus	refers	specifically	to	an	
																																								 																					7	A	minor	thing	to	note,	here,	is	that	the	subject	does	not	coincide	with	the	agent	as	a	whole:	subjectivity	seems	to	be	tied	to	a	specific	aspect	or	dimension	of	the	person	as	an	agent.	Foucault	highlights	this	in	a	later	interview,	where	he	states	that	the	subject	‘is	a	 form	and	this	 form	is	not	above	all	or	always	 identical	 to	 itself.	You	do	not	have	towards	yourself	the	same	kind	of	relationships	when	you	constitute	yourself	as	a	polit-ical	subject	who	goes	and	votes	or	speaks	up	in	a	meeting,	and	when	you	try	to	fulfil	[sic]	your	desires	in	a	sexual	relationship.	There	no	doubt	exist	some	relationships	and	some	
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individual	who	has	been	shaped	by	relations	of	power:	hence	the	term	subjec-tion.	Crucially,	Foucault’s	choice	of	 term	here	reflects	 the	dual,	and	 in	a	sense	ambiguous,	position	of	the	agent	who	is	shaped	by	power.	On	the	one	hand,	the	subject	 is	 an	effect	 of	 the	power	 relations	 influencing	her,	 and	passively	 sub-jected	 to	 them.	 But	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	 subject	 is	 an	 active	 agent	 with	thoughts,	feelings,	and	habits;	and	it	is	precisely	through	these	thoughts,	feelings,	and	habits	that	modern	power	achieves	its	goals.	Foucault	writes	that	 ‘[t]here	are	two	meanings	of	the	word	"subject":	subject	to	someone	else	by	control	and	dependence;	and	tied	to	[her]	own	identity	by	a	conscience	or	self-knowledge.	Both	meanings	suggest	a	 form	of	power	which	subjugates	and	makes	subject’	(Foucault,	1982:	781).	As	Allen	(2008)	puts	it,	
Foucault’s	analysis	of	subjection	brilliantly	captures	the	ways	in	which	power	constitutes	forms	of	identity	that	both	constrain	subordinated	subjects	by	com-pelling	them	to	take	up	subordinating	norms,	practices,	and	so	on	while	simul-taneously	enabling	them	to	be	subjects	with	the	capacity	to	act.	(Allen,	2008:	72)		This	notion	of	subjection	sheds	light	on	how	modern	power	can	influ-ence	 agents	without	 directly	 interfering.	 By	 turning	 individuals	 into	 subjects,	power	impacts	on	the	constitution	of	the	individuals	it	affects,	thereby	shaping	what	they	are	and	thus	how	they	will	act:	the	way	I	am	constituted	as	a	subject,	the	kind	of	individual	I	am,	will	naturally	influence	what	kinds	of	things	I	will	do.	
																																								 																					interferences	between	these	different	kinds	of	subject	but	we	are	not	in	the	presence	of	the	same	kind	of	subject.	In	each	case,	we	play,	we	establish	with	one’s	self	some	differ-ent	form	of	relationship’	(Foucault,	1984/1987:	121).	Thus,	any	agent	always	shares	in	in	a	myriad	of	interwoven	subjectivities.	
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In	his	lectures	at	Collège	de	France,	Foucault	describes	‘the	level	of	on-going	sub-jugation’	as	 ‘the	 level	of	 those	continuous	and	uninterrupted	processes	which	subject	 our	 bodies,	 govern	 our	 gestures,	 dictate	 our	 behaviors	 etc.’	 (Foucault,	1976/1980:	97,	emphasis	mine),	and	in	a	1984	essay	he	describes	his	project	as	‘a	historical	investigation	into	the	events	that	have	led	us	to	constitute	ourselves	and	 to	 recognize	ourselves	as	 subjects	of	what	we	are	doing,	 thinking,	 saying’	(Foucault,	1984:	46,	emphasis	mine).	Therefore,	when	power	produces	subjects,	it	 thereby	structures	 their	 field	of	possible	action.	As	such,	subjection	 is	a	non-repressive	strategy,	employed	by	modern	power,	to	achieve	its	essential	effect:	it	 is	a	way	for	power	to	influence	how	we	act,	without	directly	overriding	our	actions.	But	how	does	this	work	exactly?	Some	examples	might	clarify	the	mat-ter.	We	can	here	refer	back	to	Foucault’s	study	of	discourses	surrounding	sexu-ality.	His	point	is	that	sexuality	is	not	just	repressed,	but	also	controlled	through	the	 production	 of	 specific	 kinds	 of	 sexual	 subjects,	 who	 understand	 their	thoughts	and	desires	surrounding	sex	in	a	certain	manner,	which	in	turn	will	in-fluence	their	actions	(see,	e.g.,	Foucault,	1984/1985:	5).	But	let	us	also	construct	our	own	example.	I	will	sketch	an	example	of	an	agent	who	is	influenced	by	cer-tain,	non-repressive,	relations	of	power.	Imagine	a	girl,	Emma,	who	grows	up	in	a	modern	democratic	society.	As	she	develops,	she	comes	to	position	herself	in	the	world	in	a	certain	way:	the	way	she	responds	to	situations,	how	she	inter-prets	events,	how	she	acts	in	general	will	depend	on	the	kind	of	individual	she	is	becoming.	This,	on	Foucault’s	picture,	is	largely	the	result	of	a	myriad	of	power	relations,	continually	acting	upon	her,	and	disclosing	different	fields	of	possibili-
ties.	One	specific	example	could	be	her	interactions	with	others	who	relate	to	her	
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as	a	woman.	These	 interactions	can	 influence	which	kinds	of	possibilities	will	present	on	Emma’s	horizon:	possibilities	which	are	 traditionally	 linked	 to	 the	concept	of	femininity.	If	Emma	has	been	gifted	countless	baby	dolls	as	a	toddler,	and	is	perpetually	assumed	to	yearn	for	motherhood,	this	may	lead	her	to	be-come	a	mother	–	this	possibility	will	emerge	on	her	field	of	possible	action.	Ad-ditionally,	she	may	learn	to	comport	her	body	in	certain	ways,	keep	her	hair	long,	shave	her	legs,	understand	herself	as	rather	shy	and	bad	at	maths,	a	great	fan	of	pink,	 et	 cetera.	 Simultaneously,	 certain	 possibilities	might	 remain	 hidden	 for	Emma:	let’s	say	that,	at	a	certain	point,	the	possibility	of	becoming	an	astronaut	doesn’t	feature	in	her	field	of	possible	action.	Thus,	her	existence	has	deeply	been	shaped	by	the	social	body	she	exists	in,	and	the	kind	of	subject	she	became	be-cause	of	it.	Emma’s	subjectivity,	and	consequently	her	actions,	are	thus	informed	by	relations	of	power.	In	the	case	described,	however,	power	influences	Emma’s	ac-tions	without	 employing	 any	 repressive	 tactics.	No	one	 is	 directly	 interfering	with	her	actions:	she	is	not	forced	by	anyone	to	shave	her	legs,	or	to	become	a	mother,	and	no	one	is	keeping	her	from	pursuing	a	career	in	space	travel.	It	is	just	that	Emma	sees	herself	to	be	the	kind	of	person	who	does,	or	does	not,	do	these	kinds	of	things.	We	thus	have	an	example	of	modern	power,	structuring	someone’s	fields	of	possible	action	in	a	non-repressive	manner.		
D. DOMINATION			This	brings	us,	at	 last,	 to	Foucault’s	notion	of	domination.	Though	he	uses	the	term	throughout	his	oeuvre,	Foucault	is	not	very	consistent	in	the	way	he	uses	it.	On	the	reading	I	will	advance,	domination	denotes	those	instances	of	modern	
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power	which	amount	to	oppression.	This	characterisation	requires	some	further	explanation.	Hitherto	in	the	chapter,	we	have	not	yet	spoken	of	oppression	–	it	is	a	term	which	does	not	really	feature	in	Foucault’s	framework.8	Nonetheless,	it	is	clear	in	his	writings	that	he	considers	certain	forms	of	power	to	be	illegitimate,	harmful,	or	at	the	very	least	suspicious.	It	is	those	forms	of	power	which	I	will	consider	to	be	oppressive.	It	seems	quite	obvious	that	repressive	forms	of	power,	as	I	have	defined	them,	can	be	classified	as	oppressive	(we	will	get	to	the	reasons	as	to	why	ex-actly).	On	my	reading,	however,	this	is	not	necessarily	the	case	for	modern	forms	of	power.	Especially	when	reading	his	earlier	works,	it	is	certainly	tempting	to	think	 that	all	power	 is	oppressive	 for	Foucault,	 and	he	often	seems	 to	equate	power	with	domination.	On	my	reading,	though,	not	all	modern	power	amounts	to	 domination.	Unlike	 repressive	 tactics,	which	 are	 inherently	oppressive,	 the	tactics	of	modern	power	may	or	may	not	amount	to	oppression.	It	is	only	the	op-pressive	forms	of	modern	power,	I	submit,	which	Foucault	refers	to	as	domina-
tion.	I	thus	take	oppression	to	be	the	general	category	of	power	to	which	both	repression	and	domination	belong.			
D.1 Power	versus	Domination	
																																								 																					8	Admittedly,	at	times,	Foucault	does	speak	of	oppression.	For	example,	in	his1976	lec-tures,	he	suddenly	invokes	it	as	separate	from	both	domination	and	repression	(see	Fou-cault,	1976/1980:	16-18).	When	I	speak	of	oppression,	it	will	be	in	the	general	and	ge-neric	sense	which	I	describe	here,	and	not	in	the	specific	(but	unclear)	sense	Foucault	alludes	to	in	these	lectures.	
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The	question,	then,	is	on	what	basis	we	can	distinguish	non-oppressive	from	op-pressive	 instances	of	modern	power:	how,	 that	 is,	we	can	distinguish	modern	power	in	general	from	domination.	This	is	definitely	not	self-evident.	Foucault	is	not	always	clear	about	the	distinction	between	power	and	domination,	and	does	not	offer	a	rigorous	conception	of	domination	at	all.	Although	he	uses	the	term	fairly	frequently	throughout	his	entire	oeuvre,	he	failed	for	a	long	time	to	specify	what	he	meant	by	it.	This	relates	to	a	prominent	issue	in	Foucault	scholarship.	Some	scholars	have	argued	that	Foucault	is,	in	fact,	unable	to	distinguish	between	power	and	domination	at	all:	they	claim	that,	even	if	Foucault	did	not	mean	to	say	that	all	power	is	domination,	he	fails	to	explain	on	what	basis	we	may	distinguish	legiti-mate	 from	 illegitimate	manifestations	of	power.	A	well-known	version	of	 this	criticism	was	 formulated	 by	Nancy	 Fraser	 (1981),	who	 argues	 that	 Foucault,	whilst	clearly	worried	about	illegitimate	manifestations	of	modern	power,	lacks	the	conceptual	tools	to	distinguish	it	from	other	forms	of	modern	power.9	In	her	paper,	Fraser	credits	Foucault	for	his	‘important	insights	into	the	nature	of	mod-ern	power’	(Fraser,	1981:	272).	‘For	example’,	she	writes,	‘Foucault’s	account	es-tablishes	that	modern	power	is	“productive”	rather	than	negating.	This	suffices	to	rule	out	liberationist	politics	which	presuppose	that	power	is	essentially	re-pressive’	 (Fraser,	 1981:	 272).	 But,	 she	 writes,	 in	 analysing	 these	 productive	strategies	of	power,	Foucault	suspends	‘the	standard	modern	liberal	normative	framework	which	distinguishes	between	legitimate	and	illegitimate	exercise	of	
																																								 																					9	A	similar	criticism	is	made,	amongst	others,	by	Grimshaw	(1993).	The	only	way	Fou-cault	can	single	out	instances	of	domination,	according	to	Grimshaw,	would	be	to	intro-duce	a	robustly	normative	measure	into	his	account.	
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power’	(Fraser,	1981:	273).	His	analysis	of	power,	in	this	way,	aims	to	be	norma-tively	neutral.	Though	this	suspension	allowed	Foucault	to	focus	fully	on	the	workings	of	power,	Fraser	argues,	it	eventually	causes	him	trouble.	For,	she	contends,	sit-uations	of	power	aren’t	normatively	neutral:	‘Granted,’	she	writes,	‘there	can	be	no	social	practices	without	power,	but	it	doesn’t	follow	that	all	forms	of	power	are	 normatively	 equivalent,	 nor	 that	 any	 social	 practices	 are	 as	 good	 as	 any	other’	(Fraser,	1981:	282).	Crucially,	Fraser	argues,	Foucault	himself	assumes	an	implicit	 distinction	 between	 acceptable	 and	 unacceptable	 forms	 of	 modern	power:	‘it	is	clear’,	she	writes,	‘that	Foucault’s	account	of	power	in	modern	soci-ety	is	anything	but	neutral’	(Fraser,	1981:	282).	For	example,	Fraser	notes,	‘Fou-cault	does	not	shrink	from	frequent	use	of	such	terms	as	“domination”,	“subju-gation”,	and	“subjection”’	when	describing	 the	modern	power	regime	(Fraser,	1981:	282).	Foucault	seems	quite	clear,	Fraser	argues,	that	modern	power	as	he	analysed	it	isn’t	necessarily	harmless.	Yet,	given	his	purported	normative	neu-trality,	he	cannot	substantialise	his	normative	 intuitions	about	 the	dangers	of	modern	 power:	 he	 is	 unable,	 according	 to	 Fraser,	 ‘to	 distinguish	 better	 from	worse	sets	of	practices	and	forms	of	constraint’	(Fraser,	1981:	282).	The	problem	is	that	he	does	 not	 offer	 us	 any	 tools	 to	 substantialise	 this	 distinction:	 Fou-cault’s	 framework	‘has	no	basis	for	distinguishing,	for	example,	forms	of	power	which	involve	domination	from	those	which	do	not’	(Fraser,	1981:	286).	In	an	interview	conducted	in	1984,	however	–	after	Fraser	published	her	paper	–	Foucault	offers	a	brief	sketch	of	what	he	means	by	domination.	In	the	interview,	he	admits	that	he	was	not	always	clear	in	his	use	of	terms:	‘I	am	not	sure,	when	I	began	to	interest	myself	in	this	problem	of	power,	of	having	spoken	
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very	clearly	about	it	or	used	the	words	needed’	(Foucault,	1984/1987:	130).	He	then	goes	on,	at	last,	to	distinguish	power	from	domination:	‘It	seems	to	me’,	he	states,	‘that	we	must	distinguish	the	relationships	of	power	[…]	and	the	states	of	domination’	(Foucault,	1984/1987:	130).10	So	how	does	he	distinguish	both?	In	the	 interview,	Foucault	describes	
power	as	‘the	relationships	in	which	one	wishes	to	direct	the	behaviour	of	an-other’	(Foucault,	1984/1987:	122),	and	as	‘strategic	games	that	result	in	the	fact	that	some	people	try	to	determine	the	conduct	of	others’	(Foucault,	1984/1987:	130).	This	is	consistent	with	our	definition	of	power	as	acting	upon	actions	and	structuring	fields	of	possible	action.	Foucault	then	describes	domination	as	a	spe-cific	 arrangement	of	 power	 relations,	 in	which	 these	 relations	have	 lost	 their	usual	flexibility.	In	states	of	domination,	he	writes,	‘relations	of	power,	instead	of	being	variable	and	allowing	different	partners	a	strategy	which	alters	them,	find	themselves	firmly	set	and	frozen’	(Foucault,	1984/1987:	114).	Foucault	uses	the	term	‘figé’,	which	can	be	translated	as	fixed,	frozen,	or	solidified.	In	the	inter-view,	he	uses	a	range	of	similar	metaphors	to	describe	the	state	of	power	rela-tions	in	domination:	relations	of	power	are	“blocked”	(bloqué),	rendered	“immo-bile”	(immobile)	and	“fixed”	(fixe).	The	crucial	characteristic	that	he	wants	to	cap-ture	is	inflexibility.	The	underlying	assumption	here	is	that,	normally,	relations	of	power	are	flexible	and	ever-changing:	relationships	of	power,	Foucault	em-phasises,	‘are	changeable	relations,	i.e.	they	can	modify	themselves,	they	are	not	given	once	and	for	all’	(Foucault,	1984/1987:	123).	But,	in	a	state	of	domination,	
																																								 																					10	Though,	curiously,	in	an	interview	given	just	the	year	before,	he	ponders	whether	the	distinction	between	power	and	domination	‘is	not	something	of	a	verbal	one’	(Foucault,	1983/1984:	378).		
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‘the	relations	of	power	are	fixed	in	such	a	way	that	they	are	perpetually	asym-metrical’	(Foucault,	1984/1987:	123).	Thus,	on	this	suggestion,	power	is	domi-nation	when	its	workings	have	become	all	too	firmly	fixed.	
	
D.2 The	Category	of	Oppression	
	We	have	now,	following	Foucault,	characterised	domination	as	a	specific	kind	of	power	 constellation.	 This	 general	 sketch	 of	 domination,	 however,	 does	 not	firmly	establish	on	what	basis	power	here	amounts	to	oppression	–	that	is,	why	precisely	it	is	an	illegitimate,	or	suspicious,	form	of	power.	What	is	it	about	fixed	or	frozen	relations	of	power	that	make	them	domineering?	I	submit	that	one	reason	why	domination,	thus	conceived,	amounts	to	a	form	of	oppression	is	that	it	compromises	choice.	Power,	we	saw,	always	struc-tures	agency.	But	in	domination,	as	I	will	show,	it	structures	agency	in	such	a	way	that	choice	is	compromised.	Accordingly,	I	propose	that	a	power	situation	is	op-pressive	if	(though	not	per	se	only	if)	it	affects	agency	in	such	a	way	that	it	com-
promises	choice.	 In	what	 follows,	 I	will	demonstrate	how	both	repression	and	domination	 can	 be	 said	 to	 compromise	 choice,	 thus	 classifying	 them	 both	 as	forms	of	oppression.	I	will	do	so	by	examining	the	way	in	which	they	structure	agents’	fields	of	possible	action.		It	is	fairly	evident	that	instances	of	repression,	as	I	have	characterised	them,	belong	to	the	category	of	oppression.	This	becomes	clear	once	we	refer	back	to	the	tactics	employed	in	repressive	power:	repressive	tactics,	as	we	have	seen,	directly	 take	away	certain	possibilities	 from	the	agent,	or	 force	her	 into	certain	ones.	It	thus	directly	narrows	agents’	fields	of	possible	action.	Agency,	if	not	entirely	bypassed,	is	definitely	overridden:	the	repressed	agent	acts	not	in	
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her	own	name,	as	it	were,	but	merely	follows	the	will	and	orders	of	her	oppres-sor.	As	such,	I	submit,	repression	compromises	choice	in	a	fairly	straightforward	manner:	the	agent’s	actions	are,	in	a	sense,	not	her	own,	but	the	result	of	repres-sive	power	relations	narrowing	her	field	of	possible	action.	If	it	was	up	to	her,	her	field	of	possible	action	would	look	different.	She	cannot	do	as	she	wants.	It	 is	 less	clear,	however,	when	modern	power	relations	amount	 to	op-pression.	We	saw	that	modern	power	indirectly	structures	agents’	field	of	possi-ble	action.	When	does	this	influence	compromise	their	choices?	To	find	out,	we	must	examine	the	way	in	which	modern	power	relations,	and	strategies	of	sub-jection,	 are	 affecting	 agency:	 when	 can	 we	 say	 they	 compromise	 someone’s	choices,	and	when	do	they	not?	This	question,	however,	brings	us	to	another	per-tinent	issue	in	Foucault	scholarship,	which	is	discussed	at	length	by	Allen	(2000).	Many	authors	have	argued	that	Foucault’s	conceptualisation	of	modern	power	implies	what	Allen	calls	‘the	death	of	the	subject’.	These	critics,	Allen	writes,	‘ar-gue	that	Foucault	claims,	or	that	his	archaeological	and	genealogical	works	im-ply,	that	the	subject	is	merely	or	nothing	more	than	the	effect	of	discourse	and	power’	(Allen,	2000:	115,	emphasis	mine).	In	other	words,	the	worry	is	that,	if	subjects	are	constituted	through	power	relations	in	the	way	Foucault	describes,	they	are	their	merely	passive	product,	and	as	such	not	really	subjects	in	any	real	sense.	If	true,	this	hypothesis	has	many	implications.	For	our	purposes,	its	most	important	implication	is	that,	if	the	subject	goes,	the	possibility	of	agency	seems	to	go,	too:	‘the	death	of	the	subject’,	Allen	writes,	 ‘implies	the	death	of	agency’	(Allen,	2000:	117).	Linda	Alcoff	(1990),	for	example,	writes	that	she	
fail[s]	to	see	how	there	can	be	agency	within	this	kind	of	analysis.	If	we	are	the	effects	of	a	totalized	power/knowledge	and	do	not	ourselves	have	causal	control	
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over	power/knowledge,	then	in	what	possible	sense	can	we	be	said	to	have	ef-fective	agency?	(Alcoff,	1990:	76).		Lois	McNay	(1992)	agrees:	‘Foucault	asserts	the	autonomous	perspective	of	sub-jects,	but	his	assertion	is	undermined	by	his	failure	to	explain	theoretically	how	such	autonomy	is	possible’	(McNay,	1992:	153).11	But	if	this	is	so,	this	would	mean	that	the	notion	of	choice,	and	many	of	its	associated	concepts	used	in	both	philosophy	and	psychology,	are	out	the	win-dow.	Accordingly,	 if	our	criteria	for	oppression	are	formulated	in	reference	to	the	agency	of	those	who	are	oppressed,	and	more	specifically	the	status	of	their	choices,	it	seems	that	we	can	no	longer	conceptualise	oppression	in	any	mean-ingful	 sense.	 If	 the	 effects	 of	 modern	 power	 indeed	 erase	 the	 possibility	 of	agency,	this	implies	that	modern	power	cannot,	in	a	meaningful	sense,	be	distin-guished	 from	 domination.	 In	 fact,	 if	 subjugation	 indeed	 dissolves	 agency,	 we	might	have	to	conclude	that,	wherever	power	employs	strategies	of	subjugation,	it	is	always	oppressive.	We	might	have	to	conclude,	in	other	words,	that	modern	power	as	Foucault	describes	 it	always	and	necessarily	amounts	 to	domination	–	whether	he	meant	to	suggest	this	or	not.		In	her	paper,	however,	Allen	convincingly	argues	against	the	“death	of	the	subject”	hypothesis.	The	crucial	point	to	note,	she	contends,	is	that	the	sub-ject	is	not	merely	the	effect	of	power.	She	writes	that	
Foucault	is	very	careful	never	(at	least	not	as	far	as	I	am	aware)	to	say	that	the	subject	is	merely	an	effect	of	discourse	and	power.	Instead,	he	says	that	it	is	an	effect	of	discourse	and	power.	[…]	To	say	that	subjects	are	the	products	of	forces																																									 																					11	Allen	(2000)	mentions	several	other	authors	who	formulate	this	sort	of	criticism,	in-cluding	Habermas	(1987),	Hartsock	(1990),	and	McCarthy	(1991).	
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that	are	largely	out	of	their	control,	as	Foucault	does,	is	not	to	say	that	they	have	no	control	over	anything	whatsoever.	(Allen,	2000:	120)			So,	on	Allen’s	reading	–	which	I	endorse	–	the	fact	that	a	subject	is	constituted	through	relations	of	power	does	not	alter	the	status	of	this	subject	as	an	agent.	There	is	thus	scope	for	agency	left	on	Foucault’s	picture:	modern	power	always	affects,	but	doesn’t	therefore	destroy,	agency.	This	means	that	my	strategy,	to	distinguish	modern	power	from	domi-nation	in	terms	of	their	different	effects	on	agency,	remains	available.	But	I	still	need	to	demonstrate	that	domination,	as	Foucault	sketches	it,	can	be	said	to	com-promise	choice.	In	order	to	do	so,	I	will	further	develop	his	brief	characterisation	of	domination	given	 in	 the	 interview,	by	pairing	 it	with	his	notion	of	 fields	of	possible	action.	If	power	relations	structure	an	agent’s	field	of	possible	action,	and	domination	consists	in	frozen	power	relations,	it	follows	that	domination	in-volves	frozen	fields	of	possible	action.	By	implication,	I	propose,	power	amounts	to	domination	when	the	fields	of	possible	action	it	produces	are	fixed	and	inflex-ible.	This	yields	a	slightly	more	substantial	account	of	domination:	we	can	define	it	as	a	power	situation	in	which	power	relations,	through	the	production	of	sub-
jects,	structure	and	freeze	agents’	field	of	possible	action.	The	idea	is	that	an	agent	is	stuck	in	a	certain	kind	of	subjectivity,	which	controls	her	agency	by	restricting	the	kinds	of	possibilities	available	to	her.	Allen	 (1999),	 in	 fact,	proposes	 to	 reformulate	Foucault’s	 characterisa-tion	of	domination	 in	 a	 similar	way.	 She	writes	 that	Foucault’s	description	of	states	of	domination	as	congealing	 the	network	of	power	 relations	 seems	 too	
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strong,	and	suggests	 ‘instead	[…]	that	in	such	states,	power	networks	are	con-
stricted,	so	that	the	range	of	options	that	are	available	for	those	in	subordinate	positions	to	exercise	power	is	limited’	(Allen,	1999:	45).	On	this	basis,	Allen	con-cludes,	‘Foucault	does	offer	a	way	of	distinguishing	between	power	and	domina-tion	that,	even	if	it	is	not	completely	adequate	as	it	stands,	can	easily	be	reformu-lated	to	be	consistent	with	the	spirit	of	the	bulk	of	his	writings	about	power’	(Al-len,	1999:	45).		At	this	point,	the	sketched	difference	between	a	flexible	field	of	possible	action	and	a	frozen	one	remains	a	bit	abstract.	We	can	clarify	the	general	differ-ence	by	returning	to	the	example	of	Emma.	Imagine	that	Emma,	at	an	early	age,	takes	an	interest	in	outer	space.	She	is	never	encouraged	to	explore	this	interest,	and	forever	after	gifted	princess	dresses	and	baby	dolls.	She	sees	that	only	her	male	classmates	are	taken	seriously	when	they	dream	of	certain	careers,	such	as	that	of	an	astronaut.	The	girls	talk	about	motherhood	and	becoming	a	housewife.	Let	us	also	imagine	that,	at	a	later	age,	the	possibility	of	becoming	an	astronaut	doesn’t	feature	on	her	field	of	possible	action,	even	though	she	is	aware	of	this	possibility	in	abstracto.	Thus	far,	we	can	say	that	Emma’s	field	of	possible	action	has	been	shaped	by	power	relations.	In	and	of	itself,	this	does	not	suffice	to	con-clude	that	she	exists	in	a	state	of	domination.	As	Foucault	explains,	power	rela-tions	are	everywhere,	and	they	act	upon	us	all	without	exception.	How	any	mod-ern	subject	understands	herself,	and	how	her	field	of	possible	action	is	shaped,	is	always	informed	by	her	social	context,	rife	with	power	relations.	We	only	have	a	case	of	domination	if	an	agent’s	field	of	possible	action	is	congealed,	meaning	she	cannot	act	differently	than	she	does,	because	she	cannot	move	beyond	the	particular	way	in	which	she	is	constituted.	
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When	would	this	be	the	case,	and	how	can	we	tell?	Imagine,	for	example,	that	Emma	reads	a	book	about	a	young	girl	becoming	an	astronaut,	and	thinks	it	is	weird	of	this	lady	to	want	to	be	an	astronaut,	as	this	is	not	appropriate	for	girls.	If,	after	reading	the	book,	Emma	still	can’t	see	herself	become	an	astronaut,	this	serves	as	an	indication	that,	in	this	respect	at	least,	her	possibility	field	is	frozen.	And	in	this	respect,	then,	we	can	consider	her	the	subject	of	domination.	The	cru-cial	point	is	not	that	her	field	of	possible	action	was	shaped	or	structured	a	cer-tain	way,	but	that	it	seems	fixed	in	a	certain	way:	it	does	not	seem	sufficiently	flexible.	She	operates	within	a	fixed	set	of	possibilities	that	she	cannot	truly	see	beyond.	It	is	not	just	so	that,	because	of	the	specific	power	context	she	exists	in,	she	is	constituted	a	certain	way:	she	seems	unable	to	be	or	become	otherwise.	(The	precise	mechanisms	at	work	here	are	likely	complex	and	manifold:	it	might	be,	for	example,	that	she	has	learnt	to	gain	recognition	through	the	performance	of	certain	set	gender	roles,	and	the	prospect	of	breaking	them	carries	the	threat	of	 losing	her	source	of	recognition.	Or	it	might	be	that	Emma	finds	comfort	in	having	her	identity	spelled	out	for	her,	so	she	must	not	face	the	difficult	task	of	self-constitution,	and	so	she	eschews	non-conformity.)	On	this	characterisation	of	domination,	I	submit,	we	can	classify	it	as	a	form	of	oppression:	I	argue	that,	if	power	freezes	my	field	of	possible	action,	it	thereby	compromises	my	choices.	This,	admittedly,	is	not	self-evident.	For,	un-like	 in	repression,	 the	dominated	agent	retains	a	significant	degree	of	agency:	she	acts	and	chooses	without	any	direct	interference.	But,	I	suggest,	we	can	ex-plain	how	her	choices	are	compromised	in	reference	to	the	idea	of	a	corrupted	will.	 On	my	characterisation,	recall,	a	will	is	corrupted	if	it	is	dispositioned	to	
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choose	a	certain	way,	such	that	it	is	practically	impossible	not	to	make	this	very	choice.	We	can	see	how	precisely	such	a	thing	happens	in	domination.	The	dom-inated	agent	is	dispositioned	to	act	a	certain	way	–	namely	according	to	the	pat-terns	prescribed	by	her	subjectivity.	But,	crucially,	she	is	stuck	in	this	subjectiv-ity	and	thus	in	its	patterns,	such	that	other	ways	of	acting	cannot	seem	to	enter	her	field	of	possible	action.	As	such,	she	cannot	but	act	in	the	way	she	does.	We	have	reason	to	believe	that	Emma,	for	example,	is	not	just	dispositioned	to	act	in	a	certain	way,	but	so	dispositioned	that	she	cannot	but	act	this	very	way:	it	seems	that	she	cannot	but,	in	those	areas	where	this	is	possible,	act	in	a	gender-con-forming	manner.	 In	 this	way,	 I	 submit,	her	will	 is	corrupted:	 for	 it	cannot	but	choose	one	of	these	options,	and	is	practically	unable	to	pursue	any	alternative	routes.	On	this	basis,	 then,	 I	submit	 that	 the	dominated	agent	makes	compro-mised	choices.	She	still	makes	choices;	but	insofar	as	they	are	made	within	a	fro-zen	field	of	possibilities,	I	submit,	these	choices	are	compromised.	We	can	now	reformulate	the	difference	between	repression	and	domi-nation	in	terms	of	their	effect	on	the	agent’s	will,	and	the	way	in	which	they	com-promise	choice.	I	submit	that	repression	bypasses,	or	at	least	overrides,	the	will	of	the	repressed	agent.	Though	it	may	be	too	strong	to	claim	that	her	agency	is	bypassed	altogether	–	for	she	is	still	acting	–	it	does	seem	fair	to	posit	that	her	will	is	overridden.	When	I	am	directly	interfered	with,	and	forced	into	(refraining	from)	doing	φ,	I	cannot	exercise	my	own	will	–	I	am,	in	a	sense,	forced	to	exercise	someone	else’s.	On	this	basis,	it	is	also	clear	that	my	choices	aren’t	really	my	own.	Domination,	 in	contrast,	can	be	said	to	corrupt	the	agent’s	will.	Without	being	overridden,	as	happens	in	repression,	the	will	of	the	dominated	agent	is	still	ac-
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tive.	It	is,	in	a	much	deeper	sense	than	in	repression,	the	agent’s	own.	The	domi-nated	agent	is	still,	in	an	important	sense,	an	agent,	and	a	maker	of	choices.	But,	crucially,	the	horizon	within	which	the	will	is	operative	is	constrained:	for	the	agent’s	field	of	possible	action	is	frozen.	We	thus	have	two	distinct	forms	of	op-pression:	domination	and	repression,	both	of	which	compromise	choice,	but	in	a	different	manner.	 Repression	 directly	 compromises	 choice	 by	 forcing	 certain	possibilities	upon	an	agent.	Domination,	in	contrast,	fixes	its	subjects	into	a	cer-tain	horizon	of	possibilities.	(Of	course,	these	two	categories	are	conceptual,	and	in	reality	the	distinction	may	not	always	hold	as	clearly.)	
	
D.3 Domination	and	the	Corrupted	Will	Thus	understood,	Foucault’s	notion	of	domination	sheds	further	light	on	how	a	will	can	be	corrupted.	We	saw	that	a	corrupted	will	means	the	agent	cannot	but	choose	φ,	but	we	could	not	explain	in	what	sense	precisely	this	agent	cannot	but	φ,	since	this	 impossibility	did	not	correspond	to	any	physical	or	metaphysical	impossibility	to	–	φ.	The	idea	of	a	frozen	field	of	possible	action	offers	one	possi-ble	explanation	as	to	how	such	an	agent	cannot	but	φ.	Foucault’s	crucial	insight,	in	this	context,	is	that	agency	has	an	important	perceptive	dimension:	our	agency	takes	place	within	a	field	of	possible	action,	which	consists	in	the	possibilities	for	action	we	can	see.	Importantly,	our	field	of	possible	action	consists	in	those	pos-sibilities	that	we	can	see	as	viable	for	us	specifically	–	not	in	those	we	are	merely	aware	of	in	the	abstract.	This	field	of	possibilities	is	the	context	within	which	the	will	operates	–	within	which	agency	takes	place	and	choices	are	made.	Factors	influencing	 this	 field	will,	 consequentially,	 influence	 the	operation	of	 the	will.	Crucially,	then,	certain	factors	may	freeze	our	field	of	possible	action.	In	this	case,	
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something	influences	which	possibilities	we	can	see	as	viable.	This	will	restrict	the	scope	of	our	field	of	possible	action,	and	thus	restrict	our	agency.	When	our	field	of	possible	action	is	frozen,	possibilities	outside	of	this	field,	even	if	we	are	aware	of	 them,	will	not	seem	viable	 to	us.	And	this	corrupts	our	will:	 for	 it	 is	forced	to	operate	within	a	fixed	set	of	possibilities.	We	thus	are	dispositioned	to	φ,	in	such	a	way	that	we	cannot	but	φ.	And	the	reason	for	this	is	that	we	practi-cally	cannot	see	certain	kinds	of	possibilities	as	viable	routes	of	action.	This	does	not	mean,	though,	that	this	kind	of	agent	can	just	do	one	thing.	Indeed,	a	whole	array	of	possibilities	remains	open	to	her:	Emma,	for	example,	can	make	different	kinds	of	choices	in	all	areas	of	her	life.	Importantly,	when	a	field	of	possible	action	is	frozen,	this	does	not	mean	that	agency	is	bypassed.	It	is	still,	indeed,	a	field	of	possible	action.	One	way	to	capture	this	idea	is	to	say	that	the	agent’s	will	is	still	operative.	Crucially,	however,	her	field	of	possible	action,	within	which	the	will	is	operative,	is	frozen.	This	means	that	the	agent	is	disposi-
tioned	 to	act	within	 this	 frozen	 field.	As	 such,	we	can	say	 that	her	will	 is	 cor-rupted.		In	light	of	this,	we	can	refer	back	to	the	difference	between	a	will	which	is	merely	dispositioned	 to	φ,	 and	a	will	which	 is	 corrupted.	 If	 I	 offer	 you	 ten	pounds	to	pick	the	green	lollipop,	this	should	normally	only	disposition	you	to	do	so.	But	you	will	probably	still	perceive	picking	the	other	one	as	a	viable	option,	as	something	which	you	could	do.	In	contrast,	when	my	sister	threatens	to	reveal	my	secret,	perhaps	not	paying	her	rent	to	appease	her	will	just	seem	unviable	to	me.	The	difference	between	these	respective	influences,	indeed,	reflects	the	dif-ference	between	the	effects	on	agency	of	power	in	general	and	those	of	domina-tion	specifically.	
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The	notion	of	a	frozen	field	of	possible	action	thus	tracks	the	same	kind	of	tension	which	pervades	Augustine’s	notion	of	a	corrupted	will:	how	an	agent,	even	 though	still	exercising	agency,	nonetheless	makes	compromised	choices.	Notably,	these	choices	are	not	compromised	because	of	any	direct	interference	or	any	sort	of	strict	 impossibility	 to	do	otherwise;	nor	are	 they	only	 compro-mised	if	the	agent	intends	or	wants	to	do	otherwise.	They	are	compromised	in-sofar	as	she	is	dispositioned	to	φ,	because	she	cannot	perceive	any	alternatives	as	viable.	
	
E. CONCLUSION			In	sum,	the	notion	of	a	field	of	possible	action	allows	us	to	see	how	a	will	may	be	corrupted:	it	allows	us	to	see	how,	through	influencing	her	field	of	possible	ac-tion,	an	agent’s	options	for	choice	can	be	constrained	even	if	none	are	explicitly	forced	upon	her,	nor	taken	away.	In	domination,	this	happens	through	subjec-
tion:	the	dominated	subject	will	understand	herself	and	the	world	in	a	certain	way,	which	determines	which	possibilities	she	can	see	as	open	to	her,	as	the	kind	of	things	she	does	and	can	do.	My	proposal,	then,	is	that	this	account	of	domina-tion	can,	roughly,	serve	as	a	model	for	the	kind	of	oppression	that	takes	place	
internally	in	self-oppression.	In	the	previous	chapter,	I	hypothesised	that,	in	hy-perkrasia,	practical	reason	compromises	the	agent’s	own	choices	by	corrupting	her	own	will.	Thus	far,	however,	we	could	not	yet	explain	what	exactly	this	would	look	like,	as	we	had	no	detailed	account	of	how	a	will	could	be	corrupted.	Fou-cault’s	 account	of	domination,	 then,	offers	us	a	more	elaborate	description	of	how	this	may	happen.	Drawing	on	these	insights,	we	can	further	elaborate	our	account	of	hyperkrasia:	we	can	now	posit	that	practical	reason	corrupts	the	will	
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by	freezing	the	agent’s	fields	of	possible	action.	With	this	further	insight,	we	can	refine	our	hypothesis:	
hyperkrasia	is	a	real	form	of	agency,	in	which	practical	reason	becomes	
authoritarian,	exercising	a	form	of	self-control	which	freezes	the	agent’s	field	of	
possible	action,	thereby	corrupting	her	will	and	compromising	choice.	
	Whenever	the	hyperkratic	agent	finds	a	way	to	pursue	the	end	she	is	fixated	on,	her	field	of	possible	action	freezes:	for,	due	to	her	self-inflicted	pressure,	she	is	dispositioned	to	then	pursue	this	end,	in	such	a	way	that	not	doing	so	just	doesn’t	seem	like	a	viable	option.	She	thus	cannot	but	φ,	because	she	does	not	see	other	possibilities	as	viable.	Her	choice	to	φ	(and,	by	extension,	her	choices	to	–	φ)	are	in	this	sense	compromised.	Of	course,	there	are	limits	to	the	analogy	with	domination.	For	one,	the	precise	way	in	which	the	will	is	corrupted	seems	somewhat	different.	For	Fou-cault,	domination	is	a	form	of	oppression	which	does	not	necessarily	feature	any	
pressure.	When	he	describes	instances	of	modern	domination,	he	describes	sub-jects	which	are	obedient,	and	almost	mindlessly	follow	certain	patterns	of	action.	In	hyperkrasia,	in	contrast,	there	is	a	pressure	involved:	this,	on	my	description,	is	a	characteristic	element	of	self-oppression.	Practical	reason	can	freeze	a	field	of	possible	 action	 through	 the	 implementation	of	 a	 certain	kind	of	pressure	–	which	compels	her	so	strongly	to	choose	φ	that	not	doing	so	does	not	seem	via-ble.	In	other	words:	in	domination,	the	possibilities	an	agent	will	see	before	her	are	fixed	by	her	subjectivity;	in	self-oppression,	they	are	fixed	because	of	a	pres-sure	to	act	a	certain	way.	In	this	sense,	the	effects	of	domination	and	self-oppres-sion	on	an	agent’s	field	of	possible	action	are	similar,	but	the	exact	manner	in	
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which	this	effect	is	obtained	may	differ.	Foucault	thus	allows	us	to	further	elaborate	our	account	of	hyperkrasia,	and	my	 proposal	 is	 that	 in	 hyperkrasia	 practical	 reason	 corrupts	 the	will	 by	freezing	the	agent’s	field	of	possible	action.	Before	we	can	examine	how	practical	reason	may	corrupt	an	agent’s	own	will,	however,	we	must	further	unpack	some	of	 the	 ideas	I	have	proposed	in	this	chapter.	The	key	notion	I	will	adopt	 from	Foucault	is	that	of	a	field	of	possible	action.	The	reason	for	this	is	that	this	notion	gestures	towards	a	perceptive	dimension	in	agency,	which	deeply	influences	our	actions	by	shaping	the	horizon	within	which	our	agency	takes	place.	But,	at	this	point,	the	idea	of	a	field	of	possible	action,	and	how	it	can	be	frozen,	is	insuffi-ciently	clear.	A	field	of	possible	action,	consisting	in	the	options	for	action	which	seem	viable	to	me,	is	just	my	interpretation	of	a	turn	of	phrase	only	once	men-tioned	by	Foucault.	To	understand	whether	and	how	an	agent	may	freeze	her	
own	 field	of	possible	action,	we	need	a	deeper	understanding	of	how	this	can	happen	in	general.	Thus,	before	we	can	understand	how	agents	may	do	this	to	themselves,	we	must	further	unpack	the	general	notion	of	frozen	fields	of	possi-ble	action.	What	are	the	features	of	a	field	of	possible	action?	What	kinds	of	pos-sibilities	does	it	consist	in?	What	does	it	mean	for	a	possibility	to	seem	viable?	How	can	we	tell	if	a	field	of	possible	action	is	frozen?	How	exactly	can	this	hap-pen?	 For	these	reasons,	the	next	chapter	will	not	quite	yet	turn	to	the	question	of	self-oppression.	Instead,	it	will	build	a	more	elaborate	account	of	the	notion	of	field	of	possible	action,	and	how	such	a	field	can	freeze.	In	doing	so,	it	will	turn	to	 yet	 another	 philosophical	 tradition:	 phenomenology.	More	 precisely,	 I	will	consult	Merleau-Ponty’s	account	of	action,	which	pays	considerable	attention	to	
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the	role	of	perception	in	agency	–	and	more	specifically	the	perception	of	oppor-tunities	for	action.	Only	once	we	have	a	more	robust	account	of	frozen	fields	of	possible	actions,	formulated	against	the	backdrop	of	Merleau-Ponty’s	thought,	will	I	construct	our	final	account	of	hyperkrasia	–	something	I	will	get	to	in	the	final	chapter.		
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IV. Merleau-Ponty	
A. INTRODUCTION		In	the	previous	chapter,	I	showed	how	Foucault’s	notion	of	a	field	of	possible	ac-tion	brings	into	view	an	approach	to	agency	which	looks	not	just	at	the	agent,	but	also	at	how	the	agent	perceives	herself	and	the	world	around	her.	Foucault,	how-ever,	does	not	offer	an	account	of	what	he	means	with	this	notion;	nor	does	he	offer	any	conceptual	tools	to	further	develop	it.	In	order	to	do	so,	we	need	a	set	of	philosophical	tools	which	can	help	spell	out	the	way	in	which	an	agent	perceives	possibilities,	and	how	this	relationship	informs	her	agency.	In	this	chapter,	I	will	demonstrate	that	Merleau-Ponty’s	phenomenological	account	of	action	–	in	which	
phenomenal	fields	play	a	key	role	–	offers	something	of	this	sort.1	Loosely	drawing	on	 this	account,	 I	will	offer	a	more	substantial	and	detailed	characterisation	of	fields	of	possible	action.	In	a	next	step,	I	will	explain	how	a	field	of	possible	action,	thus	understood,	may	 freeze.	More	precisely,	 I	will	suggest	 that	when	this	hap-pens,	a	certain	opportunity	is	hypersalient	for	an	agent,	which	means	that	it	solic-its	her	to	act	with	extreme	urgency.	This	has	as	a	result	that	other	opportunities	
																																								 																					1	One	may	wonder	whether	this	turn	to	Merleau-Ponty	is	justified	in	light	of	Foucault’s	own	 rejection	 of	 the	 phenomenological	 tradition	 (see,	 for	 example,	 Foucault,	1966/2002:	xiv).	But	my	aim	is	not	to	marry	the	whole	of	Foucault’s	project	with	the	phenomenological	tradition.	My	aim	is	merely	to	further	develop	one	of	Foucault’s	in-sights	drawing	on	some	specific	aspects	of	Merleau-Ponty’s	phenomenological	thought	–	and	this,	again,	for	the	specific	purpose	of	conceptualising	self-oppression.	That	being	said,	 I	 think	 there	 do	 exist	 some	 stark	 similarities	 between	 Foucault’s	 and	Merleau-Ponty’s	thought.	For	detailed	discussions	of	the	relation	between	Foucault’s	thought	and	phenomenology,	see,	e.g.,	Crossley	(1994),	May	(2003),	and	Han	(1998,	part	I).		
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seem	unviable	to	her,	which	excludes	them	from	her	field	of	possible	action.	I	then	hypothesise	that,	in	hyperkrasia,	practical	reason	has	precisely	this	effect.	This	chapter	thus	turns	to	yet	another	scholarship	to	further	complete	our	picture	of	hyperkrasia:	phenomenology.	Again,	I	will	not	be	able,	in	this	chap-ter,	to	do	justice	to	the	vastness	and	complexity	of	the	phenomenological	tradi-tion.	I	will	merely	single	out	a	few	philosophical	tools	which	we	may	use	to	un-derstand	self-oppression,	found	in	the	works	of	Merleau-Ponty.	This	means	I	will	only	discuss	those	elements	of	his	thought	which	are	of	direct	relevance	to	this	thesis	–	my	characterisation	of	his	views	is	by	no	means	complete.	It	also	means	I	will	focus	mostly	on	whichever	reading	of	his	works	is	most	useful	for	my	pur-poses,	rather	than	engaging	in	interpretative	exegesis.	For	these	reasons,	I	will	mostly	rely	on	Merleau-Ponty’s	thought	as	presented	in	The	Phenomenology	of	
Perception	(1945/1978),	since	this	work	contains	a	great	deal	of	his	views	on	human	behaviour	and	action.	Moreover,	for	the	most	part,	I	will	rely	directly	on	Komarine	Romdenh-Romluc’s	(2011,	2012)	reading	of	Merleau-Ponty’s	account	of	action.	This	reading	is	but	one	interpretation,	and	is	certainly	not	compatible	with	all	others.	But,	again,	I	am	merely	appealing	to	Merleau-Ponty	in	order	to	take	some	of	his	conceptual	building	blocks	for	developing	my	account	of	hyper-krasia.	 	
B. MERLEAU-PONTY	AND	PHENOMENAL	FIELDS		In	the	previous	chapter,	I	loosely	characterised	fields	of	possible	action	as	con-sisting	in	those	routes	of	action	which	seem	viable	to	an	agent.	This	characteri-sation	was	construed	in	light	of	a	Foucauldian,	and	political,	reading	of	fields	of	possible	action.	Foucault,	as	we	have	seen,	used	this	turn	of	phrase	to	describe	
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the	effects	that	specific	modern	power	relations	have	on	individuals’	agency.	Ac-cordingly,	I	suggested	that	fields	of	possible	action	are	frozen	whenever	power	
relations	are	(namely	in	states	of	domination).	In	this	chapter,	I	will	offer	a	more	
general	interpretation	of	the	notion	of	fields	of	possible	action,	and	how	they	can	be	frozen.	For	the	notion	can	also	be	applied	in	a	much	wider	context.	Fields	of	possible	action	–	on	my	view	–	are	not	just	constituted	through	power	relations:	which	routes	of	action	present	to	someone	depends	on	a	variety	of	different	fac-tors,	and	not	all	of	them	can	be	reduced	to	relations	of	power.	My	field	of	possible	action	 can	 be	 informed,	 for	 example,	 by	my	habits	 or	 the	 state	 of	my	mental	health;	as	well	as	factors	like	an	unexpected	snow	storm,	or	the	way	in	which	the	shelves	at	a	supermarket	have	been	organised.	Similarly,	they	can	also	be	frozen	by	things	other	than	power	relations.	From	now	on,	when	speaking	of	fields	of	possible	action,	I	am	doing	so	in	the	general	sense,	and	not	in	the	specific	Fou-cauldian	sense.	In	 order	 to	 construct	 this	 more	 general	 interpretation	 of	 possibility	fields,	we	must	consider	how	they	are	constituted,	and	how	they	can	be	frozen,	not	just	by	power	relations	but	in	general.	It	is	these	questions,	I	suggest,	which	Merleau-Ponty’s	account	of	action	can	help	us	answer.		
B.1 Phenomenal	Fields	Merleau-Ponty’s	account	of	action,	which	 is	a	phenomenological	account,	 is	of	course	deeply	embedded	in	his	wider	account	of	perception.	One	of	the	most	cru-cial	aspects	of	perception,	for	Merleau-Ponty,	is	that	it	is	not	just	an	objective,	but	also	a	deeply	subjective	matter.	Perception	is	always	perception	by	a	specific	subject:	‘I	cannot	view	the	world	from	nowhere;’	Romdenh-Romluc	explains,	‘I	
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always	perceive	the	world	from	my	own	particular	perspective’	(Romdenh-Rom-luc,	2011:	19).	This	means,	for	Merleau-Ponty,	that	we	do	not,	first	and	foremost,	perceive	 things	 in	 the	 world	 as	 objects	 with	 quantifiable	 features	 (such	 as	weight,	size,	or	colour).	Rather,	we	immediately	perceive	them	as	things	which	have	meaning,	which	speak	to	us.	The	“world”	as	we	perceive	it	is	a	meaningful	context	in	which	to	exist,	and	in	which	everything	exists	in	a	meaningful	and	in-terconnected	 manner	 –	 rather	 than	 just	 an	 objective	 arrangement	 of	 things	which	can	be	observed	“from	nowhere”.	Another	way	to	put	this	is	that	we	al-ways	 immediately	 interpret	 the	world:	when	 I	hold	a	pan,	 I	do	not	perceive	a	metal	 round	object	with	 a	black	 stick	poking	out	 –	 I	 perceive	 a	pan,	which	 is	something	to	cook	food	in.	My	perception	of	the	object	is	an	immediate	interpre-tation	of	it.	And	this	holds	for	the	world	around	us	in	general.	Another	 important	aspect	of	perception,	 for	Merleau-Ponty,	 is	that	we	perceive	the	world	as	inviting	us	to	respond	to	it.	The	pan,	for	example,	invites	me	to	cook	food	in	it	(though,	depending	on	the	context,	it	might	also	invite	me	to	do	other	things:	e.g.	slam	a	wooden	spoon	on	it	in	order	to	use	it	as	a	percus-sion	instrument).	We	perceive	the	world	as	a	set	of	possibilities	which	invite	us	to	respond	this	way	or	another.	As	Romdenh-Romluc	explains	this	point,	
[t]he	perceiver	perceives	their	environment	as	‘inviting’	them	to	interact	with	it	in	certain	ways,	as	‘offering’	certain	possibilities	for	action	and	‘disallowing’	oth-ers.	In	other	words,	the	perceiver	is	not	confronted	with	things	that	have	merely	‘objective’	properties	such	as	size,	shape,	and	so	on.	Instead,	things	look	edible,	reachable,	kickable	etc.	(Romdenh-Romluc,	2011:	74)		Or,	as	Merleau-Ponty	puts	it	more	cryptically,	 ‘to	move	one’s	body	is	to	aim	at	things	through	it;	it	is	to	allow	oneself	to	respond	to	their	call’	(Merleau-Ponty,	
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1945/1978:	160-161).	As	such,	our	perception	continually	invites	us	to	respond.	Merleau-Ponty	calls	the	world	as	it	appears	to	perception	the	phenome-
nal	field:	‘The	phenomenal	field’,	Romdenh-Romluc	writes,	‘is	the	worldly	region	that	is	presented	in	experience,	considered	as	it	appears	to	the	perceiver’	(Rom-denh-Romluc,	2011:	104).	This,	for	Merleau-Ponty,	consists	in	a	collection	of	per-ceived	invitations	to	respond.	My	hypothesis,	then,	is	that	the	notion	of	a	phe-nomenal	field	can	help	illuminate	that	of	a	field	of	possible	action.	But	before	I	propose	my	account	of	fields	of	possible	action	in	its	light,	we	must	first	get	a	better	grip	on	Merleau-Ponty’s	account	of	phenomenal	fields.	A	first	thing	to	note	is	that	Merleau-Ponty	does	not	always	refer	to	the	content	of	perceptual	experience	as	the	phenomenal	field:	he	posits	that,	through	perception,	the	phenomenal	field	gets	transformed	into	the	‘Lebenswelt’,	‘which	is	the	intersubjective	world	of	more	or	less	determinate	things’	(Romdenh-Rom-luc,	2011:	23).	Romdenh-Romluc	explains	that	the	phenomenal	field	refers	to	the	stage	of	perception	which	comes	before	the	Lebenswelt:	the	content	of	the	phe-nomenal	field	is	just	phenomena,	whilst	the	Lebenswelt	is	imbued	with	meaning.	Note,	however,	that	according	to	Romdenh-Romluc,	‘[n]o	clear	line	can	be	drawn	between	the	phenomenal	field	and	the	Lebenswelt,	which	retains	elements	of	am-biguity	 and	 indeterminacy’	 (Romdenh-Romluc,	 2011:	 23).	We	 sometimes	 see	things	without	being	sure	what	they	are,	encounter	new	interpretations	of	cer-tain	objects,	et	cetera.	Romdenh-Romluc	points	out	 that	 the	phenomenal	 field	‘itself	admits	of	varying	stages’,	and	that	sometimes,	 ‘Merleau-Ponty’s	analysis	focuses	on	the	Lebenswelt,	but	at	other	times	it	focuses	on	the	phenomenal	field’	(Romdenh-Romluc,	2011:	23).	For	the	sake	of	simplicity,	I	disregard	this	distinc-tion	and	simply	refer	to	the	content	of	perception	as	the	‘phenomenal	field’.	Thus	
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understood,	the	phenomenal	field	is	imbued	with	meaning.		
B.2 How	are	Phenomenal	Fields	Formed?		A	next	question	is	how	phenomenal	fields,	thus	considered,	are	constituted:	what	determines	which	opportunities	to	respond	I	will	perceive?	According	to	Rom-denh-Romluc’s	reading	of	Merleau-Ponty,	there	are	three	main	factors	determin-ing	my	phenomenal	field:	(1)	what	I	can	do;	(2)	where	I	am;	and	(3)	what	I	am	
currently	doing.	In	addition,	Romdenh-Romluc	holds	that	our	phenomenal	fields	are	also	determined	in	part	by	(4)	what	we	could	do.	In	this	section,	I	will	con-sider	these	four	factors	in	turn.		
(1) What	we	can	do:	our	motor	skills	
	Which	opportunities	for	action	I	perceive,	first	of	all,	depends	on	what	I	can	do.	Merleau-Ponty	refers	to	our	physical	capacities	as	motor	skills.	Romdenh-Rom-luc	explains	that	motor	skills	are	physical	abilities	to	do	something:	‘To	possess	a	motor	skill’,	she	writes,	‘is	to	be	able	to	do	something.	They	encompass	very	sim-ple	capacities,	such	as	the	ability	to	scratch	oneself,	 through	to	more	complex	skills,	such	as	the	ability	to	play	guitar’	(Romdenh-Romluc,	2011:	77).	According	to	 Merleau-Ponty,	 an	 agent	 normally	 only	 perceives	 opportunities	 for	 action	which	she	has	the	motor	skill	to	perform.	If	I	am	not	capable	of,	say,	riding	a	bi-cycle,	I	will	not	perceive	a	bicycle	as	inviting	me	to	do	ride	it.	Thus,	the	content	of	our	phenomenal	field	first	of	all	depends	on	what	kinds	of	things	I	am	capable	of	doing.	‘The	perception	of	an	opportunity	to	act’,	Romdenh-Romluc	explains,	‘is	simultaneously	an	awareness	of	oneself	as	possessing	the	power	to	perform	that	action’	(Romdenh-Romluc,	2011:	106).	When,	during	my	gardening	session,	
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I	perceive	a	possibility	of	pulling	out	some	weeds,	this	presents	to	me	as	some-thing	which	I	can	do:	I	can	move	my	arm	in	the	right	direction,	grasp	the	roots	at	an	appropriate	point,	get	my	muscles	to	pull	them	away	from	the	earth	with	ad-equate	force,	et	cetera.		This	relates	to	the	fact	that	a	phenomenal	field	is	always	specific	to	the	person	who	perceives	it:	accordingly,	perceived	invitations	for	action	are	always	opportunities	 specific	 to	 the	perceiving	agent.	Perceived	opportunities	are	al-ways	opportunities	for	me:	‘I	perceive	my	environment	as	demanding	certain	ac-tions;	 I	perceive	 it	 as	 requiring	me	 to	act	 in	 certain	ways’	 (Romdenh-Romluc,	2011:	106).	When	I	perceive	the	opportunity	to	pull	out	some	weeds,	this	does	not	present	as	something	someone	could	do.	It	presents	specifically	as	an	invita-tion	to	me:	it	is	something	I	can	do.	In	fact,	according	to	Romdenh-Romluc,	the	very	perception	of	a	certain	possibility	to	φ	is	itself	already	an	exercise	of	my	motor	skill	to	φ.	This	is	so,	she	explains,	because	knowing	how	to	do	something	involves	recognising	opportuni-ties	to	do	so.	‘Acquiring	a	motor	skill’,	she	writes,	is	‘partly	a	matter	of	learning	to	perceive	opportunities	to	exercise	it’	(Romdenh-Romluc,	2011:	77).	Once	I	am	able	to	do	a	certain	kind	of	thing	–	cook	rice,	pet	a	dog	–	I	will	recognise	oppor-tunities	to	do	so	whenever	they	arise.	I	can	only	recognise	these	opportunities	as	such	because	I	am	capable	of	taking	them	up.	Thus,	according	to	Merleau-Ponty,	recognising	these	opportunities	is	itself	already	an	exercise	of	my	ability	to	do	these	things.	In	sum,	Romdenh-Romluc	puts	it,	‘motor	skills	furnish	the	subject	with	ways	of	perceiving	the	world’	(Romdenh-Romluc,	2011:	78).	
(2) Where	we	are:	our	environment	
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Secondly,	the	content	of	our	phenomenal	field	is	also	determined	by	where	we	are:	our	perception	is	first	of	all	a	perception	of	our	direct	environment,	at	a	spe-cific	 time	 and	place	 (tx).	 Usually,	 I	will	 only	 perceive	 opportunities	 for	 action	which	are	actually	possible	at	tx:	I	must	perceive	my	environment	as	suitable	for	them.2	What	I	can	do	at	tx	heavily	depends	on	what	can	be	done	at	tx.	‘To	exercise	any	motor	skill,’	Romdenh-Romluc	writes,	‘one	must	be	in	the	right	kind	of	envi-ronment	–	 for	example,	 to	exercise	my	skill	 at	horse-riding,	my	surroundings	must	contain	a	horse’	(Romdenh-Romluc,	2011:	77).	Note	that	what	a	perceived	environment	will	invite	me	to	do	is	not	just	a	function	of	its	“objective”	features.	The	opportunities	I	perceive,	are	perceived	in	light	of	my	perceived	environment,	not	my	environment	“as	such”:	‘motor	skills	are	not	exercised	in	response	to	the	agent’s	environment	where	this	is	under-stood	 in	merely	physical	 terms.	They	are	exercised	 in	response	 to	 the	agent’s	
perceived	surroundings’	 (Romdenh-Romluc,	2011:	81).	My	perceived	environ-ment	is	always	seen	from	my	very	particular	perspective,	and	as	such	imbued	with	meaning:	a	bike	only	invites	me	to	ride	on	it	because	I	interpret	it	as	a	bike,	which	is	something-to-ride-on.	But	one’s	perceived	environment	also	includes,	for	example,	one’s	social	landscape,	i.e.	the	social	and	cultural	meaning	a	certain	setting	has	to	the	perceiver.	Merleau-Ponty	observes	in	The	Phenomenology	of	
																																								 																					2	 Admittedly,	 there	 seem	 to	 be	 exceptions	 to	 this	 rule.	 Romdenh-Romluc	 argues	 that	agents	can	sometimes	exercise	motor	skills	which	are	‘relevant	to	merely	possible	envi-ronments’	(Romdenh-Romluc,	2011:	95),	rather	than	their	actual	one	–	for	example	when	a	kickboxing	instructor	fights	an	imaginary	opponent.	Clearly,	her	environment	is	not	ex-actly	suitable	for	fighting	as	it	lacks	an	actual	opponent,	but	because	the	agent	can	imagine	a	suitable	scenario,	she	is	able	to	exercise	these	motor	skills.		
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Perception	that	‘the	conventions	of	the	social	group,	our	set	of	listeners,	immedi-ately	elicit	 from	us	 the	words,	 attitudes	and	 tone	which	are	 fitting’	 (Merleau-Ponty,	1945/1978:	106).	For	example,	during	a	business	meeting,	I	will	perceive	this	environment	as	inviting	me	to	avoid	using	swearwords.	This	also	relates	to	the	fact	that,	as	Romdenh-Romluc	points	out,	‘perception	has	an	affective	or	emo-tive	dimension’	(Romdenh-Romluc,	2011:	74),	which	also	influences	which	op-portunities	 for	 action	 will	 invite	me.	 Romdenh-Romluc	 writes	 that	 ’Merleau-Ponty	describes	perceptual	experience	as	having	an	affective	dimension	which	contributes	to	the	subject’s	perception	of	their	surroundings	as	requiring	certain	forms	of	behaviour’	(Romdenh-Romluc,	2011:	78-79).	This	underlines,	once	more,	how	our	perceptions	of	the	world	are	deeply	individual.	My	personal	history,	the	state	of	my	mental	health,	or	the	way	I	un-derstand	myself	can	all	influence	how	I	perceive	an	environment,	and	thereby	influence	which	opportunities	for	action	I	will	perceive	in	it.	If	I	am	particularly	shy,	for	example,	it	might	simply	not	occur	to	me	to	talk	to	a	stranger	at	the	bar,	whilst	another	person	may	walk	 in	and	 immediately	strike	up	a	conversation	with	the	person	next	to	her.		
(3) What	we	are	currently	doing:	our	task	or	project	A	third	major	factor	influencing	our	phenomenal	field,	according	to	Romdenh-Romluc,	is	what	Merleau-Ponty	calls	our	current	task	or	project:	that	which	we	are	in	the	process	of	doing	at	a	given	time.	At	any	given	tx	–	unless,	perhaps,	we	are	unconscious	–	we	are	always	already	in	the	process	of	doing	something.	This	will	disclose	to	us	those	opportunities	in	our	environment	which	are	relevant:	my	task	functions	as	a	“filter”	for	the	opportunities	open	to	me	at	tx,	and	generally	
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discloses	those	that	relate	to	it.	For	example,	when	I	am	gardening,	I	am	more	likely	to	perceive	the	opportunity	for	specific	activities	such	as	cutting	the	grass	or	pulling	out	weeds,	than,	say,	doing	a	pirouette,	even	though	this	is	a	possible	route	of	action	for	me	at	tx.	Romdenh-Romluc	explains	that	‘[t]he	behaviour	one	perceives	one’s	surroundings	as	requiring	is	partly	determined	by	one’s	current	task	or	project’	(Romdenh-Romluc,	2011:	74).	In	this	context,	she	refers	to	an	example	given	by	Merleau-Ponty	in	The	Structure	of	Behaviour	(1942/1963)	of	a	player	on	a	football	field.	The	field	presents	to	the	player	in	a	certain	manner:	‘They	do	not	merely	see	the	spaces	between	the	players	on	the	opposing	team	as	places	where	no	one	is	standing,	but	as	‘openings’,	that	is,	opportunities	to	pass	the	 ball	 to	 a	 team	mare	 or	 to	 progress	 towards	 the	 goal’	 (Romdenh-Romluc,	2011:	75).	Crucially,	the	field	only	shows	up	as	such	because	the	player	is	en-gaged	in	the	project	of	football-playing:	‘the	player	only	perceives	the	pitch	like	this	when	they	are	playing	football.	If	they	accidentally	wander	on	to	the	pitch	during	a	game	whilst	walking	their	dog,	they	will	see	the	ball	as	to-be-avoided,	rather	than	as	to-be-intercepted’	(Romdenh-Romluc,	2011:	75).		
(4) What	we	could	do:	The	Power	to	Reckon	with	the	Possible	On	the	picture	presented	so	far,	our	phenomenal	field	consists	in	perceived	op-portunities	for	me	at	tx	which	are	relevant	to	my	current	task.	But	our	phenomenal	field,	on	Romdenh-Romluc’s	reading	at	least,	contains	more	perceived	opportuni-ties	than	that:	it	is	not	restricted	to	task-related	possibilities	only.	She	argues	that	a	normal	agent	will	also	perceive	opportunities	for	action	which	relate	to	merely	
possible	tasks,	which	she	would	be	capable	of	performing	at	tx.	This	is	due,	Rom-denh-Romluc	argues,	to	what	Merleau-Ponty	calls	‘the	power	to	reckon	with	the	
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possible’.	‘One	manifestation	of	this	power’,	she	writes,	‘is	the	perception	of	op-portunities	for	action,	over	and	above	just	those	that	relate	to	what	one	is	cur-rently	doing’	(Romdenh-Romluc,	2011:	94).	As	such,	‘the	normal	subject	[…]	also	perceive[s]	 the	world	as	 requiring	actions	 that	 relate	 to	merely	possible	 tasks’	(Romdenh-Romluc,	2011:	95).	For	example,	when	I	am	gardening,	I	may	not	only	perceive	opportunities	to	pull	out	weeds	and	cut	the	grass,	but	I	may	also	perceive	the	opportunity	of	jumping	into	the	swimming	pool,	even	though	this	is	a	not	rel-evant	to	my	task	at	tx.	This	means	that	our	phenomenal	field	can	also	include	pos-sibilities	which	go	beyond	our	current	task.		In	fact,	on	Romdenh-Romluc’s	reading,	this	is	always	the	case.	In	normal	agents,	she	argues,	the	capacity	to	perceive	alternatives	is	always	present	and	ex-ercised.	On	her	reading,	any	normal	agent	continuously	perceives	alternative	pos-sibilities.	She	is	clear	that	‘the	power	to	reckon	with	the	possible	is	implicated	in	
all	of	the	normal	human	agent’s	behaviour.	One	always	perceives	more	possibili-ties	for	action	than	those	that	correspond	to	one’s	current	task’	(Romdenh-Rom-luc,	2011:	100,	emphasises	mine).	Thus,	our	phenomenal	 field	not	only	can	 in-clude	alternative	possibilities:	it	always	includes	them.	This	might	seem	odd.	In	many	situations,	it	feels	like	I	don’t	perceive	any	alternative	routes	of	action.	When	I	go	downstairs	in	the	morning,	and	absent-mindedly	start	brushing	my	teeth	whilst	reminiscing	my	dreams,	it	does	not	oc-cur	to	me	to	do	anything	else.	One	may	doubt	that,	in	this	moment,	I	perceive	any	alternative	invitations	for	action.	Yet	we	must	assume	that	the	power	to	reckon	with	the	possible	is	always	minimally	present.	This	becomes	clearer	once	we	re-call	how	low	the	threshold	is,	for	Merleau-Ponty,	to	perceive	an	invitation	to	ac-
			
			
163	
tion.	On	Merleau-Ponty’s	 account,	 simply	 to	 recognise	something	 implies	per-ceiving	an	opportunity	for	action:	 ‘To	recognise	something’,	Romdenh-Romluc	writes,	
is	to	perceive	it	as	familiar,	and	things	appear	familiar	when	one	is	skilled	at	–	or	in	the	habit	of	–	interacting	with	them.	To	perceive	something	as	familiar	is	thus	to	perceive	it	as	something	for	which	a	particular	form	of	behaviour	is	ap-propriate.	(Romdenh-Romluc,	2011:	94)		 	When	I	walk	past	the	shower,	for	example,	I	do	not	first	and	foremost	see	it	as	a	large	glass	box	–	I	first	of	all	perceive	it	as	something	to-wash-myself-in,	even	if	I	do	not	consider	doing	so	in	that	moment.	As	such,	I	perceive	the	shower	as	in-viting	me	to	act,	thus	disclosing	an	alternative	route	of	action	–	even	if	this	invi-tation	is	not	currently	relevant	to	me,	and	even	if	this	invitation	doesn’t	occur	to	my	conscious	mind.	The	power	to	reckon	with	the	possible	is	thus	continually	exercised,	even	if	we	are	fully	absorbed	in	our	projects.		In	sum,	for	a	large	part,	the	opportunities	we	perceive	at	tx	will	be	ones	relevant	to	our	current	task.	But	we	also	always	perceive	invitations	to	alterna-tive	possibilities.	This	is	not	to	say,	of	course,	that	an	agent	will	perceive	all	op-portunities	an	environment	offers	at	tx.	there	are	many	opportunities	within	any	environment,	which	I	am	capable	of	taking	up,	but	which	I	do	not	perceive.	This	will	be	particularly	the	case	for	far-fetched	opportunities:	for	example,	in	my	cur-rent	environment,	I	could	use	the	plant	pot	on	my	office	desk	to	smash	the	win-dow:	but	–	before	constructing	this	example	–	I	did	not	perceive	this	opportunity	at	all.	 	
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B.3 Urgency	and	Salience	Our	phenomenal	 field	 thus	consists	 in	perceived	opportunities	 to	act.	But,	ac-cording	to	Merleau-Ponty,	we	do	not	just	perceive	opportunities	to	act	as	if	from	a	distance,	seeing	what	might	be	done	at	a	certain	time:	when	we	perceive	an	opportunity,	it	always	already	solicits	us.	It	‘pulls’	us,	as	it	were,	towards	action.	
‘[P]erceived	demands	for	action’,	Romdenh-Romluc	writes,	 ‘immediately	draw	
forth	the	agent’s	behaviour’	(Romdenh-Romluc,	2011:	90,	emphasis	mine).	The	agent	does	not	just	perceive	opportunities	to	act,	but	is	simultaneously	and	im-mediately	invited	to	also	act	on	them:	‘at	any	one	time,	the	agent	does	not	per-ceive	 their	 surroundings	 as	 offering	 a	 disparate	 collection	 of	 actions.	 Instead	they	perceive	it	as	demanding	a	certain	form	of	behaviour’	(Romdenh-Romluc,	2011:	75,	emphasis	mine).	Here,	 it	 really	comes	 to	 the	 fore	how,	on	Merleau-Ponty’s	account	of	action,	the	perceptive	and	the	executive	dimension	of	agency	are	very	tightly	knit	together.	But,	as	we	have	sketched	it	so	far,	a	phenomenal	field	consists	in	several	perceived	opportunities	to	act:	at	any	tx,	 I	thus	perceive	a	number	of	different	opportunities	at	once.	Clearly,	not	all	of	these	can	effectively	draw	me	into	action.	On	Merleau-Ponty’s	view,	I	will	take	up	those	invitations	for	action	which	solicit	me	most	strongly.	In	this	context,	Romdenh-Romluc	introduces	two	helpful	no-tions:	urgency	and	salience.	In	her	2011	book,	she	mentions	that	‘perceived	de-mands	for	action	differ	in	their	urgency’	(Romdenh-Romluc,	2011:	95).	It	is	those	demands	which	are	 ‘perceived	as	most	urgent’,	she	writes,	which	will	 ‘initiate	action’	(Romdenh-Romluc,	2011:	95).	In	a	2012	contribution	to	The	Oxford	Hand-
book	 of	 Contemporary	 Phenomenology,	 she	 further	 illuminates	 this	 point.	 She	there	defines	the	urgency	of	a	perceived	demand	for	action	as	‘the	strength	with	
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which	[it]	draw[s]	the	agent	to	act’	(Romdenh-Romluc,	2012:	200).	Urgency	thus	refers	to	the	strength	of	a	solicitation.	She	also	introduces	the	joint	notion	of	sa-
lience:	‘The	urgency	with	which	the	agent	is	solicited’,	she	writes,	‘will	depend	on	what	might	roughly	be	called	the	salience	of	the	affordance	for	the	agent’	(Rom-denh-Romluc,	2012:	200).3	Salience	is	thus	a	quality	of	an	opportunity	perceived	by	an	agent,	which	determines	how	strongly	this	perception	will	solicit	her	to	act:	an	agent,	Romdenh-Romluc	writes,	‘will	experience	those	affordances	that	are	most	salient	for	her	as	soliciting	her	most	strongly.	Less	salient	affordances	will	solicit	her	less	strongly’	(Romdenh-Romluc,	2012:	200).	In	this	context,	the	etymology	of	the	term	is	quite	illuminating:	salience	comes	from	the	Latin	salire,	which	means	to	leap.4	Salience,	indeed,	refers	to	the	quality	of	standing	out	from	one’s	surroundings:	salient	opportunities	are	those	which,	 for	a	certain	agent,	‘leap	out’	over	others.		In	sum,	the	different	perceived	opportunities	to	act,	which	make	up	the	agent’s	phenomenal	field	at	tx,	will	have	different	degrees	of	salience	for	her,	so-liciting	 her	with	 corresponding	 urgency.	 Her	 behaviour,	 then,	 ‘will	 be	 drawn	forth	by	the	most	urgent	solicitations’	(Romdenh-Romluc,	2012:	2000).	A	next	question	is	what	determines	the	salience	of	a	perceived	opportunity.	One	of	the	main	factors	determining	salience,	Romdenh-Romluc	points	out,	 is	the	agent’s	current	task	or	project.	Which	opportunities	to	act	will	‘leap	out’	for	me	over	oth-ers	at	tx	will	be	deeply	influenced	by	what	I	am	doing	at	tx:	
																																								 																					3	Romdenh-Romluc	uses	the	notion	‘affordance’,	which	overlaps	with	my	use	of	the	term	‘opportunity’.	Roughly,	it	refers	to	something	an	agent	is	physically	capable	of	doing	in	a	certain	environment.		4	See	Hoad	(1996:	414).	
			
			
166		What	the	agent	is	currently	doing	makes	certain	opportunities	for	action	–	those	that	are	relevant	to	her	current	task	–	salient	for	her.	These	opportunities	will	then	solicit	her	more	urgently,	and	so	play	a	greater	role	in	drawing	forth	her	behaviour.	(Romdenh-Romluc,	2012:	204)		For	example,	when	I	am	painting	in	my	shed,	this	will	render	relevant	opportu-nities	 in	my	 environment	more	 salient	 –	 such	 as	 colour-mixing,	 selecting	 the	right	brush,	or	taking	some	distance	from	the	canvas	to	assess	whether	I	got	the	perspective	right.	Other	opportunities	which	I	may	perceive	in	my	environment,	such	as	riding	the	bike	stood	at	the	back	of	the	shed,	will	be	less	salient	for	me	and	thus	not	draw	me	into	action.	My	current	task	thus	confers	salience	upon	certain	opportunities.	Note,	though,	that	other	factors	may	also	influence	the	salience	of	perceived	opportu-nities.	Romdenh-Romluc	mentions	that,	‘[n]o	doubt,	there	are	a	number	of	dif-ferent	factors	that	contribute	to	salience’	(Romdenh-Romluc,	2012:	204).	For	ex-ample,	when	a	task	may	be	achieved	in	a	variety	of	ways,	other	factors	will	fur-ther	determine	which	way	is	most	salient	to	me:	I	decide	to	check	in	on	my	grand-father,	who	is	in	hospital,	but	my	aversion	to	hospital	environments	makes	the	opportunity	to	give	him	a	phone	call	a	more	salient	way	to	perform	this	task	than	paying	him	a	visit	in	person.	Furthermore,	which	tasks	I	will	take	up	in	the	first	place	will	depend	on	which	tasks	are	most	salient	for	me.	This	can	again	be	de-termined	by	many	factors.	When	I	am	in	a	good	mood,	for	example,	I	might	be	more	inclined	to	donate	to	the	local	food	bank	when	visiting	the	supermarket,	but	when	I	have	just	lost	my	job,	I	may	grumpily	pass	by	the	food	bank	and	not	
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donate	anything	to	it.5	My	mood	here	influences	the	salience	of	a	perceived	pos-sible	task,	and	so	determines	whether	I	take	it	up	at	all.	(If	I	do	take	up	the	task,	this	in	turn	will	render	relevant	possibilities	salient	for	me:	I	grab	some	tins	from	the	shelf	to	donate,	etc.)		
C. FIELDS	OF	POSSIBLE	ACTION		
C.1 Phenomenal	Fields	and	Fields	of	Possible	Action	This	concludes	my	initial	sketch	of	Merleau-Ponty’s	notion	of	a	phenomenal	field.	On	the	picture	I	have	presented,	largely	following	Romdenh-Romluc’s	reading,	a	phenomenal	field	consists	in	several	perceived	opportunities	for	action,	which	have	different	degrees	of	salience.	The	most	salient	opportunities	will	draw	the	agent	into	action.	I	will	now	explain	how	the	notion	of	a	phenomenal	field	may	illuminate	the	notion	of	a	field	of	possible	action.	In	this	section,	I	will	discuss	the	relation	between	phenomenal	fields,	as	Merleau-Ponty	understands	them,	and	fields	of	possible	action,	as	I	understand	them.	The	main	difference,	I	suggest,	is	that	some	perceived	opportunities	belonging	to	my	phenomenal	field	at	tx	may	nevertheless	not	belong	to	my	field	of	possible	action	at	tx.	This	can	happen	in	three	main	ways:	(1)	a	perceived	opportunity	may	not	be	an	opportunity	to	act	proper;	(2)	a	perceived	opportunity	may	not	be	an	actual	possibility;	(3)	a	per-ceived	opportunity	may	not	seem	viable	for	the	agent.	I	will	discuss	these	three	possibilities	in	turn.	(1) 	A	first	possibility	is	that	a	phenomenal	field	may	include	perceived	
																																								 																					5	 For	 a	 study	 of	 the	 effects	 of	 good	mood	 on	 helping	 others,	 see	 e.g.	 Isen	 and	 Levin	(1972).	
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opportunities	to	respond	to	the	world	which	–	arguably	–	aren’t	opportunities	to	
act	proper.	We	saw	that,	for	Merleau-Ponty,	agents	perceive	their	surroundings	as	a	set	of	opportunities	to	respond	to	the	world.	But,	some	might	argue,	not	all	opportunities	 to	 respond	 are	 necessarily	 opportunities	 for	 action	 in	 the	 full	sense	of	the	term.	Thus	far,	I	have	not	distinguished	between	perceived	invita-tions	to	respond	to	the	world	and	perceived	invitations	to	act.6	Arguably,	how-ever,	I	may	sometimes	perceive	the	world	as	inviting	me	to	respond	but	not	per	se	to	act.	For	example,	if	I	look	at	my	coffee	mug,	this	can	appear	to	me	as	some-thing-to-drink-from.	But	it	may	also	appear	as	a	dear	friend’s	gift.	In	the	latter	case,	my	perception	may	invite	me	to	respond	to	it	with,	say,	warm	feelings.	But	this	is	not,	some	might	say,	an	invitation	to	action	exactly.	Admittedly,	for	Merleau-Ponty,	all	perception	involves	activity.	He	holds	that	perception	is	always	active:	it	is	not	just	the	passive	reception	of	sense	data,	but	always	implies	a	sort	of	active	engagement	with	the	world.	 ‘Perception	on	this	account’,	Romdenh-Romluc	writes,	‘is	an	activity	of	the	perceiver.	[…]	They	invest	 their	environment	with	a	bodily	significance’	 (Romdenh-Romluc,	2011:	97).	 But	 this	 does	 not	 mean	 that	 the	 kind	 of	 activity	 involved	 in	 perception	amounts	 to	agency	 in	 the	 full	 sense.	Moreover,	 it	 does	 not	mean	 that	 the	 re-sponses	we	perceive	the	world	to	demand	themselves	amount	to	actions	proper.	Granted,	 Merleau-Ponty	 argues	 that	 even	 thought	 is	 expressed	 and	therefore	embodied	–	he	conceptualises	private	thought	as	silent	speech,	which	he	argues	is	a	bodily	activity	(see	Romdenh-Romluc,	2011:	187-188).	As	such,	
																																								 																					6	Romdenh-Romluc	does	not	seem	to	make	such	a	distinction,	though	she	sometimes	speaks	of	behaviour	and	other	times	of	actions,	a	distinction	which	may	reflect	a	similar	difference.	
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even	a	sense	of	gratitude	when	I	look	at	my	mug	might	count	as	a	bodily	activity	for	Merleau-Ponty.	But	even	if	we	grant	this,	this	still	does	not	mean	every	ex-pression	or	bodily	activity	amounts	to	action	proper.	All	responses	to	the	world	may	be	bodily	activity,	sure,	but	this	does	not,	in	any	obvious	way,	classify	them	as	actions.	It	remains,	of	course,	an	open	question	where	precisely	to	draw	the	line	between	proper	actions	and	mere	responses,	and	some	may	not	want	to	draw	this	line	at	all.	Remaining	agnostic	as	to	whether	or	not	all	responses	amount	to	actions	proper,	I	will	from	now	on	speak	of	perceived	invitations	to	act	specifi-cally.	Thus,	erring	on	the	side	of	caution,	I	propose	that	a	field	of	possible	action	consists	solely	in	perceived	opportunities	to	act	–	whether	or	not	one	wants	to	include	all	opportunities	to	respond	within	that	group.	I	thereby	leave	it	open	whether	 there	may	be	perceived	possibilities	 to	 respond	which	belong	 to	my	phenomenal	field,	but	which	would	be	excluded	from	my	field	of	possible	action	because	they	are	not	possibilities	to	act	proper.	This	is	a	first,	potential,	differ-ence	between	phenomenal	fields	and	fields	of	possible	action.		(2) A	second	potential	difference	concerns	the	fact	that	some	perceived	opportunities	for	action	may	be	actually	false.	It	may	happen	that	a	phenomenal	field	includes	perceived	opportunities	to	act	which	do	not	correspond	to	actual	
possibilities.	Whenever	I	perceive	a	possibility	to	φ,	I	implicitly	assume	this	is	an	actual	possibility	for	me	at	tx:	I	both	take	myself	to	be	capable	of	performing	φ,	and	I	take	the	performance	of	φ	to	be	actually	possible	in	my	current	environ-ment.	But	my	perception	may	be	mistaken.	It	may	be,	for	one,	that	my	motor	skill	to	φ	is	defective,	such	that	I	may	perceive	an	opportunity	to	φ	but	lack	the	phys-
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ical	capacity	to	perform	φ.	An	example	of	such	a	case	is	in	fact	discussed	by	Mer-leau-Ponty	himself	 in	The	Phenomenology	of	Perception:	he	discusses	the	case	of	a	veteran	with	a	phantom	limb.	The	veteran	still	perceives	certain	opportuni-ties	 for	 action	–	he	might	 get	up	 from	his	 chair	 in	 an	attempt	 to	walk	–	 even	though	he	is	no	longer	capable	of	actually	performing	these	actions.	According	to	Merleau-Ponty,	 the	veteran	has	defective	motor	 skills:	he	 can	 still	 exercise	them	 insofar	 as	 he	 can	 perceive	 opportunities	 to	 do	 certain	 things,	 but	 is	 no	longer	able	to	effectively	perform	them.		Secondly,	it	may	happen	that	my	environment	isn’t	actually	suitable	to	φ	at	tx.	Normally,	I	only	perceive	opportunities	to	φ	if	they	are	actually	possible	at	tx.7	But	it	may	happen	that	I	perceive	an	opportunity	which	isn’t	actually	there,	not	because	my	motor	skill	to	do	φ	is	defective,	but	because	φ	isn’t	actually	pos-sible	at	tx:	for	example,	I	might	see	a	swamp	but	take	it	for	a	patch	of	grass	I	can	walk	on.		In	both	these	cases,	I	perceive	an	opportunity	to	act	which	isn’t	an	actual	opportunity.	This	means	I	will	not	be	able	to	act	upon	these	possibilities:	there	is	a	technical	barrier,	as	it	were,	between	the	perceived	opportunity	and	my	ex-ecution	of	it.	Such	a	perceived	possibility,	on	my	view,	will	belong	to	my	phenom-enal	field	but	not	to	my	field	of	possible	action.	Thus,	a	field	of	possible	action	at	tx	consists	only	in	perceived	opportunities	to	act	which	are	actual	opportunities	at	tx.	 (3) 	Lastly,	there	is	a	third	way	in	which	a	perceived	opportunity	may	
																																								 																					7	Though,	as	noted,	Romdenh-Romluc	argues	that	an	agent	may	also	respond	to	possible	environments	in	some	cases	(see	footnote	2	in	this	chapter).	
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not	belong	on	an	agent’s	field	of	possible	action.	Sometimes,	an	agent	may	per-ceive	an	opportunity	to	act,	which	she	is	physically	capable	of	performing,	and	which	is	technically	possible	at	tx,	yet	feel	unable	to	take	up	this	opportunity	in	action.	On	a	visit	to	Chicago,	my	friend	and	I	are	on	the	103rd	floor	of	the	Willis	Tower,	which	has	a	glass-bottomed	observation	deck.	My	 friend,	keen	to	 take	some	pictures	on	the	deck,	heads	over	there	and	urges	me	to	come	along.	But	the	very	sight	of	the	glass	floor	makes	me	feel	nauseous,	and	I	feel	like	I	just	cannot	step	onto	the	deck.	If	this	feeling	of	inability	is	sufficiently	strong,	we	might	want	to	say	this	opportunity,	though	belonging	to	my	phenomenal	field,	does	not	be-long	to	my	field	of	possible	action.	Or,	to	give	another	example,	a	robber	holds	me	at	gunpoint	and	commands	me	to	hand	over	my	wallet.	Technically,	it	is	possible	for	me	to	not	hand	it	over.	But	in	that	moment,	as	I	fear	for	my	life,	this	oppor-tunity	just	doesn’t	seem	available	to	me.	It	may	belong	to	my	phenomenal	field,	but	it	is	arguably	excluded	from	my	field	of	possible	action.	As	mentioned,	in	these	cases,	there	is	no	technical	barrier	preventing	me	from	acting	upon	 the	perceived	opportunity:	 it	 is	 technically	possible	 to	walk	onto	the	deck,	for	example,	and	I	also	have	the	motor	skills	to	(it	just	requires	that	I	walk	onto	it).	My	apparent	inability	to	act	on	this	opportunity	seems	rather	a	perceptive	issue.	There	is	something	about	the	way	I	perceive	this	opportunity	that	keeps	me	from	acting	upon	it:	I	do	not	perceive	it	to	be	a	viable	opportunity	for	me.	We	could	say	that	there	is	a	perceptive	barrier	preventing	me	from	acting	upon	it,	which	excludes	it	from	my	field	of	possible	action.		In	sum,	on	my	characterisation,	a	field	of	possible	action	consists	in	per-ceived	opportunities	to	respond	which	(1)	are	opportunities	to	act,	(2)	are	actual	opportunities	at	tx,	and	(3)	do	not	lie	behind	a	perceptive	barrier.	
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C.2 Frozen	Fields	of	Possible	Action	This,	finally,	brings	us	to	the	main	question	of	the	chapter:	how	may	a	field	of	possible	action,	thus	conceived,	be	frozen?	In	the	last	chapter,	I	proposed	that	a	field	of	possible	action	is	frozen	if	an	agent	is	forced	to	make	choices	within	a	fixed	set	of	possibilities,	such	that	she	cannot	but	φ.	This,	I	argued,	is	one	way	in	which	our	will	can	be	corrupted.	I	have	also	specified	that	the	agent’s	inability	to	–	φ	is	not	of	a	metaphysical	or	physical	kind,	but	rather	a	perceptive	issue:	the	agent	cannot	perceive	opportunities	to	–	φ	as	viable.	On	this	basis,	I	propose	that	the	key	to	further	conceptualising	the	idea	of	a	frozen	field	of	possible	action	is	the	newly	introduced	notion	of	a	perceptive	barrier.	In	brief,	my	proposal	is	that,	when	an	agent’s	field	of	possible	action	is	frozen,	this	is	due	to	a	perceptive	dis-
position,	which	leads	to	recurrent	perceptive	barriers.	In	this	section,	I	shall	un-pack	this	proposal	in	further	detail.	First	of	all,	we	need	to	get	clear	on	the	notion	of	a	perceptive	barrier.	How	are	perceptive	barriers	possible?	What	are	their	characteristics?	As	men-tioned	before,	a	perceptive	barrier	has	nothing	to	do	with	physical	or	metaphys-ical	impossibilities.	It	is	also	clear	that	a	perceptive	barrier	does	not	mean	the	agent	does	not	perceive	certain	opportunities:	it	is,	precisely,	a	barrier	lying	be-
tween	the	agent’s	phenomenal	field,	which	consists	in	perceived	opportunities,	and	her	field	of	possible	action.	I	definitely	perceive	the	opportunity	to	step	onto	the	Willis	Tower	deck.	Neither	is	my	problem	that	this	opportunity	does	not	oc-
cur	to	my	conscious	mind:	my	friend	is	asking	me	to	join	her	on	the	deck,	making	me	very	aware	of	the	opportunity.	The	problem	lies	rather	with	the	way	I	per-ceive	this	opportunity.	
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How	an	agent	perceives	opportunities	to	act	thus	can,	I	hypothesise,	pre-vent	her	from	acting	upon	them.	But	how	precisely	could	that	work?	I	want	to	explain	how	this	is	possible	in	reference	to	the	notion	of	salience.	More	precisely,	I	propose	that	perceived	opportunities	can	be	hypersalient	for	an	agent.	When	an	opportunity	to	φ	is	hypersalient	 for	an	agent	at	tx,	 it	solicits	her	with	extreme	urgency,	such	that	not	doing	φ	just	doesn’t	seem	viable	to	her.	As	a	result,	any	opportunity	which	involves	not	φ-ing	at	tx	seem	inaccessible	to	her:	they	come	to	lie	behind	a	perceptive	barrier.	This	barrier	is	a	perceptive	one	because	it	re-sults	from	the	way	the	agent	perceives	the	opportunity	to	φ,	and	consequently	all	other	opportunities	on	her	phenomenal	field	at	tx	which	involve	not	φ-ing.	As	I	look	at	the	glass	floor	of	the	observation	deck,	my	fear	makes	the	opportunity	to	avoid	the	deck	hypersalient:	it	seems	so	urgent	to	me	that	any	opportunities	which	involve	not	avoiding	it	don’t	stand	a	chance	at	drawing	me	into	action.	I	am	too	strongly	solicited	by	the	very	urgent	opportunity	to	avoid	it.	As	a	result,	the	opportunity	to	walk	onto	the	balcony	seems	unviable	to	me:	I	feel	like	I	just	
can’t.	 This,	I	submit,	freezes	my	field	of	possible	action.	Since	any	opportunity	which	involves	not	φ-ing	seems	unviable	to	me,	I	am	forced	to	act	and	choose	within	a	fixed	possibility	set.	Of	course,	the	hypersalient	opportunity	to	φ	may	itself	comprise	many	others:	I	can	avoid	the	observation	deck	by	just	standing	there,	by	walking	around	inside	of	the	building,	or	by	buying	something	to	drink	in	the	café.	But	whichever	choice	I	make,	I	am	practically	precluded	from	choos-ing	certain	perceived	opportunities	–	namely	the	ones	which	I	perceive	to	be	un-viable,	and	which	thus	lie	behind	a	perceptive	barrier.	
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Note	that	there	is	only	a	perceptive	barrier	if	a	certain	perceived	oppor-tunity	is	hypersalient,	such	that	any	conflicting	opportunities	seem	unviable.	The	mere	fact	that	one	opportunity	is	more	salient	than	others	is	not	enough	to	cause	a	perceptive	barrier:	indeed,	as	we	have	seen,	this	is	always	the	case.	A	field	of	possible	 action	 consists	 in	 several	perceived	opportunities,	with	different	de-grees	of	salience,	only	one	of	which	can	be	most	salient	at	tx.	This,	in	itself,	does	not	mean	the	agent	feels	unable	to	act	upon	any	of	the	other,	less	urgent,	oppor-tunities.	To	clarify	the	difference,	let	us	construct	a	parallel	Willis	Tower	exam-ple.	In	this	parallel	case,	the	sight	of	the	glass	floor	does	not	make	me	feel	queasy	at	all.	Yet,	 as	my	 friend	calls	me	onto	 the	deck,	 I	 see	 that	 it	 is	quite	 crowded.	Though	 I	 have	 no	 problem	 with	 crowds,	 I	 don’t	 really	 fancy	 squeezing	 past	sweaty	strangers.	I	tell	my	friend	I	will	wait	inside	whilst	she	takes	her	pictures.	On	this	description,	I	don’t	feel	unable	to	step	onto	the	deck.	I	just	happen	to	pre-fer	another	course	of	action.	The	opportunity	to	avoid	the	deck,	therefore,	is	not	hypersalient:	it	just	happens	to	be	the	most	salient.	I	can	still	perceive	other	op-portunities	as	viable,	and	they	are	not,	therefore,	excluded	from	my	field	of	pos-sible	action	in	this	case.	It	seems	fair	to	say	that	there	is	no	perceptive	barrier	preventing	me	from	acting	upon	them.	But	I	suggested	that,	when	a	field	of	possible	action	is	frozen,	this	is	due	to	a	perceptive	disposition,	leading	to	recurrent	perceptive	barriers.	A	frozen	field	of	possible	action,	as	I	conceive	of	it,	is	part	of	a	temporally	extended	condition.	The	agent	does	not	 just	have	a	perceptive	barrier	 in	one	specific	 situation,	 in	which	one	individual	perceived	opportunity	is	hypersalient.	The	situation	is	re-
curring.	As	such,	I	propose	that,	when	a	field	of	possible	action	is	frozen,	an	agent	
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has	a	perceptive	disposition	to	perceive	certain	types	of	opportunity	as	hyper-salient.	This	means	that,	whenever	she	perceives	an	opportunity	of	this	type,	it	tends	to	solicit	her	with	extreme	urgency,	resulting	in	a	perceptive	barrier.	Note	that	such	an	agent	tends	to	perceive	certain	types	of	opportunity	as	hypersalient,	and	not	just	one	opportunity.	Any	perceived	opportunity	to	φ	is	a	perceived	opportunity	at	tx,	and	thus	unique	to	that	particular	time	and	context.	The	opportunity	to	open	my	curtains	yesterday	morning	was	a	different	oppor-tunity	than	the	one	to	open	my	curtains	this	morning.	But	opportunities	can	be	classed	into	different	types	–	for	example,	one	type	of	opportunity	 is	“curtain-opening”.	Any	particular	perceived	opportunity,	then,	does	or	does	not	belong	to	this	type.	(Note,	though,	that	opportunity	types	need	not	overlap	with	a	certain	motor	skill.	One	opportunity	type,	for	example,	could	be	“avoiding	interactions	with	my	grandmother”.	Particular	opportunities	belonging	to	this	type	could	re-quire	a	wide	variety	of	motor	skills:	it	could	mean	I	refrain	from	answering	the	phone,	hide	behind	the	sofa	when	she	visits,	or	turn	around	when	I	run	into	her	on	the	street.	It	does	seem	plausible,	however,	to	assume	that	opportunity	types	will	often	relate	to	certain	kinds	of	tasks.)	If	an	agent	has	a	perceptive	disposition	to	perceive	certain	 types	of	opportunity	as	hypersalient,	 this	means	that,	 time	and	time	again,	her	perception	of	particular	situations	will	throw	up	perceptive	barriers:	namely	whenever,	or	almost	whenever,	she	perceives	an	opportunity	of	this	type.	The	perceptive	disposition,	in	other	words,	comes	into	effect	when	the	agent’s	phenomenal	field	features	a	possibility	of	the	relevant	type.	It	is	only	then	that	a	perceptive	barrier	emerges,	and	it	is	only	then	that	the	agent’s	field	of	possible	action	is	frozen.	This	kind	of	perceptive	disposition	thus	need	not	imply	that	the	agent’s	
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field	of	possible	action	is	constantly	frozen.	When	an	agent	has	a	perceptive	dis-position	to	perceive	a	certain	opportunity	 type	as	hypersalient,	 this	will	often	freeze	her	field	of	possible	action:	namely	whenever	(or	almost	whenever)	an	opportunity	of	this	type	features	on	her	phenomenal	field.	But	at	times	when	she	does	not	perceive	any	opportunities	of	this	type,	there	will	be	no	perceptive	bar-riers,	and	her	field	of	possible	action	won’t	be	frozen.	Clearly,	the	extent	to	which	such	a	disposition	will	affect	someone’s	life	depends	on	how	often	opportunities	of	the	relevant	type	occur.	Let	us	consider	two	examples.	In	some	cases,	an	agent’s	field	of	possible	action	is	practically	permanently	frozen.	Consider,	for	example,	the	case	of	Mary,	who	suffers	from	severe	agoraphobia.	Due	to	her	intense	fear	of	public	spaces,	Mary	hasn’t	left	her	house	for	several	years.	She	has	a	perceptive	disposition	to	perceive	opportunities	of	the	type	“involving	staying	inside	my	house”	as	hyper-salient.	Clearly,	this	type	of	opportunity	constantly	features	on	her	phenomenal	field.	It	is	not	so	that	Mary	only	perceives	such	opportunities	from	time	to	time:	much	to	the	contrary,	she	constantly	perceives	them.	This	means	that	her	field	of	possible	action	is	always	frozen:	for	it	always	features	hypersalient	opportuni-ties.	Opportunities	which	are	not	of	this	type,	therefore,	always	lie	behind	a	per-ceptive	barrier.	When	Mary	passes	by	the	front	door,	for	example,	she	recognises	it	as	a	front	door	and	so	something-through-which-to-leave-the-house.	She	thus	perceives	an	opportunity	to	leave	the	house.	Yet	she	will	not	perceive	it	as	viable,	and	so	it	does	not	belong	to	her	field	of	possible	action.	Opportunities	of	this	type,	which	involve	not	staying	inside	of	the	house,	are	continually	excluded	from	this	field	because	of	the	way	Mary	perceives	them.	
			
			
177	
But	a	frozen	field	of	possible	action	may	also	be	a	more	intermittent	oc-currence.	A	second	example	concerns	the	case	of	Fred.	Fred	suffers	from	OCD,	and	is	compelled	to	wash	his	hands	exactly	every	hour,	at	the	strike	of	the	clock.	Since	this	is	a	compulsion,	opportunities	of	the	type	“washing	my	hands	at	the	strike	of	the	clock”	tend	to	be	hypersalient	for	him.	Whenever	another	hour	has	passed,	Fred	perceives	an	opportunity	of	this	type.	This	opportunity	will,	in	that	moment,	solicit	him	with	such	force	that	other	opportunities,	which	are	not	of	the	hypersalient	type,	appear	unviable	to	him.	For	example,	Fred	may	leave	his	toast	to	burn	because,	just	as	it	started	to	turn	black,	an	hour	had	passed	and	so	he	felt	compelled	to	go	wash	his	hands.	When	the	phone	rings	at	this	time,	he	will	not	answer	it,	and	even	if	he	really	needs	the	bathroom,	he	will	still	first	wash	his	hands.	In	this	moment,	I	argue,	all	these	opportunities	are	excluded	from	his	field	of	possible	action.	Though	Fred	may	perceive	these	opportunities,	and	is	physically	capable	of	taking	them	up,	they	lie	behind	a	perceptive	barrier,	and	so	are,	in	this	moment,	excluded	from	his	field	of	possible	action.	Fred’s	field	of	pos-sible	action	thus,	basically,	freezes	every	hour.	(Note,	though,	That	Fred’s	dispo-sition	may	affect	his	life	also	at	other	times.	When	his	family	invites	him	to	come	out	on	a	hike,	for	example,	he	has	to	decline,	knowing	that	such	a	trip	would	not	allow	him	to	wash	his	hands	at	any	regular	interval.)	Further,	note	that	the	scope	of	frozen	fields	of	possible	action	may	vary:	Mary’s,	for	example,	is	usually	much	wider	than	Fred’s.	Mary’s	always	includes	a	wide	 variety	 of	 options.	 At	 any	 given	 time,	 she	 will	 usually	 perceive	 several	hypersalient	opportunities:	she	may	watch	a	film	on	TV,	do	some	laundry,	read	a	novel,	call	her	sister.	All	of	these	are	hypersalient	for	her	because	they	involve	
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staying	indoors.	The	hypersalience	is	thus	not	restricted	to	one	specific	oppor-tunity	at	tx,	but	pertains	to	any	opportunity	at	tx	which	is	of	the	right	type.	Mary,	indeed,	lives	her	whole	life	taking	up	opportunities	of	this	type.	Hypersalient	op-portunities	for	Fred,	in	contrast,	only	include	opportunities	to	wash	his	hands,	and	this	at	specific	times.	Whenever	he	perceives	an	opportunity	of	this	type,	his	field	of	possible	action	becomes	extremely	narrow:	he	can	only	really	follow	his	compulsion.		We	now	have	an	 initial	sketch	of	what	 it	means	 for	a	 field	of	possible	action	to	freeze,	and	how	this	can	recurrently	happen	because	of	an	agent’s	per-
ceptive	disposition,	leading	her	to	perceive	certain	types	of	opportunity	as	hyper-salient.	A	few	further	nuances	need	to	be	added	at	this	point.	A	first	important	point	is	that	exceptions	are	always	possible.	It	can	always	happen	that	a	certain	opportunity,	though	it	tends	to	be	hypersalient	for	an	agent,	is	not	hypersalient	under	extreme	circumstances.	Fred,	as	the	clock	almost	strikes	7,	notices	that	his	beloved	cat	is	about	to	be	run	over	by	a	car	and	rushes	outside	in	order	to	rescue	the	animal.	Or	Mary,	as	her	house	sets	on	fire,	runs	outside	in	a	panic.	Saving	the	cat	and	escaping	the	fire	are,	in	those	moments,	perceived	to	be	more	urgent	by	these	agents	than	the	opportunity	which	 is	usually	hypersalient	 for	them.	For	this	reason,	we	can	only	speak	of	a	disposition	to	perceive	certain	types	of	possi-bility	as	hypersalient,	or	say	that	a	certain	type	of	possibility	tends	to	be	hyper-salient	for	an	agent.	This	possibility	of	exception	reflects	a	further	fact	about	the	sort	of	dis-position	I	have	been	describing:	 it	seems	to	come	in	degrees.	A	very	powerful	perceptive	disposition	will	very	rarely	allow	for	exceptions:	Mary,	for	example,	
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may	flee	her	house	when	it	sets	on	fire,	but	feel	unable	to	leave	even	if	she	ur-gently	 needs	 to	 see	 a	 doctor.	 Basically,	 the	 strength	 of	 the	 disposition	 corre-sponds	to	the	quantity	of	incentive	that	is	required	to	overcome	it:	the	more	ex-ceptional	exceptions,	 the	 more	 powerful	 the	 disposition.	 (Note,	 though,	 that	this	 is	 not	 a	direct	function	of	how	probable	an	exception	is.	Consider	the	case	of	Mary.	Imagine	that	we	know,	but	Mary	doesn’t,	that	her	house	is	very	likely	to	catch	fire.	It	is	thus	likely	that	she	will	perceive	the	opportunity	to	escape,	and	so	leave	the	house,	as	more	urgent	than	any	opportunities	to	stay	indoors.	This	fact	does	not,	all	of	a	sudden,	render	Mary	less	dispositioned	to	stay	indoors.	It	just	has	become	more	likely	that	there	there	will	be	an	exception,	because	of	contin-gent	circumstances.)	In	sum,	 there	seem	to	be	two	factors	which	determine	how	deeply	an	agent’s	life	will	be	affected	by	this	kind	of	perceptive	disposition:	it	will	depend	on	how	powerful	this	disposition	is,	and	on	how	often	opportunities	of	the	rele-vant	type	occur	in	an	agent’s	life.		
C.3	Corrupted	Will	and	Compromised	Choice		In	the	previous	chapter,	I	already	suggested	that	a	frozen	field	of	possible	action	corrupts	the	will	and	compromises	choice:	I	suggested	that	the	will	always	oper-ates	within	a	field	of	possible	action,	and	if	this	field	is	frozen,	the	will	cannot	but	make	choices	within	this	field	–	meaning	the	choices	it	makes	are	compromised.	I	also	suggested	that	this	is	due	to	a	perceptive	issue:	when	a	field	of	possible	action	is	frozen,	the	agent	practically	cannot	perceive	possibilities	outside	of	it	as	viable.	This	suggestion	can	now	be	further	developed:	I	submit	that	a	percep-tive	disposition,	of	the	kind	described,	can	corrupt	an	agent’s	will.	 It	 leads	the	
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agent	to	perceive	a	certain	opportunity	type	as	hypersalient,	which	means	she	will	not	perceive	any	other	opportunities	as	viable.	These	opportunities	will	thus	lie	behind	a	perceptive	barrier,	which	reduces	her	field	of	possible	action	to	the	hypersalient	opportunities:	her	field	of	possible	action	is	thus	frozen.	The	will,	operating	within	this	field,	cannot	but	pick	a	hypersalient	route	of	action:	 it	 is	thus	corrupted.	This,	notably,	is	not	due	to	any	physical	or	metaphysical	inability	to	do	otherwise,	but	due	to	the	agent’s	perceptive	disposition.	A	corrupted	will,	thus	understood,	compromises	the	agent’s	choices.	But	a	compromised	choice	is	still	a	choice.	Mary,	for	example,	may	choose	between	taking	a	nap	or	doing	the	laundry.	But	insofar	as	this	choice	takes	place	within	a	frozen	field	of	possible	action,	in	which	one	type	of	opportunity	is	hypersalient	and	others	seem	unviable	to	the	agent,	I	submit	this	choice	is	compromised.	Ad-mittedly,	in	some	cases,	a	frozen	field	of	possible	action	may	prevent	the	agent	from	making	 choices	 at	 all.	 In	 the	 example	 of	 Fred,	 it	 is	 unclear	whether	 his	choices	to	wash	his	hands	are	compromised	choices,	or	whether	they	should	not	count	as	choices	at	all.	His	choice	is	definitely	compromised,	on	the	basis	that	other	opportunities	are	excluded	from	his	field	of	possible	action.	But	insofar	as	his	field	of	possible	action	only	really	contains	one	opportunity,	we	might	have	to	conclude	that	choice,	for	Fred,	is	in	that	moment	simply	absent.	(Indeed,	as	he	washes	his	hands	yet	another	time,	he	might	really	not	feel	like	this	is	by	choice,	or	that	he	does	so	against	his	will.)	On	the	other	hand,	some	might	still	want	to	count	his	action	as	an	exercise	of	agency,	since	he	is	not	literally	forced	to	wash	his	hands.	In	either	case,	my	argument	is	that,	if	he	makes	a	choice,	it	is	a	com-promised	one.	
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We	now	have	a	more	substantial	characterisation	of	how	a	field	of	pos-sible	action	may	freeze,	and	so	corrupt	an	agent’s	will.	A	few	more	things	must	be	noted	before	concluding	this	section.	First,	on	the	proposed	explanation,	an	agent’s	choices	are	compromised	if	they	are	made	within	a	frozen	field	of	possi-ble	action,	regardless	of	whether	she	wants	to	act	upon	any	of	the	possibilities	which	are	excluded	from	this	field.	The	choices	of	an	agent	who	has	no	intention	or	desire	to	act	upon	the	opportunities	which	lie	behind	a	perceptive	barrier	are	compromised	all	the	same.	Of	course,	often,	an	agent	may	actually	want	to	take	up	a	perceived	opportunity	which	does	lie	behind	a	perceptive	barrier.	Mary,	for	example,	may	dream	of	taking	a	walk	in	the	nearby	park.	But	even	if	she	has	no	intention	to	do	anything	of	the	sort,	the	choices	she	makes	are	still	compromised	because	of	the	frozen	field	of	possible	action	within	which	they	are	made.	Another	point	is	that	this	is	not	necessarily	the	only	way	in	which	choice	can	be	compromised.	It	may	very	well	be	possible	that	an	agent’s	field	of	possible	action	isn’t	frozen,	but	that	her	choices	are	compromised	in	another	way.	All	I	am	after	is	an	explanation	of	how	choice	may	be	compromised,	which	can	explain	how	it	is	compromised	in	the	example	cases	of	self-oppression.	Lastly,	a	potential	worry	must	here	be	addressed.	It	seems,	one	may	ob-ject,	that	our	fields	of	possible	action	are	often	frozen	in	many	a	way.	Most	peo-ple,	for	example,	have	a	strong	urge	to	survive	and	will	generally	perceive	op-portunities	which	ensure	continued	survival	as	hypersalient.	Is	anyone	avoiding	death,	therefore,	an	agent	with	a	perceptive	disposition	which	often	freezes	their	field	of	possible	action?	I	admit	this	renders	the	concept	quite	thin,	but	am	pre-pared	to	bite	the	bullet	here.	Perhaps	the	same	general	structure,	which	I	have	described	 as	 a	 frozen	 field	 of	 possible	 action,	 applies	 to	 this	 description.	 The	
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main	point	I	want	to	make	about	frozen	fields	of	possible	action	is	that	it	is	a	way	in	which	our	choices	can	be	compromised,	even	though	we	are	still	acting	agents:	if	an	agent	engages	in	action	within	them,	this	can	compromise	their	choices.	And	sometimes,	indeed,	my	urge	for	survival	may	compromise	my	choice	in	this	way:	if	someone	puts	a	gun	to	my	head	and	forces	me	to	hand	 over	my	money,	I	will	probably	claim	that	my	doing	so	was	a	very	compromised	choice.	Handing	over	the	money	was,	in	that	situation,	hypersalient	for	me,	making	conflicting	oppor-tunities	seem	unviable.		
D. CONCLUSION		In	sum,	I	have	argued	that	perceived	opportunities	can	be	hypersalient	for	an	agent,	which	makes	any	alternative	perceived	opportunities	seem	unviable	 to	her.	 This	 creates	 a	 perceptive	 barrier,	 which	 excludes	 these	 alternative	 per-ceived	opportunities	from	her	field	of	possible	action,	thus	freezing	it.	This	hap-pens	on	a	structural	basis	if	the	agent	has	a	disposition	to	perceive	certain	types	of	opportunity	as	hypersalient.	But	which	factors	can	thwart	our	perception	of	possibilities	in	this	way?	It	seems	that	a	field	of	possible	action	may	freeze	in	a	number	of	different	ways:	Fred’s	OCD	and	Mary’s	agoraphobia	are	but	two	examples,	in	which	a	psycholog-ical	condition	has	this	effect.	Another	way,	of	course,	in	which	this	can	happen	is	through	the	exercise	of	relations	of	power:	my	suggestion,	recall,	was	that	Fou-cauldian	 domination	 (on	my	 interpretation)	 freezes	 fields	 of	 possible	 action.	Through	structuring	and	fixing	the	subject’s	self-understanding,	modern	power	influences	which	possibilities	will	be	salient	for	a	certain	agent.	In	domination,	power	renders	certain	types	of	opportunity	hypersalient	for	the	subject:	Emma,	
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for	example,	may	perceive	opportunities	to	conform	to	female	gender	norms	as	hypersalient,	such	that	breaking	these	norms	won’t	seem	like	a	viable	option.	Technically,	the	list	of	factors	influencing	our	perceptive	dispositions	–	which	 opportunities	 will	 tend	 to	 be	more	 or	 less	 salient	 for	 us	 –	 is	 endless.	Equally,	a	perceptive	disposition	to	perceive	certain	opportunities	as	hypersali-
ent	may	have	many	different	kinds	of	causes.	Social	pressures,	manipulation,	ob-sessions,	fears,	addiction,	traumas,	delusions,	psychological	dispositions	–	they	can	all	to	varying	extents	have	this	sort	of	effect.	To	give	a	real-life	example,	a	gambling	 addict	 confessed	 in	 a	 radio	 programme	 that	 receiving	 notifications	about	the	amount	of	money	she	had	already	lost	had	no	effect	on	her.	It	could	not	deter	her	from	continuing	to	gamble.8	We	can	explain	this	within	our	framework	by	positing	that	her	field	of	possible	action	is	frozen	when	she	is	in	the	process	of	gambling:	the	opportunity	to	keep	gambling	is	hypersalient	 in	that	context,	with	such	force	that	alternatives	to	that	possibility	don’t	seem	viable	to	her.	This	brings	us,	at	last,	to	the	question	of	self-oppression.	My	last	hypoth-esis	was	that,	in	hyperkrasia,	it	is	an	agent’s	practical	reason	which	freezes	her	field	of	possible	action.	We	can	now	hypothesise	that,	in	hyperkrasia,	practical	reason	dispositions	an	agent	to	perceive	certain	types	of	possibility	as	hypersali-ent.	 This	way,	 the	 agent’s	 own	 self-regulation	 corrupts	 her	will,	 and	 compro-mises	her	choices.	So,	my	hypothesis	is	now	that		
hyperkrasia	is	a	real	form	of	agency,	in	which	practical	reason	becomes	
authoritarian,	exercising	a	form	of	self-control	which	tends	to	render	certain	
types	of	opportunity	hypersalient	for	the	agent,	which	freezes	her	field	of	possi-
ble	action,	thereby	corrupting	her	will	and	compromising	choice.																																									 																					8	“You	and	Yours”	on	BBC	Radio	4,	30	May	2019.	
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Note	that,	on	this	newer	formulation,	it	is	clear	that	hyperkrasia	does	not	involve	a	permanently	frozen	field	of	possible	action.	It	involves	an	on-going	perceptive	
disposition,	which	tends	to	freeze	the	agent’s	field	of	possible	action.	In	the	next	chapter,	I	will	carve	out	the	final	details	of	this	account	of	hy-perkrasia,	before	putting	this	account	to	work	by	applying	it	to	two	case	studies.		
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V. Self-Oppression:	An	Account		
A. AN	ACCOUNT	OF	SELF-OPPRESSION		My	hypothesis	is	thus	that	practical	reason	has	the	power	to	freeze	an	agent’s	field	of	possible	action	in	the	way	described,	and	that	this	is	what	happens	in	self-oppression.	The	question,	of	course,	is	how	practical	reason	can	achieve	this.	An-swering	this	question	requires	that	we	get	clear	on	which	role	practical	reason	can	play	in	a	Merleau-Pontyian	account	of	action.	This	is	perhaps	not	obvious.	For	this	picture	of	action	appears	to	be	quite	different	from	the	Aristotelean	pic-ture	which	formed	our	starting	point,	and	in	which	my	notion	of	practical	reason	remains	partially	embedded.	According	to	Aristotle,	as	we	saw,	the	generation	of	rational	action	could	be	explained	as	follows.	The	agent	has	a	set	of	rationally	held	wishes	(rational	desires	for	the	kinds	of	things	she	generally	aims	or	aspires	for	in	life,	which	she	judges	to	be	worth	pursuing).	She	perceives,	through	sen-sation,	a	particular	situation.	Her	practical	deliberation	reveals	how,	in	that	sit-uation,	she	may	best	achieve	any	of	her	wishes,	and	whether	a	certain	wish	is	indeed	worth	pursuing	under	the	given	circumstances.	This	can,	but	need	not,	happen	through	conscious	deliberation.	If	all	goes	well,	 the	agent	acts	accord-ingly.	The	structure	of	(rational)	action	generation,	in	brief,	can	thus	be	repre-sented	as	follows:	
sensation	à	practical	reason	à	action.		Merleau-Ponty,	in	contrast,	appears	to	hold	a	very	different	view	of	action.	As	we	
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have	seen,	on	his	account,	agency	can	be	explained	in	terms	of	responses	to	per-ceived	environments:	we	continually	respond	to	perceived	invitations	for	action	
by	acting.	For	Merleau-Ponty,	however,	this	does	not	seem	to	require	any	practi-cal	deliberation.	For	we	are	immediately	solicited	into	action	by	our	perceptions:	
‘perceived	demands	for	action’,	Romdenh-Romluc	explains,	 ‘immediately	draw	forth	the	agent’s	behaviour’	(Romdenh-Romluc,	2011:	90).	I	perceive	an	oppor-tunity,	which	directly	summons	me	into	action:	as	I	pull	out	weeds,	or	walk	to	the	shop,	I	need	not	deliberate	about	what	to	do,	nor	make	any	obvious	better	judgments.	Romdenh-Romluc	writes	that	‘[o]nce	an	agent	has	become	skilled	at	some	activity,	they	can	perceive	opportunities	to	engage	in	it,	and	immediately	respond	 to	 those	 perceptions	 by	 acting’	 (Romdenh-Romluc,	 2011:	 79).	 The	structure	 of	 action	 generation	 on	 this	 account,	 therefore,	 rather	 seems	 to	 be	something	like	this:	
sensation	à	action.	
	
	Practical	reason	plays	no	obvious	role	in	this	picture.	If	I	want	to	argue	that	it	can	exert	a	tyrannical	power	over	agency,	I	must	first	establish	that,	on	the	picture	I	have	presented,	it	can	exert	any	power	over	agency	at	all.	There	is,	I	submit,	is	a	meaningful	place	for	practical	reason	on	this	pic-ture	of	agency.	In	brief,	I	propose	that	practical	reason	can	influence	action	by	conferring	salience	upon	perceived	opportunities.	In	the	last	chapter,	I	already	mentioned	that	factors	other	than	an	agent’s	current	task	can	influence	salience.	In	her	2012	contribution,	Romdenh-Romluc’s	argues	that	and	how	thought,	 in	Merleau-Ponty’s	framework,	can	influence	action	in	a	variety	of	ways	by	influ-encing	the	salience	of	perceived	opportunities.	 I	want	to	make	a	similar	point	
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about	practical	reason.	Note,	though,	that	these	are	similar	but	different	points.	On	my	view	at	least,	it	is	not	clear	to	what	extent,	if	at	all,	the	workings	of	practi-cal	reason	require	any	form	of	thought,	however	unreflective,	on	the	part	of	the	agent.	What	I	have	in	mind	when	I	speak	of	practical	reason	is	a	form	of	regulated	behaviour,	clearly	aimed	at	what	could	be	described	as	a	valued	end.	It	is	mani-fest	in	action	through	“regularisms”:	specific	forms	of	behaviour	which	aim	at	a	valued	 outcome.	 This	 behaviour	 follows	 regulations	 for	 action,	 regardless	 of	whether	these	regulations	are	explicitly	formulated	in,	or	applied	by,	any	form	of	thought.	Though	practical	reason	probably	involves	some	thought	in	its	most	paradigmatic	form	–	reflective	deliberation	–	I	will	keep	the	question	open	if	and	in	what	way	it	requires	thought	of	any	kind	in	its	other	forms.	The	question	of	what	 thought	 is,	 and	 whether	 and	 to	 what	 extent	 practical	 reason	 involves	thought,	is	not	one	which	can	be	addressed	within	the	scope	of	this	thesis.	So	how	can,	on	my	suggestion,	practical	reason	influence	action	within	a	Merleau-Pontyan	framework?	We	saw	that	practical	reason,	for	Aristotle,	oper-ates	in	light	of	the	agent’s	valued	ends.	This	valuation	of	ends,	I	propose,	adds	an	affective	dimension	to	the	agent’s	perceptions	of	related	opportunities,	such	that	these	will	be	more	salient	for	her.	Surely,	when	we	perceive	an	opportunity	to	further	a	valued	end,	this	will	solicit	us	quite	strongly.	If	I	 find	it	 important	to	recycle	properly,	for	example,	the	opportunity	to	throw	my	empty	can	into	the	correct	bin	will	be	more	salient	in	light	of	this	wish.	As	such,	I	propose,	the	sound	functioning	 of	 practical	 reason	 should	 render	 opportunities	which	 are	 in	 line	with	one’s	wishes	more	salient	than	others.	Though	this	picture	 integrates	elements	of	Aristotle’s	 theory	of	action	with	that	of	Merleau-Ponty,	some	care	is	needed	here.	As	we	saw,	for	Aristotle,	
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practical	reason	comes	in	after	perception:	once	the	agent,	through	sensation,	has	 taken	 in	 her	 current	 circumstances,	 practical	 reason	 figures	 out	 which	course	of	action	to	take,	in	light	of	the	agent’s	wishes.	On	my	proposal,	however,	practical	reason	can	influence	action	through	influencing	the	way	she	perceives	opportunities.	The	structure	of	action	generation	is	thus	as	follows:	
Practical	reason	à	sensation/perception	à	action62	
	Note	 that,	 on	 my	 view,	 practical	 reason	 can,	 but	 need	 not,	 operate	through	explicit	deliberation.	At	times,	in	a	given	situation,	I	may	wonder	what	to	do,	or	wonder	which	out	of	several	options	is	the	best	one.	I	then	rely	on	my	practical	reason	to	make	an	explicit	decision.	This	decision,	then,	once	made,	will	confer	salience	upon	opportunities	which	are	relevant	to	the	selected	task,	and	consequently	solicit	me	to	act.	But,	often	enough	–	probably	most	of	the	time	–	opportunities	which	contribute	to	a	valued	end	will	immediately	be	quite	salient	for	me,	just	because	I	value	this	end.	On	both	scenarios,	the	salience,	and	thus	my	perception,	of	the	respective	opportunities	has	been	influenced	by	my	practical	reason.	Practical	reason	thus	confers	salience	upon	those	opportunities	which	
																																								 																					62	Romdenh-Romluc,	in	fact,	makes	a	similar	point	about	thought,	but	we	can	replace	‘thought’	with	‘practical	reason’:	The	traditional	view	takes	[practical	reason]	to	have	sole	responsibility	for	producing	action.	Perception	plays	a	role	in	guiding	actions,	but	it	does	so	by	providing	sensory	input	for	[practical	reason],	which	then	produces	ac-tion	as	its	output.	On	the	Merleau-Pontyian	account,	however,	[practical	reason]	never	has	sole	responsibility	for	producing	action.	The	agent's	behaviour	is	always	also	con-trolled	by	her	perceived	environment.	Thus	the	Merleau-Pontyian	model	does	not	con-ceive	of	[practical	reason]	as	a	'middleman',	standing	between	perception	and	action’	(Romdenh-Romluc,	2012:	210-211).	
			
			
189	
are	relevant	to	an	agent’s	wishes:	either	because	we	decide,	through	our	practi-cal	reason,	to	take	on	a	certain	task,	or	because	the	task,	thanks	to	practical	rea-son,	already	solicits	us.	Indeed,	the	more	we	become	habituated	to	applying	our	own	general	rules,	the	more	easily	this	will	happen.	As	such,	I	conclude	that	the	concept	of	practical	reason	can	coherently	be	integrated	within	a	Merleau-Pontian	framework	of	agency.	Having	spelled	out	how	practical	reason	may	feature	in	the	generation	of	action,	we	can	now	return	to	my	hypothesis	that,	in	hyperkrasia,	an	agent’s	practical	reason	can	freeze	her	own	field	of	possible	action.	We	saw	that	practical	reason	can	influence	agency	by	rendering	different	types	of	opportunities	more	or	less	salient:	it	can	influ-ence	the	force	with	which	opportunities	solicit	us.	In	hyperkrasia,	however,	prac-tical	reason	does	not	just	render	opportunities	of	a	certain	type	salient:	it	tends	to	render	them	hypersalient,	thus	placing	other	opportunities	behind	a	percep-tive	barrier.	The	type	of	opportunity	which	tends	to	be	hypersalient	for	the	self-oppressed	agent	are	those	which	are	relevant	to	an	end	or	wish	she	is	fixated	on.	This	means	that,	whenever	she	perceives	an	opportunity	of	this	type,	which	al-lows	her	to	further	contribute	to	this	end,	 it	will	solicit	her	with	such	urgency	that	other	opportunities	will	not	seem	viable	to	her.	On	this	characterisation	of	hyperkrasia,	we	can	thus	explain	the	oppressive	pressure,	which	characterises	it,	in	terms	of	this	urgency.	This	pressure	is	oppressive	insofar	as	it	compromises	the	agent’s	choice,	by	placing	alternative	routes	of	action	behind	a	perceptive	barrier.		
B. OVERVIEW		In	this	section,	I	will	summarise	how	I	arrived	at	my	final	hypothesis	in	reference	
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to	the	previous	chapters.	First	of	all,	we	can	refer	back	to	Aristotle’s	mereology	of	the	agent.	On	his	picture,	practical	reason	was	the	faculty	responsible	for	the	exercise	of	self-control,	understood	as	the	ability	to	aim	towards	a	valued	end	through	action.	It	is	the	workings	of	this	faculty	which,	on	my	proposal,	become	authoritarian	in	self-oppression.	Thus,	in	the	first	chapter,	I	pointed	at	practical	
reason	as	the	oppressive	element	of	the	agent	at	work	self-oppression.	In	light	of	this,	I	constructed	the	notion	of	hyperkrasia:	a	style	of	agency	in	which	practical	reason	‘takes	over’	agency	such	that	choice	is	compromised.	This	yielded	the	fol-lowing	hypothesis:		
in	self-oppression,	or	hyperkrasia,	an	agent’s	practical	reason	becomes	
oppressive.	
	But	on	this	hypothesis,	 it	was	unclear	which	part	of	the	agent	was	then	
oppressed	by	practical	reason,	and,	relatedly,	how	this	could	compromise	choice.	In	our	second	chapter,	we	introduced	Augustine’s	notion	of	the	will,	understood	as	a	faculty	of	choice	separate	from	practical	reason.	This	allowed	us	to	posit	that	practical	reason	can	oppress	the	will,	and	in	this	way	compromise	choice.	We	also	saw	how	Augustine	gave	us	the	notion	of	a	corrupted	will,	which	is	still	capable	of	choosing	but	can	only	really	make	compromised	choices.	This,	I	argued,	could	help	us	understand	how	choice	can	be	compromised	in	self-oppression	without	being	absent.	Thus,	we	arrived	at	the	following	hypothesis:		
in	hyperkrasia,	an	agent’s	practical	reason	corrupts	her	will,	thus	com-
promising	choice.	
	This	gave	us	the	basic	internal	structure	of	self-oppression:	an	agent,	though	still	
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very	much	 an	 agent	 acting	 though	 her	 own	will,	 nonetheless	makes	 compro-mised	choices	because	her	will	has	been	corrupted	by	her	practical	reason.	On	Augustine’s	model,	however,	we	could	not	explain	exactly	what	happens	here:	
how	could	practical	reason	corrupt	the	will?	We	thus	still	needed	an	explanation	for	how	practical	reason	could	cor-rupt	an	agent’s	will,	and	so	compromise	choice	without	her	will	being	bypassed.	The	beginnings	of	an	answer,	I	argued,	can	be	found	in	Foucault’s	account	of	dom-
ination,	in	which	subjects	are	dominated	without	being	directly	interfered	with.	I	argued	that,	in	domination,	power	relations	‘freeze’	an	agent’s	field	of	possible	action,	meaning	she	will	only	perceive	certain	kinds	of	possibilities	as	viable.	I	concluded	that	in	domination,	therefore,	power	relations	corrupt	the	subject’s	will:	she	still	makes	her	own	choices	as	an	agent,	yet,	operating	within	a	frozen	field	of	possible	action,	is	disposed	to	make	only	certain	choices.	This	helped	us	understand	how	a	will	could	be	corrupted	without	being	bypassed:	through	an	influence	on	her	field	of	possible	action.	A	frozen	field	of	possible	action	can	be	said	to	‘corrupt’	the	agent’s	will	without	bypassing	it:	for	the	agent’s	perception	of	possibilities	forms	the	setting	within	which	the	will	operates.	Thus,	though	the	agent	 is	 still	 an	agent,	her	 choices	 are	 compromised.	My	hypothesis	was	 that	something	similar	might	happen	in	self-oppression:	
in	hyperkrasia,	an	agent’s	practical	reason	corrupts	her	will,	thus	com-
promising	choice,	by	freezing	her	own	field	of	possible	action.		But	Foucault	did	not	offer	us	the	tools	to	understand	how	practical	rea-son	could	do	so.	Indeed,	he	simply	did	not	conceptualise	the	notion	of	fields	of	possible	action	at	all.	Before	considering	the	idea	of	self-oppression	in	light	of	
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this	notion,	 I	 constructed	a	more	robust	account	of	possibility	 fields	and	how	they	can	freeze:	in	a	fourth	chapter,	I	drew	on	Merleau-Ponty	to	further	elaborate	this	 idea.	 On	 the	 interpretation	 I	 advanced,	 a	 frozen	 field	 of	 possible	 action	means	that	a	perceived	opportunity	is	hypersalient	for	an	agent,	such	that	alter-native	opportunities	seem	unviable	to	her.	I	argued	that	this	can	happen	in	a	variety	of	ways.	One	such	way,	then,	is	what	I	would	call	self-oppression.	Practical	reason,	when	it	becomes	oppressive,	has	precisely	this	effect	on	the	agent’s	field	of	possible	action.	It	has	the	power	to	 change	 the	way	she	perceives	possibilities:	when	 it	becomes	oppressive,	 it	tends	to	render	certain	types	of	possibility	hypersalient.	As	such,	in	self-oppres-sion,	the	agent’s	will	is	often,	sometimes	even	continually,	corrupted	by	her	own	practical	reason.	We	thus	arrive	at	our	final	hypothesis:	
in	hyperkrasia,	an	agent’s	practical	reason	influences	her	perception	of	
possibilities,	such	that	it	tends	to	freeze	her	field	of	possible	action,	thus	corrupt-
ing	her	will	and	compromising	her	choice.		On	this	hypothesis,	we	can	address	both	problems	mentioned	in	the	in-troduction:	namely	 (1)	who	oppresses	whom	 in	 self-oppression,	 and	 (2)	how	choice	is	compromised.	It	is	practical	reason	which	oppresses	the	will,	and	choice	is	compromised	because	the	will	is	forced	to	operate	within	a	frozen	field	of	pos-sible	action.	The	will,	on	this	mereology,	 though	it	 is	the	seat	of	agency,	 is	the	part	of	the	agent	which	is	considered	oppressed	in	self-oppression:	it	operates	under	such	pressure	from	practical	reason	that	 it	 is	dispositioned	to	act	upon	those	opportunities	which	practical	 reason	renders	hypersalient.	As	 such,	 the	model	 of	 hyperkrasia	 establishes	 that	 self-oppression	 is	 a	 possible	 form	 of	
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agency,	which	can	be	coherently	conceptualised.			
C. FURTHER	POINTS		Before	applying	this	model	of	hyperkrasia	to	two	case	studies,	I	want	to	clarify	a	few	further	points.	First	of	all,	on	the	model	I	proposed,	an	agent	may	be	self-oppressive	even	if	she,	using	her	practical	reason,	recognises	the	situation	as	one	which	calls	for	exception	of	the	general	rule.	In	this	case,	the	agent	thinks	she	should	not	act	upon	the	perceived	opportunity,	yet	 finds	herself	unable	to	re-frain.	This	is	what	happens	when	practical	reason	sabotages	itself.	On	my	char-acterisation,	however,	an	agent	may	be	self-oppressive	without	such	 forms	of	self-sabotage.	If	her	practical	reason	causes	in	her	a	perceptive	disposition	which	throws	up	perceptive	barriers	in	the	way	described,	she	may	be	self-oppressive	even	if	she	has	no	desire	or	intention	to	overcome	thesse	perceptive	barriers.	Secondly,	on	this	model,	whether	a	form	of	agency	amounts	to	hyperkra-sia	does	not	depend	on	what	an	agent	is	aiming	for,	but	solely	on	the	manner	in	which	she	aims	for	it.	In	line	with	my	commitment	to	content	neutrality,	I	con-sider	regulations	self-oppressive	only	because	of	the	manner	in	which	they	are	implemented	and	the	effects	this	has	on	the	agent:	an	agent	is	only	self-oppres-sive	if	her	self-control	thwarts	her	perception	of	certain	types	of	opportunities,	such	 that	perceiving	 them	 freezes	her	 field	of	possible	action.	This	means	we	could	 have	 a	 submissive	 housewife	 who	 is	 not	 self-oppressive	 –	 though	 this	seems	 to	me,	 admittedly,	 rather	unlikely	–	 and	an	athlete	or	 artist	who	 is.	Of	course,	 certain	endeavours	may	 invite	 self-oppression	more	 than	others.	Per-haps,	 there	even	exist	certain	ends	which	one	cannot	but	pursue	 in	a	manner	
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which	invites	self-oppression:	certain	ends,	that	is,	can	only	be	pursued	in	a	rig-orous	manner.	As	such,	they	may	very	often	result	in	self-oppression	when	pur-sued.	(We	can	think	here,	perhaps,	of	athletes	trying	to	break	absurd	records.)	But	even	 in	 those	cases,	 if	 there	 is	self-oppression,	 this	 is	only	because	of	 the	manner	in	which	the	end	is	pursued,	and	not	because	of	the	end	itself.	Further,	 note	 that	 self-oppression	may	 itself	 have	 further	 causes.	 On	many	occasions,	 for	example,	self-oppression	may	function	as	a	micro-mecha-nism	of	social	oppression.	The	values	and	ends	one	feels	one	ought	to	aim	for	might	 be	 internalised	 oppressive	 regulations,	which	 abide	 in	 one’s	 culture:	 a	Western	woman	 in	 the	1970’s	may	have	 internalised	the	 idea	 that	 the	 female	role	was	that	of	a	housewife,	and	this	may	have	subsequently	influenced	her	per-ception	of	possibilities.	What	is	crucial	for	self-oppression	is	that	it	is	an	agent’s	practical	reason	which	is	directly,	i.e.	 in	the	first	instance,	responsible	for	how	the	agent	perceives	opportunities.	The	agent	must,	in	a	significant	sense,	herself	hold	the	internalised	values	and	ends.	This	may	or	may	not	itself	be	the	result	of	wider	oppressive	structures.	In	this	context,	note	that	the	subject	of	modern	domination,	on	Foucault’s	analysis,	 displays	 at	 least	 some	 form	 of	 self-oppression.	 Instances	 of	modern	domination,	 recall,	 operate	 precisely	 through	 shaping	 the	 constitution	 of	 the	subject.	This	way,	her	status	of	domination	is	perpetuated	by	her	own	self-un-derstanding:	as	such,	the	dominated	subject	takes	some	part	in	her	own	oppres-sion.	In	this	respect,	modern	domination	always	already	implies	something	like	self-oppression.	An	important	difference,	though,	to	which	I	will	briefly	return	later,	 is	 that	 this	 self-relation	 characterising	domination	does	not	 involve	 the	
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pressured	quality	to	agency	which	I	include	in	the	core	characteristics	of	hyper-krasia.	 		
D. TWO	CASE	STUDIES			It	has	now	been	established	that	self-oppression,	as	I	have	described	it,	is	a	form	of	agency	which	 is	both	possible	and	actual.	The	model	of	hyperkrasia	 I	have	constructed	 resolves	 the	 apparent	 paradox	 of	 self-oppression,	 and,	 as	 I	 have	tried	to	show,	allows	us	to	make	sense	of	the	three	core	examples	of	self-oppres-sion	that	were	introduced	at	the	start	of	the	thesis.	In	demonstrating	both	the	possibility	and	the	actuality	of	self-oppression,	and	by	offering	a	conceptualisa-tion	of	it,	I	have	tried	to	demonstrate	that	it	indeed	warrants	its	own	category.	My	 aim	was	 not	 to	 demarcate	 the	 exact	 limits	 and	 scope	 of	 the	 category	 by	spelling	out	a	set	of	exact	criteria.	I	have,	instead,	described	a	mereo-psycholog-ical	model	of	what	is	going	on	in	some	of	what	I	consider	to	be	exemplary	exam-ples	of	self-oppression.	But,	even	though	this	model	of	hyperkrasia	is	but	a	model,	and	not	an	exact	definition,	it	is	not	without	further	application.	In	this	section,	I	will	demon-strate	 that	 it	 can	 help	 differentiate	 core	 cases	 of	 self-oppression	 from	 other	forms	of	agency	which,	in	many	respects,	share	a	lot	of	formal	features.	In	the	introduction,	 I	mentioned	 that	 self-oppression	may	 seem	quite	 similar	 to	 an-other	form	of	agency,	which	also	involves	high	levels	of	self-control	and	self-in-duced	pressure,	yet	which	does	not	compromise	choice.	If	I	really	value	some-thing	 I	have	committed	to,	I	will	feel	a	pressure	to	act	accordingly,	and	the	exer-cise	of	my	self-control	will	indeed	involve	pressure.	This	in	itself	does	not	seem	to	compromise	my	choice.	How	can	we	distinguish	this	from	self-oppression?	Of	
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course,	in	the	one	instance,	practical	reason	exerts	an	oppressive	pressure	which	compromises	choice,	whilst	in	the	other	instance	practical	reason	does	not	com-promise	choice.	But	this	merely	begs	the	question.	How	do	we	distinguish	forms	of	pressure	which	are	oppressive,	and	so	compromise	choice,	from	those	which	are	not?	We	are	now,	having	a	model	of	hyperkrasia,	better	equipped	to	answer	this	question.	Looking	at	 this	model,	we	see	 that	a	key	distinction	 lies	 in	 the	way	 in	which	the	agent	perceives	opportunities.	In	brief,	if	not	acting	in	accordance	with	the	self-induced	pressure	seems	plainly	unviable	to	her,	it	seems	that	we	have	a	case	of	self-oppression.	But,	one	might	argue,	would	this	not	be	the	ideal	result	of	commitment?	If	an	agent	commits	to	something,	and	consequently	perceives	conflicting	opportunities	as	unviable,	does	this	not	exemplify	commitment?	For	it	 seems	 that,	 in	 commitment,	we	self-prescribe	certain	 regulations	 for	action	which	are	supposed	to	inform	our	agency	in	the	future.	These	regulations	spell	out	what	kind	of	possibilities	are	in	line	with	our	commitment	and	which	aren’t.	I	thereby	choose,	quite	radically,	against	a	large	number	of	incompatible	future	routes	of	action.	For	example,	if	I	resolve	to	eat	more	healthily,	this	will	inform	how	I	will	perceive	the	opportunity	to	consume	a	glazed	doughnut.	If	eating	the	doughnut	no	longer	appears	viable	to	me,	due	to	a	prior	commitment	I	made,	does	this	really	compromise	my	choice	to	do	so?	Doesn’t	this,	 indeed,	 instead,	
exemplify	choice?	Yet	I	submit	that	we	can	distinguish	commitment	from	self-oppression,	using	the	framework	I	have	proposed.	Normally,	commitments	will	indeed	im-pose	a	certain	pressure	on	us,	which	influences	our	perception	of	certain	possi-
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bilities.	Surely,	in	order	to	be	capable	of	directing	ourselves	as	we	wish,	and	at-taining	the	goals	we	value,	we	need	to	employ	certain	techniques	of	control	to	regulate	our	different	desires	and	inclinations,	and	we	must	see	to	it	that	they	are	implemented.	Practical	reason	helps	us	detect	which	possibilities	are	in	line	with	our	rational	ends,	and	which	aren’t,	and	influences	how	we	perceive	these.	That	is,	practical	reason	should	indeed	influence	the	salience	of	different	kinds	of	opportunities.	Normally,	however,	such	self-imposed	pressure	does	not	make	these	 opportunities	 hypersalient,	 such	 that	 other	 possibilities	 seem	 unviable.	Practical	reason	normally	structures	and	shapes	our	field	of	possible	action,	but	without	freezing	it.	Only	when	practical	reason	freezes	fields	of	possible	action,	and	 this	on	a	 structural	basis,	 can	we	 speak	of	 self-oppression.	The	difference	maps	onto	the	distinction	between	an	influenced	will	and	a	corrupted	one;	and	to	the	distinction	between	the	effects	of	power	and	those	of	domination	on	my	reading	of	Foucault.	Another	way	of	conceiving	this	difference	is	in	reference	to	the	distinc-tion	between	the	authoritative	and	the	authoritarian	operation	of	practical	rea-son.	In	regular	agency,	practical	reason	is	authoritative:	when	prescribing	what	should	be	done,	practical	reason	implements	its	authority,	usually	in	light	of	our	commitments.	It	has	a	certain	power	over	us.	As	I	perceive	the	possibility	of	eat-ing	the	glazed	doughnut,	I	will	feel	the	authority	of	my	practical	reason	telling	me	it’s	a	bad	idea.	Self-oppression,	however,	occurs	when	my	practical	reason	becomes	authoritarian.	On	this	scenario,	it	tends	to	freeze	my	field	of	possible	action.	Rather	than	perceiving	the	consumption	of	the	doughnut	as	a	bad	idea,	I	perceive	 it	 to	 be	 completely	unviable.	 I	 feel	 like	 I	 just	 cannot	and	 couldn’t	do	
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it,	and	this	because	of	a	perceptive	barrier	implemented	or	caused	by	my	practi-cal	reason.	Of	course,	in	practice,	it	may	be	hard	to	draw	the	line	between	mere	com-mitment	and	hyperkrasia.	It	can	be	a	challenge	to	pinpoint	exactly	the	agential	reality	corresponding	to	the	conceptual	and	linguistic	differences	which,	on	my	account,	separate	both.	When	is	practical	reason	authoritative,	when	authoritar-ian?	When	do	I	perceive	an	opportunity	as	just	very	unappealing,	and	when	as	unviable?	To	demonstrate	how	my	model	of	hyperkrasia	can	help	making	this	distinction	in	practice,	I	will	conclude	the	thesis	with	two	case	studies:	I	will	con-sider	the	case	of	Sam,	an	agent	who	seems	to	be	self-oppressive,	and	contrast	it	to	the	case	of	Alex,	an	agent	who,	though	his	agency	shares	many	characteristics	with	 that	of	Sam,	seems	to	be	merely	deeply	committed.	Together,	 these	case	studies	should	supply	the	reader	with	a	stronger	sense	of	how	mere	commitment	can	be	distinguished	from	self-oppression	–	and	this	without	taking	into	account	the	content	of	action.	A	key	element	of	hyperkrasia,	as	I	conceptualised	it,	is	that	the	agent	can-not	perceive	certain	opportunities	as	viable.	This,	of	course,	is	hard	to	prove:	for	we	 cannot	 access	 another	 agent’s	 perceptions.	 An	 important	 aid	 in	 detecting	cases	of	 self-oppression,	 therefore,	 is	 to	 look	out	 for	 its	 tell-tale	 signs:	 certain	mannerisms,	qualities	of	agency,	which	are	not	conclusive	evidence	that	an	agent	is	self-oppressive,	but	which	can	serve	as	a	strong	indication.	They	are	not	them-selves	any	necessary	or	sufficient	criteria	for	hyperkrasia,	but	strongly	suggest	that	the	internal	constellation	of	agency	is	akin	to	the	one	described	as	hyper-krasia.	Two	tell-tale	signs	of	hyperkrasia	have	already	been	referred	to	through-out	the	thesis:	I	mentioned	how	hyperkrasia	often	results	in	the	self-sabotage	of	
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practical	reason,	and	that	it	has	a	tendency	to	take	over	the	agent’s	life.	Another	indication	of	hyperkrasia	could	be	an	unwillingness	to	consider	alternative	pos-sibilities	when	they	arise.	Indeed,	some	other	tell-tale	signs	of	hyperkrasia	might	have	been	mentioned	by	Mele	(2001)	when	describing	Zed.63	Zed’s	'limited	pro-spects	for	satisfaction,	enjoyment,	and	fulfilment',	for	example,	may	be	a	strong	
indication	that	his	possibility	field	is	frozen.	The	fact	that	he	persists	in	the	face	of	this	agony	indicates	that	he	is	so	invested	in	being	an	academic	philosopher	that	other	possibilities	just	don’t	seem	viable	to	him.	When	conducting	the	two	case	studies,	I	will	point	out	some	tell-tale	signs,	indicating	that	the	agent	falls	either	inside	or	outside	of	the	category	of	hyperkrasia.		
D.1 The	Case	of	Sam	
	One	area	in	which	questions	of	self-control	and	choice	are	recurrent	is	that	of	food	and	eating.	To	conduct	our	first	case	study,	I	have	carefully	constructed	a	mock	agent,	Sam,	who	suffers	from	anorexia	nervosa	(hereafter:	anorexia).	This	is	a	con-dition	characterised	by	severe	restriction	of	calorie	intake	and	often	excessive	ex-ercise,	leading	to	extreme	weight	loss.	It	often	features	an	intense	fear	of	fat	and	weight	gain.64	Before	constructing	the	example	of	Sam,	I	consulted	several	first-person	 accounts	 of	 people	 diagnosed	 with	 this	 condition,	 including	 autobiog-raphies,	interviews	with	researchers,	interpretative	phenomenological	analyses,	online	blogs,	and	essays.	In	addition,	I	also	consulted	some	medical	and	academic	
																																								 																					63	See	section	F	in	the	Introduction.		
64	See	DSM-V	(section	II).	
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analyses	of	the	condition.65	These	resources	informed	the	construction	of	my	ex-ample.	Though	Sam	in	no	way	represents	any	individual	person	featuring	in	the	consulted	sources,	her	comportment,	thoughts,	and	story	are	all	inspired	by	actual	descriptions	of	how	anorexia	can	manifest.		But	before	we	start,	I	want	to	add	in	a	few	caveats	regarding	this	case	study.	It	is	very	important	to	emphasise	that,	by	employing	this	case	study,	I	am	
not	suggesting	that	all	people	diagnosed	with,	or	portraying	symptoms	of,	ano-rexia	should	be	considered	self-oppressive.	Nor	do	I	wish	to	suggest	that	these	symptoms,	even	if	they	indicate	a	self-oppressive	style	of	agency,	cannot	be	un-derstandable	 responses	 to	 both	 personal	 and	 societal	 challenges.	 Anorexia	 is	very	often	a	coping	mechanism.	Though	its	name	may	suggest	otherwise,	self-oppression	does	not	mean	that	the	self-oppressive	agent	is	in	any	way	to	blame	for	her	condition.	This	holds	true	for	all	cases	of	self-oppression,	and	perhaps	especially	so	for	cases	of	anorexia	which	seem	to	feature	self-oppression.		Another	thing	to	note,	in	light	of	this	case	study,	is	that	the	pool	of	agents	diagnosed	with	anorexia	is	internally	very	diverse.	Diagnostic	criteria	group	to-gether	a	wide	variety	of	patients,	many	of	whom	manifest	very	differing	config-urations	of	agency.	This	becomes	apparent	when	studying	individual	cases:	de-spite	 the	 obvious	 overlap	 in	 symptoms,	 many	 subtle	 differences	 emerge	 in	
																																								 																					65	Altogether,	I	consulted	the	following	resources:	Arnold	(2007),	Beth	(2017),	Bowman	(2006),	Bruch	(1978),	Charland	et	al.	(2013),	de	Rossi	(2010),	Dunkle	and	Dunkle	(2015),	Fox	et	al.	(2005),	Gremillion	(2003),	Halse	et	al.	(2007),	Hope	et	al.	(2010,	2013),	 Horn-bacher	 (1998),	MacLeod	(1981),	Malson	(1998),	Mulveen	and	Hepworth	(2006),	Raviv	(2010),	 Saukko	 (2008),	 Steiger	 and	 Jean	 (1999),	 Szmukler	 (2013),	 Tan	 et	al.	 (2003a,	2003b,	 2006,	 2011),	 Taylor	 (2008),	 Waldman	 (2015),	 Williams	 and	 Reid	(2010),	and	Woolf	(2012).		
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different	diagnosed	agents,	and	even	within	the	same	agent	during	the	course	of	the	condition.	 I	have,	 in	my	case	study,	described	some	 features	which	are	of	common	occurrence	in	those	diagnosed	with	anorexia.	This	does	not	imply,	how-ever,	that	all	agents	diagnosed	with	this	condition	exemplify	those	very	features.		Lastly,	I	have	not	constructed	any	deeper	psychological	explanation	as	to	why	Sam,	in	my	example,	developed	anorexia.	The	underlying	causes	of	ano-rexia	are	the	subject	of	much	debate	and	controversy.66	It	is	likely	that,	within	any	individual,	the	causes	of	the	condition	are	both	manifold	and	complex,	and	that	causes	are	quite	diverse	across	different	 individuals.	My	aim	is	merely	to	sketch	a	 certain	kind	of	behaviour,	 a	 style	of	 self-regulation,	which	 is	 at	 least	common	in	those	diagnosed	with	the	condition	–	regardless	of	its	underlying	ae-tiology.	Sam	is	an	18-year-old	student,	who	is	in	her	first	year	of	University.	She	studies	History	and	is	immensely	thrilled	to	do	so.	Her	weight	is	fairly	average,	and	she	is	not	very	concerned	about	her	appearance.	Nonetheless,	a	Summer	Ball	is	coming	up	in	a	few	months,	and	she	wants	to	lose	some	pounds	to	fit	in	her	dream	dress.	She	reads	in	a	magazine	that	cutting	out	carbs	is	an	efficient	way	to	lose	 weight,	 and	 so	 she	 decides	 to	 do	 so	 until	 Summer	 Ball	 comes.	 She	still	
																																								 																					66	Some	theories	attempt	 to	explain	anorexia	 in	 terms	of	 its	underlying	psychology,	arguing,	 for	example,	 that	 it	results	 from	a	refusal	to	grow	up;	that	 it	 functions	as	a	coping	mechanism	in	the	face	of	current	or	past	abuse;	or	that	it	is	an	overdeveloped	form	of	 perfectionism	 (see	 for	 example	 Crisp	 (1997),	 Tice	 et	 al.	 (1989),	 and	Bruch	(1978)).	Other	theories	point	towards	cultural	and	sociological	factors,	such	as	con-temporary	Western	 beauty	 standards	 (see	 for	 example	 Bordo	 (1993)	 and	 Gordon	(2000)).	Lastly,	some	researchers	suggest	that	biological,	genetic,	or	chemical	factors	play	a	role	in	the	development	of	the	condition	(see	for	example	Casper	(1984)	and	Holland	et	al.	(1988)).	
			
			
202	
eats	well,	leaves	aside	rice	and	bread	whilst	she	increases	her	vegetable	intake.	The	strategy	works:	after	a	few	days,	Sam	already	notices	a	slight	difference	in	her	weight.	She	feels	happy	and	accomplished,	and	decides	to	also	take	up	jog-ging.	And	so,	every	morning,	she	goes	for	a	run.	She	loses	a	little	more	weight:	it	feels	good,	and	gratifying.	 Sam	enjoys	 feeling	 in	 control	and	successful	–	both	things	she	really	values	and	aspires	for,	and	her	successful	diet	helps	her	achieve	them.	Slowly,	she	decides	to	cut	out	more	foods:	besides	carbs,	she	also	stops	eating	fatty	foods	(anything	that	will	feel	or	look	greasy)	and	sugary	stuff	(she	starts	checking	food	labels	and,	to	her	horror,	discovers	how	many	foods	have	an	alarming	sugar	content).	Later	on,	she	starts	to	feel	uncomfortable	about	the	idea	of	grease	and	oil	altogether:	she	refuses	to	eat	anything	which	is	fried	or	baked	with	oil	or	butter.	To	be	on	the	safe	side,	she	prefers	to	just	eat	raw	vege-tables.	She	figures,	however,	that	carrots	actually	taste	quite	sweet.	So	she	de-cides	 to	 leave	out	 carrots	 –	 and	perhaps	orange	 foods	 altogether.	Only	 green	foods	can	be	trusted.	Further,	Sam	only	one	wants	to	use	one	fork,	which	she	knows	for	sure	has	been	cleaned	of	all	and	any	traces	of	fat	or	unsafe	foods	–	this	fork	is	the	safe	fork.	She	keeps	it	in	her	room,	so	that	others	cannot	use	it.	Sam	also	keeps	increasing	the	length	of	her	morning	run.	After	a	while,	she	has	lost	a	significant	amount	of	weight:	much	more,	in	fact,	than	she	set	out	to	lose.	Yet	she	continues	to	abide	by	her	diet	and	exercise	routine.	They	become	very	important	aspects	of	her	life,	which	she	tends	to	prioritise	over	other	things.		In	the	meantime,	Sam	starts	to	get	a	 little	isolated.	She	starts	to	avoid	situations	in	which	food	is	being	consumed:	the	sight	of	it	makes	her	feel	quite	nauseous,	 and	 the	 expectations	 of	 others	 that	 she	 also	 participates	 in	 the	consumption	of	these	horrible	goods	really	annoys	her.	Her	friends	ask	her	out	
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on	a	weekend	trip,	but	she	declines:	she	just	wants	to	be	able	to	run	for	a	few	hours	in	the	morning,	and	eat	her	rationed	portions	of	safe	and	weighed	and	non-oily	foods,	without	comments	or	witnesses.	Sam’s	dorm	mate,	Frank,	starts	to	worry	about	her.	He	decides	to	cook	a	meal	and	invite	her	to	eat	it	together.	Sam	figures	she	has	done	very	well	the	past	weeks,	and	that	it’s	fine	to	have	just	this	one	meal.	But	as	she	joins	Frank	at	the	dinner	table,	she	is	filled	with	dread:	he	scoops	some	vegetable	stew	onto	her	plate,	and	Sam	feels	horrified	at	the	sight:	slices	of	bright	orange	carrot,	full	of	
sugar,	little	specks	of	olive	oil	floating	atop	the	broth,	chunks	of	carb-y	potato.	Her	stomach	drops	in	anguish.	I	cannot	eat	this.	With	her	fork,	she	singles	out	a	piece	of	broccoli	(broccoli	is	safe),	and	whilst	Frank	isn’t	watching,	she	quickly	dabs	it	with	a	napkin	so	as	to	remove	as	much	oil	as	possible.	She	munches	it	slowly,	and	anxiously.	After	a	few	minutes,	she	makes	up	an	excuse	to	leave.	One	 day,	 Sam	 seriously	 sprains	 her	 ankle	 during	 her	 morning	 run.	Though	she	is	in	severe	pain,	she	continues	running:	she	hasn’t	met	her	target	yet,	and	does	not	stop	until	she	does.	The	next	morning,	she	notices	her	ankle	is	all	swollen	and	blue.	She	realises,	deep	down,	that	running	will	be	very	painful,	and	make	things	worse.	But	the	thought	of	skipping	her	morning	run	makes	her	anxious	and	uncomfortable.	The	fact	that	she	even	considers	doing	so	fills	her	with	a	terrible	sense	of	guilt,	and	she	almost	feels	as	if	she	can	feel	her	body	swell	up	at	the	very	idea.	Two	weeks	later,	Sam’s	parents	are	coming	over	to	visit.	 In	the	mean-time,	Sam	has	become	extremely	thin.	Her	parents	are	shocked	upon	seeing	her,	and	inquire	about	her	wellbeing.	Sam	insists	that	she	is	fine,	just	preparing	for	Summer	Ball,	and	that	she	has	everything	under	control.	But	as	her	parents	take	
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her	out	for	dinner,	Sam	claims	to	have	eaten	just	before,	and	that	she	is	too	full	to	eat	(in	fact,	she	has	a	box	of	green	crudities	prepped	to	consume	later	on).	Her	parents,	however,	don’t	buy	the	story.	Her	father,	worried	but	angry,	offers	Sam	an	ultimatum:	either	she	eats	pizza	along	with	them,	or	she	is	coming	back	home	with	them	that	very	night.	This	would	mean	dropping	out	of	University,	some-thing	Sam	absolutely	does	not	want	to:	she	loves	her	course	and	is	a	very	prom-ising	and	enthusiastic	student.	She	figures	it	must	be	worth	just	eating	the	pizza,	and	double	her	amount	of	exercise	in	the	morning.	As	her	pizza	arrives,	however,	again	she	is	overcome	with	horror.	The	disgust	she	feels	for	the	greasy	food	in	front	of	her	is	visceral.	Come	on,	she	thinks,	you	know	you	are	capable	of	eating	
this.	You	know	how	to	eat!	She	tries	to	cut	off	a	piece	and	brings	it	to	her	mouth.	But	she	can’t	do	it.	Her	hands	tremble	at	the	realisation,	and	she	feels	tears	well-ing	up.	She	can’t	bring	herself	to	do	it.	Sam’s	parents	take	her	home	the	same	night,	much	against	her	will.	Dur-ing	the	following	days,	which	feature	many	fights	and	frustrations,	they	try	des-perately	to	force	Sam	to	eat	anything	other	than	her	measured	amount	of	vege-tables,	but	to	no	avail.	As	Sam	collapses	one	afternoon,	she	is	taken	to	hospital.	Only	there,	as	the	hospital	environment	brings	home	to	her	how	severely	she	has	compromised	her	health,	does	she	manage,	though	with	difficulty,	to	eat	a	small	portion	of	the	food	that	is	brought	to	her.	I	submit	that	Sam	displays	many	features	of	self-oppression	or	hyper-krasia.	Her	practical	reason	has	become	tyrannical,	making	certain	possibilities	appear	unviable	to	her.	Throughout	the	story,	Sam’s	practical	reason	plays	an	important	role	in	regulating	her	behaviour.	It	tells	her	how	to	achieve	her	valued	end	of	weight	loss:	cut	out	carbs,	cut	out	greasy	foods,	go	for	a	run	every	morning.	
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Sam	follows	these	directs	consistently.	Initially,	or	in	and	of	itself,	this	appears	to	be	her	choice:	in	light	of	the	approaching	Summer	Ball,	she	decides	to	self-impose	certain	regulations.	This	is	done	in	light	of	a	clear	goal,	which	she	values.	Given	her	goal	of	fitting	in	the	Summer	Ball	dress,	Sam	reasons	that	the	rational	thing	to	do	is	to	lose	some	weight.	As	time	progresses,	Sam	comes	to	value	the	project	of	weight	loss	itself:	for	whatever	reason,	it	is	something	she	deeply	identifies	with	and	which	she	finds	hugely	important	for	her	self-esteem.	Accordingly,	she	expands	her	set	of	self-prescribed	rules	which	allow	her	to	further	this	project.	In	 this	 respect,	 Sam’s	practical	 reason	appears	 to	 function	well.	But,	 I	submit,	we	have	good	reason	to	think	that	at	some	point,	her	practical	reason	becomes	oppressive.	Looking	at	Sam’s	story,	we	can	find	some	tell-tale	signs	of	self-oppression.	Most	notably,	Sam	cannot	bring	herself	to	break	certain	of	her	general	rules	even	when	she	decides	to.	We	saw	that,	on	some	occasions,	Sam	
decided	against	her	own	rules:	e.g.	to	please	her	dorm	mate	Frank,	or	to	prove	to	her	parents	that	she	was	doing	fine.	Her	practical	reason	here	made	judgments	in	light	of	other	values	and	ends	she	holds.	Despite	her	decision,	however,	she	could	not	bring	herself	to	eat	the	food	in	front	of	her.	Equally,	though	she	did	not	decide	to	skip	her	morning	run,	her	sprained	ankle	did	give	her	a	sense	that	per-haps	she	should:	nevertheless,	she	could	not	perceive	this	as	a	viable	option.	In	these	moments,	Sam	did	not	manage	to	translate	her	mental	resolve	to	act	a	certain	way	–	eat	the	stew,	eat	the	pizza	–	into	action.	In	those	cases,	her	practical	reason	sabotages	its	own	workings.	In	a	sense,	her	agency	resembles	instances	of	akrasia.	But	the	reason	why	she	cannot	translate	her	choice	into	ac-tion	is	not	an	overwhelming	desire	for	an	opposing	pleasure,	but	rather	the	urge	
			
			
206	
to	comply	with	an	opposing	practical	regulation.	In	those	instances,	Sam’s	prac-tical	reason	sabotages	its	own	workings.	These	moments	offer	a	strong	indication,	I	submit,	that	Sam’s	practical	reason	has	become	oppressive.	They	 suggest	 that	her	practical	 reason	 imple-ments	certain	general	rules	with	such	force	that	breaking	them	seems	unviable	for	her.	She	feels	so	pressured	to	act	towards	her	valued	end,	implementing	her	general	rules,	that	not	doing	so,	even	just	once,	does	not	seem	viable	to	her.	As	such,	I	hypothesise	that	certain	types	of	opportunity	tend	to	be	hypersalient	for	Sam:	namely	those	which	allow	her	to	pursue	her	valued	project	of	weight	loss.	Whenever	she	perceives	such	an	opportunity,	her	field	of	possible	action	freezes	over:	alternative	opportunities	come	to	lie	behind	a	perceptive	barrier.	This	is	indeed	a	perceptive	barrier,	for	Sam	knows	she	is	technically	and	physically	capable	of	breaking	her	own	rules.	Sam,	clearly,	perceives	the	possi-bility	of	eating	the	vegetable	stew	or	the	pizza:	she	decides	to	do	so,	which	im-plies	she	recognises	the	possibility,	and	recognises	it	consciously.	The	same	thing	holds	for	the	possibility	of	skipping	her	morning	run.	Yet	she	perceives	herself	to	be	incapable	of	taking	up	these	possibilities.	This	is	not	because	she	has	lost	the	physical	capacity	to	eat	greasy	or	orange	foods	or	not	go	for	a	run;	and	nei-ther	does	she	think	it	is	technically	impossible	to	eat	the	foods	in	question	or	skip	the	morning	run.	But	altogether,	because	of	how	appalling	and	horrifying	these	things	appear	to	her,	doing	so	seems	unviable.	The	idea	repulses	her.	Remember,	though,	that	hyperkrasia	is	a	condition.	This	perceptive	bar-rier	is	present	also	when	Sam	has	no	intention	or	wish	to	overcome	it.	She	tends	to	perceive	certain	types	of	opportunity	as	hypersalient	because	she	is	disposed	to	do	 so.	This	 type	of	opportunity,	 I	hypothesise,	 is	also	hypersalient	 for	Sam	
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when	she	has	no	intention	to	act	differently.	This	means	that	Sam	is	not	just	self-oppressive	in	instances	where	her	practical	reason	self-sabotages:	rather,	these	instances	bring	to	the	fore	her	self-oppressive	disposition.	Of	course,	this	dispo-sition	may	not	be	as	visible	in	other	moments.	When	her	practical	reason	does	not	self-sabotage,	it	is	much	harder	to	tell	whether	or	not	Sam	is	self-oppressive,	or	merely	committed.	Therefore,	it	is	mainly	from	those	moments	in	which	prac-tical	reason	self-sabotages	that	we	can	infer	Sam’s	condition	is	probably	a	self-oppressive	one.	But	even	in	other	moments,	we	can	detect	some	other	indicators	of	self-oppression:	for	example,	Sam	often	doesn’t	even	consider	breaking	her	rules	de-spite	having	reasons	to.	This	indicates	that	her	practical	reason	has	a	diminished	sensitivity	to	exception	–	affecting	its	second	function,	of	assessing	whether	pur-suing	a	valued	end	is	worth	it,	all	things	considered,	in	a	certain	situation.	When	her	friends	invite	her	on	the	weekend	trip,	it	seems	a	given	that	she	will	not	join:	going	would	render	it	more	difficult	to	follow	her	self-imposed	regime,	and	thus	this	route	of	action	seems	simply	unviable.	She	doesn’t	even	consider	whether	the	trip	might	be	worth	the	risk	of	breaking	her	commitment	a	little.	Of	course,	people	will	have	differing	opinions	as	to	what	makes	for	a	good	enough	reason	to	give	up	on	a	commitment.	Equally,	the	mere	fact	that	someone	doesn’t	con-sider	doing	so	does	not	imply	she	is	self-oppressive.	But,	if	it	happens	regularly,	consistent	 failure	to	take	certain	kinds	of	possibilities	 in	consideration	can	be	another	tell-tale	sign	of	self-oppression.	We	can	also	see	that	Sam’s	valued	end	takes	over	her	whole	life,	which	is	a	 common	 effect	 of	 hyperkrasia:	 because	 the	 agent	 cannot	 but	 further	 this	valued	end	whenever	she	finds	the	opportunity	to,	and	often	also	because	she	
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finds	ever	more	intricate	opportunities	to.	This	definitely	seems	to	be	the	case	for	Sam:	opportunities	to	further	her	goal	of	weight	loss	almost	continually	fea-ture	on	her	phenomenal	field.	In	almost	every	situation,	there	is	something	that	she	must	do.	 Insofar	as	she	cannot	but	do	so,	other	opportunities	will	 remain	behind	a	perceptive	barrier:	she	may	be	offered	some	sweets	by	a	 friend,	she	may	be	sat	in	a	café	where	salted	nuts	are	placed	on	the	table,	she	may	feel	tired	as	her	alarm	goes	off	in	the	early	morning,	in	time	for	her	morning	run,	and	see	the	snooze	button	on	her	phone.	Sam,	however,	will	not	perceive	these	possibil-ities	as	viable,	even	though	she	perceives	them.	This	also	holds	for	more	signifi-cant	opportunities:	for	example,	both	her	academic	life	and	her	social	life	suffer	from	her	condition.	Her	field	of	possible	action	is	thus	continually,	or	almost	con-tinually,	 frozen.	We	can	see	how,	as	a	result,	Sam’s	anorexia	has	a	very	wide-spread	effect	on	her	overall	agency.		
D.2 The	Case	of	Alex	In	the	second	case	study,	I	will	consider	an	agent	whose	behaviour	closely	re-sembles	self-oppression,	but	does	not	fit	in	the	category	of	hyperkrasia	as	I	have	conceptualised	it.	Jointly,	then	two	case	studies	should	show	how	our	model	of	hyperkrasia	can	help	differentiate	self-oppression	from	other	styles	of	agency	which	merely	look	like	it.	I	will	consider	 the	case	of	Alex	Honnold	as	presented	 in	 the	2018	Na-tional	Geographic	documentary	Free	Solo.	The	documentary	follows	Alex,	who	is	an	expert	in	so-called	“free	solo”	climbing	–	an	extremely	dangerous	variety	of	climbing	in	which	there	is	neither	assistance	of	another	party	nor	a	rope.	Alex	has	decided	he	wants	to	free	solo	El	Capitan	(commonly	referred	to	as	‘El	Cap’),	
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a	3,200-foot	rock	wall	in	Yosemite	National	Park	which	no	one	has	climbed	free	solo	before.	Given	that	Alex	would	be	climbing	without	a	rope,	the	risk	of	death	is	tremendously	high.	On	 the	surface,	Alex’s	 case	bears	 some	similarities	 to	 that	of	Sam.	His	project,	naturally,	requires	a	high	level	of	commitment.	He	needs	to	train	exten-sively,	and	learn	the	climbing	route	by	heart	–	something	which	he	does	by	taking	countless	 of	meticulous	 notes,	 writing	 out	 in	 detail	 every	 single	move	 of	 the	route.	 Alex,	 evidently,	 displays	 a	 high	 degree	 of	 self-control	 in	 implementing	these	measures	in	his	life.	Moreover,	this	self-controlled	lifestyle	is	naturally	accompanied	by	a	fair	amount	of	pressure.	Free	solo	climbing	the	El	Cap	really	is	a	big	dream	for	Alex.	This	pressure	only	increases	once	he	agrees	to	filming	the	documentary:	money,	time,	and	effort	have	gone	into	it,	so	if	he	decides	not	to	free	solo	the	El	Cap,	this	would	all	be	for	nothing.	When	discussing	the	documentary	with	his	crew,	Alex	recognises	that	he	can	give	up	anytime,	but	clearly	feels	this	would	be	a	major	disappointment.	Meanwhile,	other	areas	of	his	life	are	pushed	to	the	background.	He	ad-mits	that	rock	climbing	has	overall	 ‘been	a	negative’	for	his	dating	life,	and	he	lives	in	his	van	as	he	travels	around	to	climb	(Free	Solo,	2018).	 ‘If	 I	had	some	kind	of	obligation	to	maximise	my	lifespan,’	he	states,	‘obviously	I’d	have	to	give	up	soloing’	(Free	Solo,	2018).	But,	clearly,	he	does	not	think	he	has	such	an	obli-gation.	What	is	even	more	striking,	perhaps,	is	that	Alex	was	speaking	to	his	part-ner,	Sanni,	when	he	made	this	statement.	This,	however,	seems	to	be	in	line	with	his	overall	valuation	of	his	climbing	career:	at	 the	beginning	of	 the	documen-tary,	for	example,	he	states	that	he	‘will	always	choose	climbing	over	a	lady’	(Free	
			
			
210	
Solo,	2018).	Given	the	goal	he	set	himself,	all	these	things	are	in	a	sense	the	ra-
tional	thing	to	do.	But	may	Alex’s	practical	reason	here	operate	in	a	tyrannical	manner?	It	seems	not.	There	is	at	least	one	significant	difference	between	Sam	and	Alex.	In	contrast	to	Sam,	Alex	remains	capable	of	perceiving	giving	up	his	project	as	a	viable	option.	Throughout	the	documentary,	there	are	many	indications	that	this	is	the	case.	In	this	context,	one	interesting	fact	is	that	free	soloing	El	Cap	is	a	deeply	
scary	prospect	to	Alex.	He	describes	how,	for	many	years,	he	thought	about	doing	it	but	found	the	idea	too	terrifying:	‘I've	always	wanted	to’,	he	states,	‘but	then	I've	always	been	like,	"That's	too	scary"’	(Free	Solo,	2018).	So	it	seems,	in	fact,	that	free	soloing	El	Cap	was	previously	perceived	by	Alex	as	unviable,	because	he	was	too	scared	to.	But,	as	he	improved	as	a	climber	and	became	more	familiar-ised	with	the	climbing	route,	he	started	to	see	the	possibility	before	him.	Alex	thus	actively	influenced	his	perception	of	an	abstract	possibility,	which	he	found	very	valuable,	such	that	this	possibility	became	viable	 for	him,	and	thus	could	enter	his	field	of	possible	action.	In	other	words,	Alex	has	carefully	and	meticu-lously	trained	himself	to	render	this	possibility	viable.	What	Alex	is	doing,	there-fore,	seems	to	involve	in	fact	a	deliberate,	and	careful	expansion	of	his	field	of	possible	action:	‘I	try	to	expand	my	comfort	zone	by	practicing	the	moves	over	and	over	again.	I	work	through	the	fear,	until	it's	just	not	scary	anymore’	(Free	Solo,	2018).	Alex’s	practical	reason,	 in	this	respect,	does	not	render	perceived	possibilities	unviable	–	it	does	precisely	the	opposite.	In	itself,	however,	this	does	not	yet	establish	that	his	field	of	possible	ac-tion	is	not	at	the	same	time	frozen.	Perhaps	Alex	only	put	so	much	effort	 into	
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rendering	this	one	possibility	viable,	against	the	odds,	because	he	felt	like	he	had	to	do	 it	–	because	all	 alternative	possibilities,	which	 implied	not	doing	 it,	 just	didn’t	seem	viable	to	him.	Or	perhaps,	once	he	put	so	much	effort	 into	 it,	at	a	certain	point	not	climbing	El	Cap	became	unviable	for	him:	perhaps	changing	his	perception	of	this	one	possibility,	 in	order	to	make	it	viable,	made	him	feel	so	invested	in	it	that	he	felt	he	couldn’t	but	take	it	up	in	action.	But	this	does	not	seem	to	be	the	case.	This	is	already	apparent	in	the	way	he	speaks	about	the	project.	For	example,	at	the	beginning	of	the	documentary,	he	states	that	free	soloing	the	El	Cap	might	just	not	be	for	him:	
But	the	thing	is	I'll	never	be	content,	unless	I	at	least	put	in	the	effort.	Because,	like,	if	I	do	all	the	work	and	I'm	still	like,	"This	is	messed	up,"	then	maybe	it's	just	not	 for	me,	maybe	 it’s	 future	generation,	you	know.	Or	maybe	 just	somebody	who	has	nothing	to	live	for.	(Free	Solo,	2018)		And	when	he	mentions	 that	he	would	always	choose	climbing	over	a	 lady,	he	hastens	to	add:	‘At	least	you	know,	so	far’,	suggesting	he	remains	open	the	pos-sibility	 that	another	valued	end	may	become	more	 important	 in	his	 life	 (Free	Solo,	2018).	But	the	strongest	indication	that	Alex	is	not	self-oppressive	comes	when	he	actually	stops	his	first	ascent	of	the	El	Cap	not	long	after	he	starts.	The	crew	went	out	before	dawn,	all	the	cameras	were	set	up,	and	Alex	started	his	much-anticipated	free	solo	climb.	But	he	wasn’t	feeling	it,	and	decides	to	give	up.	He	clearly	feels	gutted,	and	feels	as	if	he	is	letting	his	crew	down.	But	despite	the	pressure	from	himself	and	others,	not	climbing	the	El	Cap	free	solo	remained	a	
viable	possibility	for	him.	Though	doing	the	free	solo	climb	was	a	very	salient	
			
			
212	
opportunity	for	him,	it	thus	was	not	hypersalient.	Alternative	opportunities	re-mained	 available.	 This,	 indeed,	much	 reassured	 his	 worried	 friend	 and	 crew	member	Jimmy	Chin:	 ‘What	made	the	big	difference	for	me	is	that	he	did	turn	around	[…].	He	didn't	feel	the	pressure	to	have	to	do	it	because	we	were	there.	And	I	really,	like	that	to	me	said	a	lot	[sic]’	(Free	Solo,	2018).	On	this	basis,	I	submit	that	Alex’s	agency	is	not	self-oppressive,	despite	his	 high	 degree	 of	 self-control	 and	 the	 pressure	 under	 which	 he	 makes	 his	choices.	Again,	the	aspects	of	his	agency	I	have	highlighted	to	support	my	case	are	not	meant	 to	be	 conclusive	proof:	 they	are	merely	 strong	 indications	 that	Alex’s	behaviour	falls	into	the	one,	rather	than	the	other,	category	of	agency.	In	sum,	although	my	account	of	hyperkrasia	does	not	spell	out	necessary	and	sufficient	conditions	for	self-oppression,	it	does	provide	a	model	which	can	differentiate	similar	cases	–	my	model	of	hyperkrasia	can	thus	help	bring	out	a	crucial	formal	difference	between	two	cases	that	share	some	important	formal	features.	Moreover,	it	can	do	so	in	a	way	that	is	neutral	as	to	the	content	of	the	action.	Hyperkrasia	specifically	involves	an	alteration	in	the	agent’s	perceptions:	only	 once	 certain	 possibilities	 no	 longer	 appear	 viable	 to	 an	 agent,	 are	 her	choices	compromised	by	her	pressured	exercise	of	self-control.	What	the	agent	in	question	is	doing	is	not	the	point	of	focus	here.		
E. SCOPE	AND	LIMITS	OF	HYPERKRASIA		Of	course,	these	two	case	studies	by	no	means	define	the	limits	of	the	category	of	hyperkrasia.	Some	open	questions	remain.	One	set	of	questions	concerns	the	relation	between	hyperkrasia	and	moral	duty.	For	an	agent	who	responds	to	a	call	of	duty	may	appear	very	akin	to	the	self-oppressive	agent.	When	we	feel	we	
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have	a	moral	obligation	to	do	something,	we	may	perceive	any	alternatives	as	plainly	unviable.	Let	us	consider	another	example.	Adam	is	a	32-year	old	tree	surgeon	who	adopted	a	vegetarian	diet	when	he	was	25.	He	stopped	eating	meat	because	he	finds	it	an	immoral	practice:	he	deeply	values	animal	rights	and	wel-fare.	His	actions	are	thus	fuelled	by	a	sense	of	moral	duty.	Adam	effortlessly	lives	his	life	without	ever	being	tempted	to	eat	any	animal	products.	In	fact,	the	very	idea	of	eating	them	has	become	strange	to	him:	the	possibility	of	eating	a	ham	sandwich	seems	as	to	him	not	just	unappealing,	but	simply	absurd	–	as	absurd,	say,	as	eating	the	novel	he	is	reading.	On	our	model,	then,	Adam’s	sense	of	moral	duty	appears	to	compromise	his	choices:	opportunities	to	eat	animal	products	no	longer	feature	on	his	field	of	possible	action,	and	this	is	the	field	within	which	choices	are	made.	Adam,	arguably,	doesn’t	even	perceive	the	possibility	 to	eat	meat,	so	he	cannot	really	choose	to	do	so.	Moreover,	this	is	the	result	of	Adam’s	own	self-regulation:	he	decided	to	refrain	from	eating	meat	because	he	judged	this	the	best	thing	to	do,	and	over	time	his	practical	reason	has	influenced	his	perception	of	opportunities	accordingly.	Does	this	mean	Adam	is	self-oppressed?	It	seems	not.	The	reason	for	this	is	that	Adam’s	agency	does	not	display	any	pressured	quality.	Though	he	does	exercise	 self-control,	 and	 regulates	 his	 actions	 in	 accord	with	 his	 values	 and	judgments,	this	self-control	is	not	exercised	with	any	sort	of	pressure,	let	alone	a	pressure	we	could	call	oppressive.	His	practical	reason	seems	hardly	tyrannical	or	authoritarian.	Adam,	in	short,	does	not	experience	the	sort	of	pressure	char-acteristic	of	self-oppression.	But	another	vegetarian	agent,	Eve,	may	very	well	be	self-oppressive.	Eve	experiences	a	high	amount	of	pressure	to	stick	to	her	diet,	
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and	perceives	certain	opportunities	as	unviable	as	a	result	of	this	pressure.	De-pending,	perhaps,	on	the	further	specifics	of	Eve’s	case,	we	may	here	indeed	have	a	case	of	self-oppression.	So	the	presence	of	pressure	can	here	serve	as	a	mean-ingful	differentia.	Of	course,	this	raises	some	questions	regarding	the	scope	of	the	category	of	hyperkrasia.	Might	there	exist	pressure-free	forms	of	self-oppression?	Could	one,	for	example,	become	so	used	to	one’s	own	self-oppression	that	the	pressure	resides,	and	a	rigid,	but	calm	way	of	acting	takes	over?	This	question,	which	is	an	important	one,	relates	back	to	Foucault’s	worries	about	modern	forms	of	domi-nation:	they	do	not	cause	any	conflict	or	resistance,	and	the	dominated	subject	may	not	even	experience	any	sort	of	pressure.	But,	 for	Foucault,	 the	obedient	subject	has	fallen	victim	to	the	most	worrisome	form	of	oppression	of	all	–	pre-cisely	because	it	causes	no	resistance.	Might	there	exist	similar	forms	of	self-op-pression?	In	this	case,	the	controlled	and	pressured	quality	of	agency	would	be	merely	a	 tell-tale	sign	of	self-oppression,	and	 its	absence	would	not	mean	the	agent	 is	 not	 self-oppressive.	 Thus,	 there	might	 exist	 forms	 of	 self-oppression	which,	though	they	do	not	meet	the	current	description	of	hyperkrasia,	we	might	still	want	to	classify	as	self-oppressive.	Further,	another	set	of	questions	remains	open.	In	the	case	of	Adam,	the	fulfilment	of	moral	duty	may	not	 involve	any	self-inflicted	pressure.	But	there	are	certainly	cases	in	which	dutiful	agency	does	involve	an	urgent	pressure,	and	seems	to	compromise	choice	in	the	sense	I	have	described.	In	the	case	of	Eve,	we	may	accept	the	conclusion	that	we	have	a	case	of	self-oppression.	But	in	other	cases,	 some	may	resist	 this	conclusion.	On	my	way	to	work	 I	pass	by	a	pond,	in	which	a	child	is	drowning.	I	immediately	decide	to	jump	in,	in	order	to	save	
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the	child:	this	is	something	I	do	whilst	feeling	an	enormous	amount	of	pressure.	Full	of	adrenaline,	I	am	fuelled	by	a	sense	that	I	must	save	the	kid.	This	pressure,	indeed,	is	of	such	a	nature	that	any	alternative	possibilities	simply	seem	unviable	to	me.	It	is	technically	possible	for	me	to	just	continue	on	my	way	to	work,	but	if	you	ask	me,	I	will	probably	tell	you	that	in	this	situation	I	did	not	really	have	a	
choice.	So,	on	this	scenario,	my	practical	reason	tells	me	what	I	ought	to	do,	with	such	force	that	I	feel	like	have	no	choice.	Doesn’t	this,	then,	amount	to	self-op-pression?	An	initial	reply	to	this	question	could	be	to	point	out	that	hyperkrasia	is	a	disposition,	and	not	something	which	arises	on	occasion.	The	agent	must	have	a	continued	disposition	to	perceive	certain	types	of	opportunity	as	hypersalient.	But	we	could	say,	in	response,	that	I	have	such	a	disposition:	whenever	I	perceive	an	opportunity	to	save	a	drowning	child,	it	will	be	hypersalient	to	me	–	or,	more	generally,	whenever	 I	perceive	an	opportunity	 to	save	someone’s	 life.	 Indeed,	most	agents	with	a	functioning	moral	compass	will	be	so	dispositioned.	Yet	I	admit	that	there	seems	to	be	a	distinction	between	moral	agents	in	general	and	self-oppressive	ones.	But	where	precisely	lays	the	dividing	line?	To	this	question,	I	have	no	decisive	answer	at	this	point.	My	inclination	is	that	there	may	be	a	difference	in	either	the	kind	or	degree	of	pressure	that	features	in	these	cases.	One	possibility,	for	example,	is	that	the	difference	lies	in	how	easily	a	sense	of	moral	duty	gets	triggered.	Most	agents	will	feel	a	duty	to	save	the	drowning	child	if	they	pass	by	it,	but	they	will	feel	no	ongoing	sense	of	duty	to	save	as	many	lives	as	possible.	If	an	agent	would	feel	such	a	pressure	in	many	or	most	situa-tions,	her	style	of	agency	may	move	closer	to	the	category	of	hyperkrasia.	If	an	agent,	guilt-ridden,	feels	compelled	to	spend	every	single	penny	on	charities	and	
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NGO’s	of	all	sorts,	or	refuses	to	visit	A&E	when	severely	injured	just	in	case	it	would	prevent	other	people	from	being	saved,	we	may	have	reason	to	think	her	disposition	is	not	just	a	moral	one,	but	also	a	self-oppressive	one.	Note,	in	fact,	that	this	kind	of	moral	self-oppression	is	quite	reminiscent	of	the	case	of	Beth,	one	of	our	core	examples	of	self-oppression.	Alternatively,	one	might	want	to	argue	that	my	commitment	to	content-neutrality	has,	at	this	point,	outlived	its	usefulness.	One	might	want	to	argue	that,	if	we	are	to	maintain	a	distinction	at	all	between	moral	duty	in	general	and	self-oppressive	moral	duty,	we	can	only	revert	to	the	content	of	the	agent’s	behaviour	or	values.	These	possibilities	cannot	be	further	discussed	within	this	thesis.	A	fair	amount	of	questions	thus	remains	unanswered.	As	is	the	case	for	the	classification	of	animals,	the	classification	of	forms	of	agency	is	no	exact	sci-ence,	and	perhaps	never	a	finished	business.	Perhaps	further	research	will	reveal	that	we	should	divide	the	category	of	hyperkrasia	into	further	subspecies,	and	adjust	the	differentiae	of	the	species	as	a	general	category	(much	like	taxono-mists	had	rethink	what	it	means	to	be	a	mammal	upon	discovering	the	platypus).	Though	this	is	not	to	suggest	that	the	exercise	of	classification	is	futile:	to	con-ceptualise	forms	of	agency	is	nothing	less	than	to	offer	a	framework	for	under-standing,	and	coming	to	terms	with,	the	fabric	of	our	everyday	lives.			
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Conclusion	
This	thesis	started	from	the	intuition	that	self-oppression	is	a	real	and	distinct	form	of	agency.	As	initial	support	for	this	intuition,	I	mentioned	three	cases	as	possible	examples.	Self-oppression,	however,	is	a	paradoxical	form	of	agency:	an	agent	 is	both	 the	oppressor	and	 the	oppressed,	and	so	compromises	her	own	choices.	How	is	such	a	form	of	agency	possible?	The	main	objective	of	the	thesis	was	 to	offer	a	conceptualisation	of	self-oppression,	so	as	 to	establish	 that	 it	 is	indeed	a	possible	form	of	agency,	which	warrants	its	own	category.	Accordingly,	I	devised	the	category	of	hyperkrasia.	I	have	characterised	this	category	as	in-volving,	in	its	core	form,	an	exercise	of	practical	reason	which	is	oppressive.	This	means	that	it	exerts	such	a	pressure	on	the	agent	to	pursue	a	certain	valued	end	(or	set	of	ends)	that	not	doing	so,	in	most	circumstances,	seems	unviable	to	her.	As	such,	she	cannot	but	act	 in	 the	way	she	does,	because	she	cannot	perceive	alternative	possibilities	as	viable.	Her	oppressive	practical	reason	thus	results	in	a	perceptive	disposition	which	compromises	her	choices.	This	account	of	hyperkrasia	resolves	the	paradox	of	self-oppression:	it	allows	us	to	explain	which	part	of	the	agent	is	oppressive	(namely	practical	rea-son),	and	how	an	agent	can	compromise	her	own	choices	(the	influence	of	her	practical	reason	on	her	perceptions	can	make	it	so).	It	thus	establishes	that	self-oppression	is	a	real	possibility.	Further,	it	also	establishes	that	self-oppression	as	a	distinct	form	of	agency:	for	it	manages	to	explain	the	possible	examples	of	self-oppression,	mentioned	in	the	introduction,	in	a	way	that	other	categories	cannot,	thus	spelling	out	how	these	examples	are	significantly	different	from	these	other	
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categories.		In	addition,	I	have	demonstrated	that	this	model	of	hyperkrasia,	though	by	no	means	spelling	out	any	necessary	or	sufficient	conditions,	can	be	used	as	a	tool	to	detect	self-oppression,	and	distinguish	it	from	forms	of	agency	which	are	formally	quite	similar.	To	this	end,	I	have	spelled	out	some	tell-tale	signs	of	hy-perkrasia.	 These	 are	 not	 necessary	 conditions,	 but	 strong	 indications	 that	 an	agent	is	self-oppressive.	Most	notably,	hyperkrasia	can	lead	practical	reason	to	sabotage	its	own	workings:	an	agent	may	want	or	decide	to	act	against	a	certain	principle,	yet	 find	herself	unable	 to.	Another	common	effect	of	hyperkrasia	 is	that	the	end	(or	set	of	ends)	on	which	the	agent	is	fixated	takes	over	her	life:	both	because,	whenever	she	sees	an	opportunity	to	further	this	end,	she	usually	can-not	but	take	it	up	and	so	disregard	her	other	valued	ends;	and	because	the	agent	tends	to	find	ever	more	opportunities	to	do	so.	This	project	has	aimed	to	contribute	to	the	philosophy	of	action	by	spec-ifying	the	existence	of	a	specific	form	of	agency,	which	closely	resembles	some	other	forms,	yet	which	also	seems	significantly	different.	In	doing	so,	I	have	also	offered	an	explanation	of	how	choice	can	arguably	be	compromised	through	the	exercise	of	one’s	own	agency.	But	beyond	this	merely	academic	aim,	this	thesis	also	hopes	to	contribute	to	our	general	understanding	of	human	agency	in	all	its	odd	and	complex	configurations.	Hopefully,	 the	category	of	hyperkrasia	helps	
make	 sense	 of	 certain	 forms	 of	 agency	which	 are	 otherwise	 quite	 difficult	 to	grasp.	This	further	understanding	may	be	of	use	not	just	within	philosophy,	but	also	at	the	personal	level	and	even	in	medical	or	psychiatric	contexts.	If	the	phe-nomenon	is	indeed	as	common	as	it	seems,	it	will	figure	both	in	our	daily	lives	and	among	 those	whose	agency	has	been	affected	by	certain	psychological	or	
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psychiatric	conditions.	Though	hyperkrasia	is	definitely	not	designed	to	be	a	di-agnostic	tool	–	and	though,	in	itself,	it	is	not	a	psychiatric	condition	–	it	could	be	a	useful	category	to	comprehend	the	structures	of	self-oppressive	agency	which	may	often	accompany	certain	conditions.	As	such,	it	can	provide	a	crucial	back-ground	understanding	when	dealing	with	such	agents.	Furthermore,	 the	cate-gory	of	hyperkrasia	may	be	of	use	in	a	more	political	context.	As	mentioned	ear-lier	in	the	thesis,	the	psychological	structures	of	self-oppression	as	I	lay	them	out	in	this	thesis	might	be	useful,	in	further	work,	to	consider	self-oppression	as	a	micro-mechanism	of	social	oppression.	My	 project	 of	 differentiating	 self-oppression	 is,	 of	 course,	 not	 hereby	completed.	My	characterisation	is	by	no	means,	and	not	intended	as,	a	conclusive	definition	of	self-oppression:	some	open	questions	remain	regarding	the	scope	and	limits	of	the	category.	May	there	exist	varieties	of	self-oppression,	for	exam-ple,	which	do	not	feature	any	pressure?	Or	might	there	be	forms	of	agency	which	match	my	description	of	self-oppression,	yet	differ	in	a	yet	unspecified	sense?	These	are	open	questions,	which	can	be	taken	up	in	further	research.				
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